Long-term relationships: static gains and dynamic inefficiencies by Hémous, David & Olsen, Morten
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Long-term relationships: static gains and dynamic inefficiencies
Hémous, David; Olsen, Morten
Abstract: In the 1980s the Japanese “keiretsu” system of interconnected business groups was praised
as a model to emulate, but since then Japan has often been criticized for being less innovative than
the United States. In this paper we connect the two views and argue that tight business relationships
can create dynamic inefficiencies and reduce broad innovations. In particular, we consider the repeated
interaction between final good producers and intermediate input suppliers, where the provision of the
intermediate input is noncontractible. We build a cooperative equilibrium where producers can switch
suppliers and start cooperation immediately with new suppliers. We first consider broad innovations:
every period, one supplier has the opportunity to create a higher quality input that can be used by all
producers. Since relationships are harder to break in the cooperative equilibrium the market size for
potential innovators is smaller and the rate of innovation might be lower than in the noncooperative
equilibrium. We contrast this with a setting with relationship-specific innovations that we show are
encouraged by the establishment of relational contracts. We illustrate the predictions of the model using
the recent business history of the United States and Japan and further use patent data to show that U.S.
patents are more general than Japanese and even more so in sectors using more differentiated inputs. (
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx019
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-145639
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Hémous, David; Olsen, Morten (2018). Long-term relationships: static gains and dynamic inefficiencies.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(2):383-435.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx019
Long-term Relationships: Static Gains and Dynamic
Inefficiencies∗
David He´mous† Morten Olsen‡
October 2016
Abstract
In the 1980s the Japanese ‘keiretsu’ system of interconnected business groups was praised as
a model to emulate, but since then Japan has often been criticized for being less innovative
than the United States. In this paper we connect the two views and argue that tight business
relationships can create dynamic inefficiencies and reduce broad innovations. In particular, we
consider the repeated interaction between final good producers and intermediate input suppli-
ers, where the provision of the intermediate input is non-contractible. We build a cooperative
equilibrium where producers can switch suppliers and start cooperation immediately with new
suppliers. We first consider broad innovations: every period, one supplier has the opportu-
nity to create a higher quality input that can be used by all producers. Since relationships
are harder to break in the cooperative equilibrium the market size for potential innovators is
smaller and the rate of innovation might be lower than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. We
contrast this with a setting with relationship-specific innovations which we show are encour-
aged by the establishment of relational contracts. We illustrate the predictions of the model
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1 Introduction
An extensive literature exists on how relational contracts (that is implicit agreements
relying on mutual trust) can overcome contractual incompleteness, encourage innova-
tion and allow for risk sharing. A canonical example is the Japanese ‘keiretsu’ system of
interconnected business groups which, particularly in the 1980s, was widely seen as an
economic system to be emulated by the rest of the world. Since then the pendulum has
swung the other way and though Japan continues to have some of the most impressive
firms in the world it is often criticized for not being as innovative as the United States
(Dujarric and Hagiu, 2009). In this paper, we show that although the establishment of
relational contracts can improve efficiency and encourage innovation within a relation-
ship, the introduced rigidity can be detrimental to economic growth as it discourages
broader innovation. In particular, firms engaged in relational contracting may be reluc-
tant to switch to a new potential partner with a better technology, thus reducing the
market size for a potential innovator and reducing the incentive to innovate. Based on
this we compare the innovation pattern in the United States and Japan: while both
countries are innovative, the U.S. innovations tend to be broader.
Figure 1.A provides an illustration of this using patents with at least one citation
filed with the European Patent Office (EPO). It shows that whereas the share of patents
that originate in the United States and Japan are about the same at around 13-14 per
cent, when it comes to patents that are among the five per cent most cited, the U.S.
share is 18 per cent compared with 13 for Japan. Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe
(1997) argue that the generality of a patent is better measured by the number of patent
classes that cite the patent.1 Figure 1.B demonstrates that generality only increases the
difference between Japan and the United States and for the most general patents the
share of the United States is almost three times as high as that of Japan. In section
5, we perform a more systematic analysis and show that the generality of US patents
compared with Japan is more pronounced for products that are more differentiated (in
the sense of Rauch, 1999). Our analysis aligns with Dujarric and Hagiu (2009) who
study the case of Japan and argue that although Japan’s keiretsu system has ensured
a highly productive manufacturing sector, it has not been conducive to radically new
innovations. As a consequence, Japan has failed to establish itself as a world leader in a
1They define generality of patent i is measured as 1 − Σnij=1s2i.j , where si,j is the share of citations
that patents i has received from patent class j and ni is the total number of patent classes citations
received by patent i. We regress this measure on dummies for the technological field and the year a
patent was filed and use the residual in the figure. Nothing depends on these particular corrections.
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Figure 1: Relative Importance of Japanese and US Patents
number of new industries such as software and smartphones.
This paper provides a potential explanation for the differences in innovation patterns
between the United States and Japan. More generally, it shows that relational contracts
can be a poor substitute for good institutions because they transform contractibility
issues from a static problem of inefficient allocation of resources into a dynamic problem
of inefficient development of technologies. The paper focuses on growth and innova-
tion, yet, relational contracts, requiring long-term relationships, can come at odds with
economic efficiency, whenever the economy would benefit from flexible relationships.
We first consider broad innovations that are not specific to a relationship: We have in
mind an industry with the following characteristics: (i) production requires the partici-
pation of producers and suppliers, where the suppliers provide complex inputs designed
specifically for the final good producer, (ii) suppliers are competing with each other, and
(iii) innovations allow them to “escape competition” and to increase their market share
at the expense of their competitors. In a non-repeated framework, non-contractibility of
the intermediate input typically creates an ex post hold-up situation leading to underin-
vestment by the supplier as in Grossman and Hart (1986). In a repeated framework, we
rely on the existence of good and bad matches between producers and suppliers to build
a “cooperative” equilibrium. Good matches are characterized by a higher productivity
level. If a match turns out to be good, the value of the relationship in the following
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period is higher than the expected value of a new relationship. The supplier can capture
the rents associated with this difference in values if cooperation with the producer con-
tinues, which induces her to invest more than the short-run interest would dictate. We
contrast this case with two other cases: an economy with the same lack of contractibility,
but where there is no cooperation in equilibrium (we refer to it as the “Nash case”) and
a setting in which inputs are fully contractible. The Nash and cooperative equilibria can
be seen as two extremes on a spectrum, and we think of Japan as being closer to the
cooperative case than the United States.
Every period, we let one supplier (the innovator) have the possibility to develop a new
technology, which is imitated by her competitors after one period. Producers already
engaged in a long-term relationship face a trade-off: switching to the innovator allows
them to have access to a more productive technology, but at the risk of entering into
a bad match. Entering into a bad match yields a lower productivity level no matter
whether the input is contractible or not; but, when the input is noncontractible, bad
matches are also characterized by more severe under-investment than good matches,
since cooperation only occurs in the latter. Hence, bad matches become worse relative
to good matches. This worse bad match effect is the main force behind our result
that cooperation in a weak contractible setting magnifies rigidities in relationships.2
Consequently, potential innovators have less of an incentive to develop technologies that
require existing relationships to break up and fewer general innovations will be developed
in countries where strong relational contracts are more widespread.3
We contrast this with a setting where innovation is done within an already established
relationship. We show that relational contracts encourage this type of innovation both
by improving the efficiency of production by overcoming the standard hold-up problem
and because the introduction of relationship-specific innovation itself makes the parties
more dependent on one another which further encourages cooperation.
Our model suggests that the Japanese economy did not loose steam in spite of the
strong relational contracts, but perhaps because these strong relationships held back
broader innovations. An extensive literature exists praising a superior Japanese economic
2Long-term relationships also present a barrier to entry in Aghion and Bolton (1987), who show
that when an incumbent faces entry by potential competitors with superior technology, she will sign
long-term contract that reduces the risk of entry. In our set-up, however, the relationship is of a different
nature as the contract is implicit and we rule out explicit contracts that last more than a single period.
3The introduction of dynamic inefficiencies is not trivial and depends on the source of switching
costs. In particular, in a model of exogenous fixed cost of switching, the cost of breaking up an existing
relationship would be independent of the level of cooperation and relationships would not by themselves
imply rigidity.
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model. Dore (1983) discusses the Japanese economy as a whole and argues that relational
contracts within the keiretsus overcome opportune behavior and allow for risk sharing.
A prime example is the auto-industry (Helper,1991, and Helper and Henderson, 2014).
In the heyday of the Japanese economy, there was little focus on the disadvantages of
the Japanese economic system but the sluggish growth of Japan since the 1990s changed
the tone of the literature. One such example is Dujarric and Hagiu (2009) who argue
that “...[H]ierarchial industry organization can ‘lock out’ certain types of innovation
indefinitely by perpetuating existing business practices”. They argue that in the software
industry in Japan, individual companies were part of keiretsus and developed advanced
technological solutions for specific hardware producers. By contrast, in the United States
a common platform developed which allowed for a competitive environment in which
individual software developers had strong incentives to innovate to gain market share.
Today the global software industry is dominated by American companies. We argue
below that the history of the cellphone industry in Japan is similar. Collinson and
Wilson (2006) describe Japanese chemical and steel production along the same lines.
Whether a country undertakes specific or broad innovations is important for welfare:
With more actors building on an innovation, broader innovations tend to have dispropor-
tionately higher social returns (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).4 This is illustrated
by the development of a broad software platforms that allowed for a subsequent host
of products developed by third parties. Moreover, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson
(1993) and Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) show that knowledge spillovers as measured
by patent citations are initially very localized, even for broader innovations.5
Our paper relates to an important literature on how the existence of relational con-
tracts affect economic outcomes. Macaulay (1963) first showed that interactions between
firms in most markets are repeated and that firms are engaged in relational contracts.
More recently, the importance of relational contracts in developing countries has been
highlighted by Banerjee and Duflo (2000) who show that in the Indian software industry,
4Bessen (2008) estimates that more general patents have more private value (controlling for the
number of citations). The broadest of innovations are called “General Purpose Technology” (Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg, 1995). An extensive literature exists on the importance of general purpose technology
for both the level and the pattern of economic growth (see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005 and Helpman,
1998). Hall and Trajtenberg (2004) use generality as a measure to identify GPTs in patent data.
5A parallel can be made between our paper and Akcigit and Kerr (2016). They draw a distinction
between external innovations to create new products (similar to general innovations in our framework)
and internal innovations to improve a current product (similar to relationship-specific innovations here).
They find that external innovations are more cited (indicating that they are more valuable). They
calibrate an endogenous growth model and find that in the US, external innovation are responsible for
80% of economic growth.
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reputation of firms matter for the kind of contracts they are offered. Macchiavello and
Morjaria (2015) study relational contracts in the Kenyan rose export market and find
that the value of a relationship increases with its age; while Macchiavello and Morjaria
(2014) find that competition weakens relational contracts in Rwanda’s coffee sector.6
To build our baseline model, we use the insights of Kranton (1996) and Ghosh and
Ray (1996). They show that when a producer can switch suppliers at will, a cooperative
equilibrium can only arise if there is a cost in switching partners (from the choice of
equilibrium in Kranton, 1996, and from impatient players in Ghosh and Ray, 1996).
Two papers are close to our work: Board (2011) considers a simple hold-up problem
where a principal invests in a supplier for the provision of an input. There are several
suppliers and investment costs are stochastic. To prevent hold-up, a principal and a
set of suppliers enter a relational contract where the principal is biased towards the
suppliers with whom he has already worked. This implies that an outsider with a better
technology is not systematically chosen, in line with our results.7 Nevertheless, our paper
goes further in several dimensions. First, we analyze how rigidities in turn affect the
incentives to innovate. Second, in our set-up, cooperation can be welfare reducing, which
it never is in his paper. Third, we also emphasize situations where the establishment of
long-term relationships does not create rigidities.
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) offer an empirical counterpart. They use an
Eastern European survey of firms and show that in ongoing relationships, the belief in
the efficiency of the court had very little impact on the level of trade credit, a proxy for
the level of trust between firms. This suggests that firms engage in relational contracts.
However, it matters a lot at the beginning of a relationship and for firms’ incentives to
try out new suppliers. Our model shares the same features, and may be understood as
a rationalization of their results.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the impact of institutions on macroeco-
nomic outcomes, both theoretical (Acemoglu, Antra`s and Helpman, 2007) and empirical
(Boehm, 2013, Cowan and Neut, 2007 and Nunn, 2007). Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti
(2003) show that institutions that favor the establishment of long-term relationships be-
tween firms and managers are appropriate far from the frontier but become a burden
close to it. Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2014) present a similar trade-off. These papers,
6Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) and Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian and Qian (2006, 2008) show in
related papers that in India and China long-term relationships provide a way of financing firms.
7Similarly, Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009) find that a principal may want to limit the pool of agents
that he chooses from to induce cooperation.
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however do not allow for relational contracts. In contrast to our paper, Francois and
Roberts (2003) study the impact of growth on contractual arrangements.
Finally, we can draw a parallel between our model and the Industrial Organization
literature on buyer power and supplier innovation. For instance, Inderst and Shaffer
(2007) find that following a merger, a retailer can increase its profits by reducing the
number of its suppliers, which in return may lead suppliers to reduce the diversification
of their products.8 In our model, relational contracts push a buyer (the producer) to
stay with the same supplier (and therefore to reduce the number of suppliers he works
with) which reduces suppliers’ innovation.
We start out by introducing the basic model in section 2, where we describe the
cooperative equilibrium that we study and show that cooperation leads to rigid rela-
tionships. Section 3 studies the effect of cooperation on the rate of innovation. Section
4 demonstrates how cooperation encourages relationship-specific innovations. Section 5
discusses our results in light of a comparison between the United States and Japan and
tests some of our results using patent data. Section 6 presents two extensions: a combi-
nation of both models and an extension of the baseline model where imitation need not
occur after one period. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of the main results are available
in Appendix A and the remaining proofs in the Online Appendix (Appendix B).
2 Cooperation and rigidity of relationships
In this section we show that relational contracts may lead to rigid relationships. We
develop a general equilibrium model of repeated interaction between final good producers
(he) and intermediate input suppliers (she), where some matches are exogenously more
productive than others. We define a cooperative equilibrium in which the prospect of
continuing the relationship in the following period provides suppliers in a good match
with an incentive to invest more than they would do in the one-shot interaction. In this
section, innovation occurs exogenously and grants one supplier a better technology. We
show that a producer in a good relationship will be less willing to switch to the innovator
when cooperation occurs relative to an equilibrium in which there is no cooperation
(Nash case) or a setting with contractible inputs (contractible case).
8On the other hand, both Inderst and Wey (2011) and Fauli-Oller, Sandonis and Santamaria (2011)
find that buyer power incentivizes upstream investment.
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2.1 Preferences and production
A representative agent consumes a set of differentiated goods (denoted ci) of measure 1,
and a homogeneous outside good (denoted Co) with a utility function given by:
U =
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + ρ)t
(
Co,t +
σ
σ − 1
∫ 1
0
c
σ−1
σ
jt dj
)
, (1)
where ρ is the discount rate. We drop the subscript t when this does not lead to confusion.
The outside good is produced at constant returns to scale one for one with labor
and we normalize its price and wages to 1 (we consider parameter values such that the
outside good always remains active).9 All the action in the model takes place in the
production of differentiated goods. The demand for a variety j, cj, and the quantity of
variety j produced, qj, can be written as a function solely of its own price:
10
qj = cj = p
−σ
j . (2)
There is a mass 1 of final good producers and each variety is associated with one
producer who has the monopoly right over that variety. Final good producers die with
probability δD every period and are replaced with new ones. Moreover, in every period,
each final good producer must hire a single intermediate input supplier. There is a mass
1 of infinitely-lived intermediate input suppliers.11 Each supplier can supply any number
of final good producers without decreasing returns to scale.
More specifically, if the monopolist j hires the supplier k, the production technology
is linear in the quantity of high quality inputs provided by the supplier:
qj = (θjkAk)
1
σ−1 X, (3)
where θjk is a match specific and verifiable permanent level of productivity, Ak is the
productivity of the intermediate input supplier k (with any producer) and X is the
9Because of technological progress, the differentiated sector will eventually become so productive,
that the consumption of the homogeneous good is driven to 0. Hence, technically, we present an approx-
imation which is only valid for sufficiently low productivity of the differentiated sector. Alternatively, if
the productivity of the homogeneous good also grows at the rate of the technological frontier (through
a knowledge externality), then our solution is exact. Nothing of substance depends on this.
10The functional form of the utility function allows us to avoid general equilibrium effects through
wages (due to the homogeneous good) or the price index of the differentiated goods (as utility is
separable). These features would complicate the analysis without changing any of our central results.
11We could equally have assumed that the intermediate good suppliers die with probability δD.
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quantity of intermediate inputs of high quality provided by the supplier (we will refer
to θjkAk as productivity, although, strictly speaking productivity is given by (θjkAk)
1
σ−1
). Producing one high quality intermediate input requires one unit of the homogeneous
good, but the supplier can also produce an intermediate input with no value in produc-
tion at 0 cost. The match-specific level of productivity θjk can take two values: θjk = 1
in good matches or θjk = θ < 1 in bad matches. The quality of a match is revealed to
both the supplier and the producer when they are matched (but before the supplier has
incurred any investment) and is permanent.12 A producer/supplier pair is a bad match
with probability b. Once a supplier has been chosen, a period has to pass before the
producer can form new relationships.
Throughout the paper we normalize the amount of high quality inputs provided by
the supplier by θjkAk, and denote it x (such that x ≡ X/ (θjkAk)). x also corresponds to
the normalized investment level, as low quality inputs are produced costlessly. We can
then express revenues as θjkAkR (x), where R (x) ≡ xσ−1σ , and joint profits as θjkAkΠ (x)
where Π (x) ≡ xσ−1σ − x. We think of a period as corresponding to several years. Hence,
the quantity of intermediate inputs X captures not only an intermediate input per se,
but different relationship-specific investments in physical or human capital.
2.2 Contractual incompleteness
We model contractual incompleteness as a classic hold-up problem (a simpler version
of Grossman and Hart, 1986). More specifically, an input is specific to a particular
producer and is useless to any other agent in the economy. Once a producer has chosen
to work with a particular supplier, he cannot find another supplier for this period and
the two are engaged in a bilateral monopoly. We briefly consider the one shot interaction
in order to show the inefficiencies that repeated interactions can overcome.
If the input is contractible, the court can verify whether the input provided is of
high or low quality. The producer and the supplier sign a contract where the normalized
quantity of high quality inputs is at the first best level (m) given by:
m ≡ arg max
x
R (x)− x = ((σ − 1) /σ)σ .
If the input is noncontractible, the court cannot verify the quality of the input.
12As explained in section 3.4, this is not a crucial assumption: the logic of our results would hold if
the type of a match is revealed after investment has occurred.
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We further make the classic assumption that revenues and expenditures of the parties
are non-verifiable and cannot be part of a contract. There is a standard double hold-up
problem: the producer can claim that the inputs are of low quality and refuse to pay and
a supplier can costlessly deliver low quality inputs: any contract specifying the amount
of inputs of high quality to be provided is worthless. Revenues are shared through ex-
post Nash Bargaining, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining power of the supplier. Since
she bears the full cost of the investment but is only paid a share β of the revenues she
provides the amount of high quality input that maximizes her ex-post profits, the “Nash”
normalized level of investment, n, given by:
n ≡ arg max
x
βR (x)− x = βσm,
where there is naturally underinvestment: n < m.
Before the producer and the supplier start working together, an ex-ante cash transfer
can be exchanged. If all suppliers are identical ex-ante (Ak = 1 for all k) Bertrand
competition ensures that they make zero profits. Hence, the ex-ante transfer from the
supplier to the producer is equal to t = (1− b+ bθ) (βR (m)−m) in the contractible
case, and to t = (1− b+ bθ) (βR (n)− n) in the noncontractible one.
2.3 Innovation
We focus on “Schumpeterian” innovations where firms can capture a larger market share
by improving the quality of their products (see Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt, 2015, for
the relevance of Schumpeterian growth theory). We think of these innovations as repre-
senting broad innovations that can be adopted by several firms or sectors and study the
case of relationship-specific innovations in section 4.
For the moment, we abstract from the innovation decision and assume that an in-
novation happens with probability δI ∈ (0, 1)—innovation is endogenized in section 3.
When innovation occurs one of the suppliers gets access to a technology γ > 1 times more
productive than the previous frontier technology, but, after a single period all suppliers
have access to the new technology. This matches our view of each period corresponding
to several years but can alternatively be viewed as reflecting relatively poor IPR protec-
tion. Section 6.2 presents a case where innovation diffuses. We denote by A the current
frontier technology, so that, in periods without innovation all suppliers use technology
A, and, in periods with innovation only the innovator uses the frontier technology while
9
the other suppliers use γ−1A.
2.4 Timeline
The overall timeline within each period is as follows:
1.
Final good produ-
cers die with pro-
bability δD and
a mass δD of new 
final good pro-
ducers are born. 
2.
Innovation occurs 
with probability δI . 
If innovation occurs 
one supplier has 
access to a technology 
γ>1 times more 
productive. 
3.
Each supplier makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer of an ex-ante 
transfer t to each producer. 
In the contractible case, she also 
commits to an amount of high 
quality input conditioned on the 
quality of the match.
4.
Each producer 
chooses his sup-
plier and the 
transfer t from 
the supplier to 
the producer is 
paid. 
5.
The type of the 
match is revealed 
if the two parties 
are interacting for 
the first time (it is 
already known 
otherwise). 
6.
The supplier decides 
on how much high
quality input to pro-
vide in the noncon-
tractible case. 
7.
Revenues are sha-
red between the 
producer and the
supplier through 
ex post bargaining 
where the supplier 
has a weight of β. 
Every stage game has three moves: in phase 3 suppliers make offers of ex-ante trans-
fers, in phase 4 producers choose suppliers, and in phase 6 suppliers undertake the
investment.13 Since the transfer is in cash, it is verifiable and contractible.
2.5 Contractible, Nash and cooperative cases
Having described the model assumptions, we now characterize the two equilibria that we
study when the input provision is noncontractible: the Nash case where the supplier’s
normalized investment level is fixed at the one-shot interaction level n and the cooperative
case where in some matches the normalized investment level is above the Nash level n
(that is the supplier “cooperates” with the producer). We contrast both equilibria with
an alternative set-up: the contractible case where the input is fully contractible and the
first best level of investment can be achieved even in a one-shot interaction.
Contractible and Nash cases. In both cases, a nascent producer switches suppliers
until he finds a good match and stays with her in periods without innovation. The good
match supplier offers an ex-ante transfer that allows her to capture the entire surplus
of the ongoing relationship over any other relationship. In periods with innovation the
producer optimally decides whether he should switch to the innovator (we study this in
section 2.7). If the innovator turns out to be a bad match, the producer resumes working
with his previous good match supplier in the following period. The only difference
13The assumption of suppliers making take it or leave it offers simplifies matters, but is not necessary.
We could extend the model to include ex ante Nash bargaining over the surplus without affecting the
incentive constraints (a similar result is demonstrated in MacLeod and Malcomson ,1989).
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between the two cases is the investment level: it is given by the first-best level m in the
contractible case and the Nash level n in the Nash case.14
Strategies of the cooperative equilibrium. There is a continuum of SPNEs
featuring some level of cooperation. We consider strategies where the game is played
independently for each producer. Our goal is to model a competitive industry where
suppliers innovate in order to capture new customers. To capture this, we focus on a
class of equilibria where (under some constraints) cooperation within new relationships
is as high as possible from the beginning of the relationship— and as explained below
our equilibrium satisfies a “bilateral rationality constraint”. In other words, we consider
a situation where relationships are relatively flexible because it is “easy” for a supplier
to attract a producer, as she can offer him a high level of cooperation from the start.
We define a “cooperating good match supplier” as a good match supplier with whom
no deviation triggering a punishment has occurred. Similarly a “non-cooperating good
match supplier” is a good match supplier with whom a deviation (by either party)
triggering a punishment has occurred. An “outdated” supplier is a supplier who does
not have access to the frontier technology. We can now state the following proposition
which characterizes the strategies played in our cooperative equilibrium (Appendix A.1
provides a formal proof and the following subsections explain the equilibrium intuitively):
Proposition 1. The following strategies form a SPNE and apply for each producer
independently:
- S1) A cooperating good match supplier invests x∗ if she has access to the frontier
technology and y∗otherwise. A bad match and a non-cooperating good match invest n.
- S2) The values x∗, y∗ ∈ (n,m] are chosen so as to maximize the joint value of a
relationship under the incentive compatibility constraint faced by a good match supplier.
- S3) The producer switches supplier until he finds a good match (in periods with
innovation, he tries out the innovator), who then becomes a cooperating good match.
Once the producer knows a cooperating good match, he sticks with her in periods with-
out innovation. In periods with innovation, he optimally chooses between the outdated
cooperating good match and the innovator depending on which relationship offers him
the highest value. If the innovator turns out to be a good match, she becomes the new
cooperating supplier.
14The contractible environment is still a world of limited contractibility as we do not allow for contracts
across periods or between more than two parties. Hence, the equilibrium in the contractible case need
not achieve the overall first best.
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- S4) A cooperating good match supplier becomes non-cooperating when: i) she did not
invest x∗ or y∗ when she should have, or ii) in a period without innovation, the producer
picked a different supplier, or iii) in a period with innovation, the producer chose another
outdated supplier, or iv) in a period with innovation, the producer chose the innovator
and the innovator turned out to be a good match. A cooperating good match supplier
does not become non-cooperating if the producer chose the innovator and the innovator
turned out to be a bad match. All good match suppliers are initially cooperating.
- S5) If a deviation has occurred, the producer optimally chooses between starting a
new relationship or sticking with the non-cooperating good match depending on which
relationship offers the highest total discounted profits.
- S6) Ex-ante transfers are determined by Bertrand competition such that the producer
is indifferent between his first best and second best option, and the second best supplier
is indifferent between being chosen and not.
2.6 Characterizing the cooperative equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by two (normalized) investment levels: x∗ in frontier
good matches and y∗ in outdated good matches. This subsection and the next explain
how cooperation can be sustained, how x∗ and y∗ are determined, and the role played
by the assumptions on the strategies in Proposition 1 S1-S6. Appendix A.2 gives a set
of conditions on strategies which pin down the same SPNE.15
Value functions. To characterize the investment levels x∗, y∗, we must first derive
the value functions. We normalize the value functions by the level of the frontier tech-
nology. In a period without innovation, we use the notation V zi to denote the beginning
of the period normalized value of a producer (z = p), a supplier (z = s) or the total
value (z = T ) in a new relationship (i = 0) or a relationship with a cooperating good
match supplier (i = 1). By “supplier value” here we only refer to the value that the
supplier captures from working with that specific producer (since the game is played in-
dependently, we do not have to keep track of the value the supplier captures with other
producers). In a period with innovation we similarly use W zi to denote the value with
an outdated supplier (i = 1 for a cooperating good match and i = 0 for a new supplier).
15These are i) a symmetry and information condition, which ensures that equilibrium play does not
depend on irrelevant information; ii) a forgiveness condition, which as discussed below, ensures that the
supplier resumes working with a producer who switched to the innovator if the innovator turns out to
be a bad match; iii) a bilateral rationality condition and iv) a no-cooperation in bad matches condition.
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Consider the relationship between a producer and a cooperating good match supplier
with the frontier technology. Their (normalized) joint value obeys:
V T1 = Π (x
∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 ) . (4)
The current normalized profits are given by Π (x∗) (per S1). If the producer survives,
which happens with probability 1 − δD, there are two possibilities for the next period.
If no further innovation occurs, he keeps the same good match supplier. The situation
is then identical to the current one, so the joint value is V T1 . With probability δ
I , an
innovation occurs, the frontier technology moves one step and the producer has to decide
whether he should switch towards the innovator or stay with the now outdated good
match supplier (per S3). This decision depends on parameters and is the subject of
section 2.7. If he stays with the outdated good match, their joint value (normalized by
the previous period’s technology) is given by γW T1 . If he switches, then per S6, Bertrand
competition implies that the innovator captures the surplus over the producer’s second
best option, namely staying with the outdated good match; so that the joint value of
the producer and the current good match is still given by γW T1 .
The (normalized) joint value of a relationship between a producer and a cooperating,
outdated, good match supplier in periods with innovation similarly obeys:
W T1 =
1
γ
Π (y∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 ) . (5)
The current normalized profit flow is now given by γ−1Π (y∗): the supplier’s technology
is one step below the frontier and the supplier invests y∗ instead of x∗ (per S1). If
no innovation occurs in the following period, the supplier gets access to the frontier
technology and the producer sticks to that supplier (unless a deviation has occurred), so
that their normalized joint value is V T1 . If another innovation occurs, the situation is the
same as for equation (4) as the supplier remains just one step below the new frontier.
Consider now a producer that has not yet met a good match supplier. In a period
without innovation, following S3, this producer will start a new relationship (he has no
interest in staying with a bad match whose productivity is below average and who does
not cooperate). The joint value of starting a new relationship obeys:
V T0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T0 + δIγW T0 ) . (6)
13
With probability 1− b, the supplier is a good match. Once this is revealed, the supplier
can invest x∗ and the joint value is simply V T1 . With probability b, the supplier turns
out to be a bad match, and current profits are only θΠ(n) as both productivity and
cooperation are lower (per S1). The continuation value of a bad match supplier (with this
producer) is 0, since the producer never returns to that supplier. Instead the producer
will start another relationship in the next period. If no innovation occurs, several firms
will have access to the frontier technology, so that through Bertrand competition (per
S6), the producer captures the whole expected value of this new relationship: V p0 = V
T
0 .
When an innovation occurs the producer gets the value of his second best option (per
S6), namely a new relationship with an outdated supplier: γW T0 .
The law of motion for W T0 is similarly given by:
W T0 = (1− b)W T1 + b
1
γ
θΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T0 + δIγW T0 ) . (7)
With probability 1 − b, the outdated supplier turns out to be a good match delivering
the joint value W T1 . With probability b, the outdated supplier is a bad match so that
the investment level is n (per S1), and productivity is γ times below the frontier. The
following period is identical to the previous case where the producer meets a new supplier
with the frontier technology since the frontier technology diffuses after one period.
To find the value functions for suppliers and producers, consider again a producer
who knows a cooperating good match supplier. In a period without innovation, his
second best option is to start a new relationship. Per S4, if he does so, and therefore
deviates on his previous good match supplier, she becomes non-cooperating, but other
potential good match suppliers are still willing to cooperate immediately, delivering the
joint value V T0 .
16 By Bertrand competition (see S6), on equilibrium path, the producer
in a relationship with a cooperating good match supplier must capture his second best
option, namely V T0 , while the cooperating good match supplier can capture the surplus
of a relationship with her over the producer’s second best option. Therefore, we obtain:
V p1 = V
T
0 and V
s
1 = V
T
1 − V T0 . (8)
16Technically, the presence of a non-cooperating good match supplier could affect the value of starting
a new relationship so that in equation 8, one should replace V T0 with V
T,n
0 , the value of starting a
relationship when the producer knows a non-cooperating good match. Nevertheless, if the producer
always prefers trying a new supplier to staying with a non-cooperating good match, then V T0 = V
T,n
0
and (8) holds (see Appendix A.1 which deals with this issue rigorously).
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Incentive compatibility constraints. We can now describe the incentive com-
patibility (IC) constraints faced by suppliers. After the ex-ante payment, a cooperating
frontier supplier has a short run incentive to deviate from x by investing n. She would
then gain ϕ (x)Ak, where Ak is the technology used by the supplier and:
ϕ (x) ≡ (βR (n)− n)− (βR (x)− x) . (9)
Per S4, the cost of such deviation is that cooperation ceases, and the producer expects
the now non-cooperating good match to only invest n from now on. Per S5, he optimally
decides between trying a new supplier or sticking with this non-cooperating good match.
Here, we focus on parameters for which the former occurs, so that the continuation value
of a non-cooperating good match supplier (with that producer) is 0 (see Appendix B.1
for the other cases). On the other hand, if the supplier cooperates and the producer
survives, their relationship continues (per S3) and her continuation value is V s1 if there
is no innovation and γW s1 otherwise (W
s
1 is derived in Appendix A.1). Therefore, a good
match supplier who has access to the frontier technology faces an incentive compatibility
constraint given by:
ϕ (x∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V s1 + δIγW s1 ) . (10)
This IC constraint applies to any cooperating good match supplier with the frontier
technology: an old supplier in a period without innovation, a new supplier who turns
out to be a good match in a period without innovation, or the innovator if she turns out
to be a good match. Indeed, at the time of the investment decisions, all these suppliers
face the same situation (in particular a good match innovator is not different because in
the next period, all suppliers will have her technology). This justifies our assumption S1
that all good match suppliers with the frontier technology cooperate to the same extent
(as long as no deviation has occurred for them).
Without innovation, the incentive constraint of an outdated good match supplier is:
γ−1ϕ (y∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V s1 + δIγW s1 ) . (11)
The right-hand sides of (10) and (11) are identical but the left hand side of (11) is lower
at equal levels of investment, which is why we had to allow for two different levels of
investment x∗ and y∗ in S1. To understand this, consider a period with innovation, then
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the incentive to deviate in a good match is scaled by the technology currently used,
which is lower for an outdated supplier than for the innovator, whereas the reward from
cooperation is scaled by the technology available in the next period which is the same
for an outdated supplier and the innovator since imitation occurs after one period.
Following S2, we focus on equilibria where investment levels x∗ and y∗ maximize joint
profits under these incentive constraints, so that either x∗ and y∗ are equal to the first
best or their respective incentive compatibility constraint (10) or (11) bind. By definition
ϕ(n) = 0, so the investment levels are higher than the Nash level: x∗, y∗ > n. Further,
since (11) is a laxer constraint than (10), the level of investment with an outdated
supplier must be weakly higher than with a frontier supplier, i.e. y∗ ≥ x∗ (with equality
if x∗ = m). Appendix A.1 derives explicitly the right-hand side of both IC constraints
which then allows us to fully characterize the investment levels x∗, y∗.17
Bilateral rationality. Together, S1, S2 and S4 imply that our equilibrium satisfies
a “bilateral rationality” condition for good matches, in that a producer and a new sup-
plier’s strategies are such that cooperation is maximized right from the beginning of the
relationship (see Appendix A.2). In particular, if a producer had deviated on a supplier
before, new suppliers are still willing to cooperate with that producer right away (in
other words, suppliers do not coordinate to enforce cooperation). This feature of the
equilibrium matches our goal capturing an industry where suppliers innovate to increase
their market share and therefore should not start by “punishing” new customers.
It is well known in the literature that generating cooperation when players can switch
partners at will requires a switching cost: otherwise, the threat of retaliation from the
current partner does not carry any force and the cost from not cooperating is non-
existing. The switching cost here is the risk of finding a bad match.18 A good match
supplier benefits from having been revealed as such. This informational advantage acts
as a fixed cost which pushes the producer to stick to the same supplier, who can then
capture the associated rents. The prospect of capturing these rents induces cooperation
17Appendix B.1 does the same for parameter values such that the producer does not always prefer
trying a new supplier to staying with a non-cooperating good match. In addition, Appendix A.3 provides
comparative static results on how the investment levels depend on the parameters of the model.
18Kranton (1996) first demonstrates that in a setting with identical agents and costless switching
between partners any equilibrium featuring more cooperation than a one shot interaction cannot be
“pair-wise enforceable”: any equilibrium with cooperation requires some initial cost of a new relationship
from lower initial cooperation, but when two new partners first meet they could credibly agree to skip
the initial low level of cooperation and the equilibrium unravels. Both Ghosh and Ray (1996) but
also Kranton (1996) build equilibria that overcome this by introducing impatient players who never
cooperate. The existence of such players (similar to our bad matches here) serves as an expected cost
of establishing a new relationship and enables cooperation.
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by a good match supplier in the first place. Crucially, this fixed cost interacts naturally
with the incomplete contractibility: there is no cooperation in bad matches, as bad
matches have no prospect.19 Hence bad matches are “even worse” relatively to good
matches in the cooperative case than in the contractibility or the Nash cases.
2.7 To switch or not to switch
Having demonstrated that long-term relationships can mitigate the under-investment
from contractual incompleteness, we now show that cooperation makes relationships
more rigid. In periods when one innovator has a superior technology, producers without
good match suppliers try her. Producers already in a good match face the trade-off of
accessing the better technology, but at the risk of engaging in a bad match.
Consider first the contractible case. The technological advantage of the innovator
lasts for only one period and, if the innovator is a bad match, the producer reverts to
his old supplier. Therefore, the producer switches to the innovator if and only if:
1− b+ bθ > γ−1, or equivalently, γ > γcon ≡ (1− b+ bθ)−1 . (12)
With probability b the new supplier is a bad match, but her technology is γ times more
productive. The Nash case is identical except with investment levels at n. Hence, the
producer switches to the innovator if and only if γ > γNash = γcon.
We now turn to the cooperative equilibrium built above. A producer previously in a
good match switches to the innovator, if and only his expected value with the innovator
is higher than that with his old supplier. These expected values depend on whether the
outdated good match supplier punishes a producer who switches to the innovator. S3
and S4 stipulate that the outdated supplier punishes the producer for switching if the
innovator turns out to be a good match. Otherwise, in the following period, there would
be two good matches (the innovator and the previous good match) willing to cooperate
with the producer with the same technology. This means that neither could capture
any value which precludes any cooperation in the current period. However, S3 and S4
also stipulate that if the producer switches, and the innovator turns out to be a bad
match, then the previous supplier forgives the producer and resumes cooperation in the
19If θ is low enough, it is in fact impossible to build an equilibrium which features cooperation in
all bad matches. For higher θ one can build mixed strategy equilibria where some, but not all, bad
matches feature some level of cooperation. Allowing for such would alter little in our general analysis,
but would complicate both exposition and notation.
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following period (that innovator is no longer viewed as a threat).20 As a result, the
decision to switch depends only on profits in the first period because in the next period
the producer will be with a cooperating good match supplier in either case.
The innovator is a good match with probability 1 − b, in which case she invests
x∗ and a bad match with probability b, in which case she invests n, while the old good
match supplier invests y∗ and her technology is γ times less productive. Hence, producers
previously in a good match switch to the innovator if and only if (1− b) Π (x∗)+bθΠ (n) >
γ−1Π (y∗) (Appendix A.1 provides a formal proof). This can be written as:
1− b+ bθ (Π (n) /Π (x∗)) > γ−1 (Π (y∗) /Π (x∗)) . (13)
Cooperation occurs in good matches so x∗ > n, moreover, as explained above y∗ ≥ x∗.
Therefore Π (n) /Π (x∗) < 1 and Π (y∗) /Π (x∗) ≥ 1 so that (12) is more easily satisfied
than (13), which gives us:
Proposition 2. (i) The parameter set for which innovators capture the whole market
in the cooperative case is a subset of the parameter set for which innovators capture
the whole market in the contractible or the Nash cases. (ii) In particular, the minimum
technological leap required for an innovator to capture the whole market in the cooperative
case (γcoop) is higher than that in the contractible or Nash cases: γcoop > γcon = γNash.
This proposition is the result of two effects: First, a worse bad matches effect as a
bad match is more costly relative to a good match in the cooperative case. Indeed, bad
matches have an inherently lower productivity level, but they also involve less investment
as both parties realize that the relationship will come to an end in the following period.
This effect is captured by the term Π (n) /Π (x∗) in (13).21 It makes switching to the
innovator a riskier activity when the producer is engaged in a relationship.
The second effect is an encouragement effect, which comes through the term Π (y∗) /Π (x∗)
in (13): The opportunity to obtain the frontier technology in the following period encour-
20This assumption is the natural starting point because, as explained below, it makes the switching
decision jointly efficient and it simplifies exposition. We consider the opposite case—where a supplier
always punishes a producer if he switches supplier, no matter what happens with the new supplier—in
Appendix A.4 and demonstrate that under quite general conditions the qualitative results are the same
and that the inability to revert back adds another source of rigidity from cooperation.
21Recall that for θ sufficiently small, cooperation in bad matches is necessarily impossible. For θ not
small enough, the fact that there is no cooperation in bad matches directly results from our assumption
on the equilibrium play. However, even if a pair were to deviate and start cooperating, the level of
normalized investment would be lower than in good matches, and so even this “cooperative” bad match
would be relatively worse, than in the contractible or Nash cases.
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ages an outdated supplier to provide a larger effort, which partly erodes the technological
advantage of the innovator. The encouragement effect is especially strong when imita-
tion happens after only one period, but exists as long as the supplier has a positive
probability of getting access to the frontier (see also section 6.2).
Proposition 2 delivers the first important message of the paper: in a context of weak
contractibility, cooperation makes it more difficult to break up existing relationships.
Because of the existence of bad matches, for γ sufficiently low, innovations are not
adopted by suppliers in good matches, but the threshold for adoption is higher in the
cooperative case than in the contractible or Nash cases. Importantly, so far, there are no
welfare cost from this“rigidity”of relationships and welfare in the cooperative equilibrium
is necessarily higher than in the Nash case. Indeed, because of the“forgiveness condition”,
the decision to switch or not is jointly efficient for the outdated supplier, the innovator
and the producer.22 There are only welfare costs once the innovation rate is endogenized.
Furthermore, when γ ∈ (γcon, γcoop), Proposition 2 directly predicts that technological
differences across firms should be more important in countries with poor contractibility
institutions and high level of cooperation/trust than in countries with good institutions
or poor institutions but very low level of cooperation/trust. This is line with a large liter-
ature, started with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), which argues that productivity differences
are larger in developing than in developed countries.
3 Endogenous innovation
Subsection 2.7 showed that cooperation creates rigidity in long-term relationships. We
now turn to the issue of how this rigidity can be the source of dynamic inefficiencies by
endogenizing the rate of innovation. We show that it is reduced with noncontractibility
and may be further reduced by cooperation.
3.1 Rate of innovation
To endogenize innovation we choose a simple setting, but since the crucial element is the
impact of relational contract on the value of an innovation, it should be clear that our
22In fact, from a welfare point of view, at a given rate of innovation, producers switch to the innovator
“too much”. As final good producers are monopolists (the level of normalized investment that maximizes
welfare is higher thanm) bad matches are even more detrimental to welfare than to profits, and switching
to the innovator inevitably involves more bad matches.
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results hold more generally. Every period, one supplier gets a new idea which turns into
a useful innovation with probability δI if the potential innovator invests Aψ
(
δI
)
(where
A is the frontier technological level before innovation occurs). The function ψ is convex
with ψ (0) = 0, ψ′ (0) = 0 and lim
δI→1
ψ′
(
δI
)
=∞. Since the probability that the potential
innovator has already made a successful innovation is infinitesimal, the previous period
market share of the potential innovator is infinitesimal and for all purposes the potential
innovator is an entrant. Here, we compare the rates of innovation in the three different
cases: contractible, Nash and cooperative.
Thanks to Bertrand competition the innovator captures the entire surplus of a re-
lationship with her over the second best option of the producer.23 Because imitation
occurs after one period and a supplier forgives a producer who switches to the innovator
if the innovator turns out to be a bad match, this surplus corresponds to the difference
in profits between the two options in the first period (if it is positive). We denote by
V s,tI,K the value captured by the innovator (normalized by the frontier productivity level)
from a relationship with a producer, who knows a good match supplier (t = g), or does
not (t = b), for the contractible (K = con), the Nash (K = Nash) and the cooperative
cases (K = coop). In the contractible case, depending on whether the producer is in a
relationship with a good match or not, the value captured by the innovator is given by:
V s,gI,con =
(
1− b+ bθ − γ−1)+ Π (m) orV s,bI,con = (1− b+ bθ) (1− γ−1)Π (m) . (14)
The situation of producers previously in a good match has been analyzed in (12). The
reasoning is similar for the other producers: joint expected profits are the same with
the innovator and any other supplier except in the first period where they are γ times
higher with the innovator. Similarly, for the Nash case, we get:
V s,gI,Nash =
(
1− b+ bθ − γ−1)+ Π (n) and V s,bI,Nash = (1− b+ bθ) (1− γ−1)Π (n) . (15)
Finally, in the cooperative case, we get:
V s,gI,coop =
(
(1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n)− γ−1Π (y∗))+ , (16)
V s,bI,coop = (1− b)
(
Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))+ bθ (1− γ−1)Π (n) . (17)
23More generally, with ex-ante Nash Bargaining, the innovator would capture only part of the differ-
ence, but as long as she captures a constant positive part, the results of this subsection carry through.
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The case of producers previously in good matches follows from the derivation of (13): if
the producer switches his expected profits are (1− b) Π (x∗)+bθΠ (n), if he stays with his
old (good) supplier, she will deliver effort y∗, but will use a technology which is γ times
below the frontier, generating profits γ−1Π (y∗). The innovator captures the difference
if it is positive, which gives (16). For a producer who does not know a good supplier,
the alternative to starting a relationship with the innovator is to try a new (outdated)
supplier. Such a supplier would bring expected profits γ−1 ((1− b) Π (y∗) + bθΠ (n)) as
she is a good match with probability 1 − b but uses a technology γ times below the
frontier. The innovator captures the difference in profits, namely (17).
In equilibrium, the steady-state fraction of firms previously not in a good match is
constant given by ω = δD/
(
1− (1− δD) b).24 Hence, assuming that the steady state
has been reached, the innovator solves the problem:
max
δ̂
γδ̂
[
ωV s,bI,K
(
δI
)
+ (1− ω)V s,gI,K
(
δI
)]− ψ (δ̂) , (18)
for K ∈ {con, Nash, coop}. We denote by ZK = ωV s,bI,K
(
δI
)
+ (1− ω)V s,gI,K
(
δI
)
, the
expected total value of an innovator. The first order condition ψ′
(
δI
)
= γZK uniquely
defines the equilibrium rate of innovation in the contractible case (δcon), and in the
Nash case (δNash). In the cooperative case, the value of the innovator depends on the
equilibrium rate of innovation, so any fixed point of the first order condition would be a
solution to the problem. We consider the highest one and denote it δcoop (alternatively
we could assume that ψ is sufficiently convex to rule out multiple equilibria). A higher
expected value ZK leads to a higher rate of innovation.
From (16) and (17) the reward from innovation in the cooperative case is:
Zcoop = Π (x
∗)
 ω
(
(1− b)
(
1− γ−1 Π(y∗)
Π(x∗)
)
+ bθ (1− γ−1) Π(n)
Π(x∗)
)
+ (1− ω)
(
(1− b) + bθ Π(n)
Π(x∗) − γ−1 Π(y
∗)
Π(x∗)
)+
, (19)
implying that Zcoop is an increasing function of Π (x
∗) and Π (n) /Π (x∗) and decreasing
in Π (y∗) /Π (x∗). In the Nash and contractible cases the ratios are replaced by 1 and
Π (x∗) by Π (n) and Π (m) respectively. The comparison between the innovation rates
in the three cases results then from three effects. The worse bad match effect reduces
24ω is the share of firms that know a good match supplier willing to cooperate with them. It does
not depend on the rate of innovation, because when an innovation occurs, producers do not lose the
possibility to cooperate with their old supplier.
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the expected gain from innovation in the cooperative case as the lower productivity
of a bad match will be further amplified by the lack of cooperation (this is reflected in
Π (n) /Π (x∗) < 1 in (19)). The encouragement effect (Π (y∗) /Π (x∗) ≥ 1 in (19)) induces
more cooperation from the existing supplier in the cooperative case which reduces the
gain from switching and therefore the value of the innovator. And the scale effect :
a higher level of investment by frontier good matches increases profitability should the
innovator turn out to be a good match which increases the incentive to innovate (Π (n) <
Π (x∗) ≤ Π (m)). Comparing the contractible case to the cooperative one, all effects go in
the same direction and δcoop < δcon unambiguously. Comparing the cooperative and Nash
cases, the worse bad match and the encouragement effects push towards δNash > δcoop,
but the scale effect pushes in the other direction, giving an ambiguous result.
To go further, we investigate in turn what happens for different innovation sizes.
First, for sufficiently small innovation sizes, no producer in a good match would try the
innovator (that is γ ≤ γNash = (1− b+ bθ)−1). In this case we use (15) and (17), and
the difference in expected value is given by:
ZNash − Zcoop = ω (1− b)
((
1− γ−1)Π (n)− (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))) . (20)
As shown in Appendix B.4, Π (x∗)−γ−1Π (y∗) > (1− γ−1) Π (n) implying that the scale
effect (Π (x∗) > Π (n)) always dominates the encouragement effect (Π (y∗) /Π (x∗) ≥ 1).
The innovator captures more from producers not in good matches in the cooperative
case than in the Nash case (V s,bI,coop > V
s,b
I,Nash) and we must have δ
Nash < δcoop.
For intermediate values of γ ∈ (γcon, γcoop),25 innovation breaks relationships in the
Nash case but not in the cooperative case. Using (15) and (17), we get that
ZNash−Zcoop = (1− ω)
(
1− b+ bθ − γ−1)Π (n)+ω (1− b) ((1− γ−1)Π (n)− (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))) .
(21)
In that case the excess rigidity of relationships in the cooperative case creates an extensive
margin by which an innovator has a lower market size in the cooperative case than in
the Nash case. If the death rate of producers δD is low, most producers will have found a
good match (ω is small), and the market captured by an innovator in the cooperative case
25Although we denote by γcoop the size of innovation necessary for switching in the cooperative case in
both this section and the preceding, they are mathematically different objects. In the preceding section,
γcoop was a function of the exogenous rate of innovation δI . In this section, δI is a choice variable so
γcoop is no longer a function of δI . Not making this explicit in the text should not lead to confusion.
Further since γNash is independent of the innovation rate δI , Proposition 2 still applies.
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is much smaller than in the Nash case. Cooperation reduces innovation: δNash > δcoop.26
Finally, if γ is large enough, γ > γcoop, innovation breaks relationships in all cases,
so that this extensive margin disappears. Using (15), (16) and (17), we obtain:
ZNash−Zcoop = (1− b)
1− (1− δD) b
[(
1− b (1− δD)− γ−1)Π (n)− ((1− b (1− δD))Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))] .
(22)
For innovation sizes sufficiently close to γcoop, the innovator still captures little from
producers previously in a good match relationship so that innovation is lower in the
cooperative case δNash > δcoop (γ <
(
1− b (1− δD))−1 is a sufficient condition). On the
other hand, for γ sufficiently large, the outdated supplier is at too large a disadvantage
regardless of her effort level, the scale effect dominates and δcoop > δNash.
In particular we can derive the following proposition (proof in Appendix B.4), which
combines the three cases but uses stricter assumptions in order to provide sufficient
conditions that do not depend on endogenous variables such as x∗, y∗ and γcoop.
Proposition 3. a) The rate of innovation is the highest in the contractible case: δcon >
δNash, δcoop. b) If innovations are small enough (γ ≤ γNash) or if they are large enough,
then the innovation rate in the cooperative case is higher than in the Nash one δNash <
δcoop. c) Assume that the death rate of producers is low enough δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
, then for
an intermediate range of innovation sizes, γ ∈
(
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) ,
1
1−b(1−δD)
)
the
innovation rate is higher in the Nash case than in the contractible one: δNash > δcoop.
A case of special interest is when the cooperative equilibrium can achieve the first
best level of efforts in good matches (that is the static inefficiencies are fully overcome).
We then obtain the following Remark, which stipulates that the condition of Part c) of
the previous proposition is now both sufficient and necessary.
Remark 1. Assume that the cooperative equilibrium ensures the first best level of in-
vestment in good matches (y∗ = x∗ = m), and that δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
, then the innovation
rate is higher in the Nash than the contractible case, δNash > δcoop, if and only if
γ ∈
(
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) ,
1
1−b(1−δD)
)
. The higher is the level of productivity of bad
matches, θ, the smaller is the ratio Π (m) /Π (n) (that is the smaller is the scope for
static inefficiencies) and the smaller is the death rate of producer δD, the more likely it
is that δNash > δcoop.
26Specifically, using the expression for ω, we obtain that δNash > δcoop if and only if
δD
(
Π(x∗)
Π(n) − b+ bθ − γ−1 Π(y
∗)
Π(n)
)
< 1− b+ bθ − γ−1.
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Intuitively, for low θ, production in bad matches is already low regardless of whether
cooperation occurs or not. The “worse bad match” effect is dominated by the scale effect
and cooperation increases the innovation rate. On the other hand, a small death rate of
producers δD increases the share of producers already in a good match. Since it is those
producers that an innovator may fail to capture in the cooperative case, it becomes more
likely that cooperation reduces innovation.
Our model predicts that, for intermediate size of innovations, relationships should
last longer in countries with poor contractual enforcement but high level of cooperation
relative to countries with either high level of contractual enforcement or low level of
trust. Indeed, if γ < γcont = γNash, relationships are never broken (unless the producer
dies). If γ ∈ (γcon, γcoop), relationships never break up in the cooperative case but do
so in the contractible and Nash cases. While if γ > γcoop, relationships break up with
innovation in all cases, but as long as γ < 1/(1 − b(1 − δD)), innovations are the least
frequent in the cooperative case.
3.2 Welfare
As innovation is already too low from a welfare perspective because of standard innovation-
externalities of imitation and building-on-the-shoulders-of-giants, a lower rate of innova-
tion can easily translate into lower welfare. Relative to the Nash equilibrium, cooperation
enhances investment and reduces the static inefficiencies. However, it may also reduce
the innovation rate, aggravating the dynamic inefficiency in the economy. When the
discount rate ρ is sufficiently low, dynamic inefficiencies matter more for welfare than
static ones, so that cooperation reduces welfare when it reduces innovation. We obtain:
Corollary 1. Welfare is always lower with incomplete contractibility than with com-
plete contractibility. Welfare may be higher or lower in the cooperative case than in
the Nash case, but when the discount rate ρ is sufficiently low, the death rate of pro-
ducers satisfies δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
, and for an intermediate range of innovation sizes, γ ∈(
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) ,
1
1−b(1−δD)
)
, cooperation reduces welfare.
The fact that the rate of innovation is inefficient to start with is essential for this
result. Relationships make the profitability of a new innovation smaller for the innovator,
but that loss in itself cannot outweigh the benefit of higher investment that comes from
the relationship. It is only because innovation is already too low (such that a further
reduction lowers welfare for society as a whole) that relationships can decrease overall
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welfare. Consider alternatively a setup in which an innovation is temporary such that
the innovator returns to the old technology after one period and no imitation is possible
(such that both imitation and ‘building on the shoulders of giants’ have been precluded).
In such a case, private and social benefits of an innovation are equal.27 All our results
except corollary 1 would still hold.
3.3 Cooperation and expanding varieties
The main proposition of this paper is that cooperation can be a poor substitute for
full contractibility as it might reduce new innovations. Countries with higher levels
of cooperation vary widely, from mature developed economies like Japan, to rapidly
growing economies like India. In the following we show that the existence of relational
contracts is more likely to reduce growth for more mature economies.
Extend the model such that the mass of final good producers, Nt, is increasing:
Nt+1 = Nt (1 + gN). This could represent catch-up growth, horizontal innovation, pop-
ulation growth or periods of increasing outsourcing (interpreting the new final good
producers as foreign firms who decide to start acquiring their inputs from the country of
study). Innovation costs scale by the number of products (they are given by ψ
(
δI
)
AN),
so that the innovation problem is independent of the number of products. This ensures
that if the share of firms who know a good match is at the steady-state level, the in-
novation rate is constant and the cooperative equilibrium keeps the same structure as
before with constant x∗ and y∗. We can then show (proof in Appendix B.5):
Remark 2. Assume that the cooperative equilibrium ensures the first best level of in-
vestment in good matches (y∗ = x∗ = m), then the lower is the growth rate of product
gN , the larger is the set of γ for which δ
Nash > δcoop.
Intuitively, growth in the number of products creates a mass of new producers who
are not yet in a good match relationship. Cooperation raises the profits that an innovator
can make from supplying this type of producers (recall that V s,bI,coop > V
s,b
I,Nash), so a higher
growth rate gN makes it more likely that cooperation increases the innovation rate.
27Technically, to ensure efficient innovation it would still be necessary to implement a subsidy to the
production of the final good in order to get rid of the existing monopoly distortion.
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3.4 The type of switching costs
We now analyze the generality of Propositions 2 and 3 by discussing alternative setups.
What drives our result is that if a supplier turns out to be a bad match not only is
productivity lower, but so is cooperation. Therefore bad matches become relatively
worse which makes switching riskier. More generally, to generate cooperation in an
equilibrium where parties can change partners at will, there must be a cost of switching
from one partner to another (here, the risk of finding a bad match). In many set-ups this
cost interacts with incomplete contractibility to generate a lower level of cooperation at
the beginning of a relationship. For instance, if we assume instead that the type of a
match is only revealed after the first investment has occurred, then cooperation in the
first period of a relationship would lie between the Nash level and the level in a good
match. Similarly, in models where suppliers differ in their discount rate, or in models
with relationship-specific human capital, the (expected) level of cooperation in a new
relationship will be lower than in an established one.28 In all these settings, relationships
would be more rigid in the cooperative equilibrium than in a “Nash” equilibrium where
cooperation does not take place. This excess rigidity in return can reduce the incentive to
innovate, particularly when it restricts significantly the market of a potential innovator.
Nevertheless, the result that cooperation creates rigidities is not straightforward.
Consider an alternative set-up without good and bad matches but with a fixed cost of
switching suppliers fA. Then, provided that the fixed cost is sufficiently large, the first
best investment level can be achieved in the cooperative equilibrium and the producer
switches to the innovator as soon as (γ − 1) Π (m) ≥ f in both the contractible and
cooperative cases, but he switches if (γ − 1) Π (n) ≥ f in the Nash case, that is for
higher innovation sizes γ. In contrast with our set-up, the relative cost of switching does
not increase with cooperation, and the innovation rate is always higher with cooperation.
Finally, note that even in the current set-up society could do better if suppliers
were willing to collude. This could be either by refusing to cooperate with a producer
who has deviated on any supplier or by outdated suppliers agreeing not to cooperate
with potential producers in periods when innovation has taken place so as to encourage
28This is consistent with Johnson et al. (2002) who show that the belief in the efficiency of the
court matters for the level of trust between firms at the beginning of a new relationship, but much
less later. Similarly, Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004), show in an experimental setting that low effort was
punished by the termination of the relationship but that effort was high from the beginning in successful
relationships. And Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) found that the value of a relationship increases
with its age in the Kenyan rose market export, which, they argue, provides support for their model
which, as ours, features heterogeneity on the supplier side.
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producers to try out the innovator. This, however, does not fit the description of a
competitive industry, and is difficult to generalize in a set-up with imperfect information
(for instance if suppliers do not know whether a producer knows a good match or not,
whether an innovation has occurred or not).
4 Cooperation and relationship-specific innovation
We now focus on within-relationship innovation by letting the technology (denoted Ajk)
of a supplier k be specific to the producer j with whom she is working, so that the
frontier technology (denoted Aj) is producer-specific. There are no longer good or bad
matches. As before, every period, a mass δD of producers die and are replaced by new
producers. When a new producer is born, all suppliers obtain a technology level equal
to the average technology in the economy to work with that producer. If the producer
survives, suppliers keep the technology they had at the end of the previous period.
As before, suppliers make take-or-leave-it offers to producers and each producer
chooses one supplier. A supplier can innovate with probability δI by spending ψ(δI)Ajt
units of the final good, where ψ is increasing and convex. An innovation increases tech-
nology for line j (and only for that line) by a factor γ such that in the following period
the successful innovator has a productivity advantage over the other suppliers. In such
a case all other suppliers get access to the technology just below: hence suppliers can
only be at most one step below the frontier for each line j. We assume throughout that
the innovation rate δ is contractible—so as to focus on the consequences of incomplete
contractibility in input provision. Whether an innovation occurs or not is revealed before
the supplier makes her investment, which simplifies the exposition, but does not contain
any element of substance. Within each period we have a timeline as follows.
1.
Final good produ-
cers die with pro-
bability δD and a 
mass δD of new 
final good produ-
cers are born. 
2. 
Each supplier 
makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it 
offer of an ex-
ante transfer t to 
each producer.
3.
Within each product 
line j, the producer 
and supplier decide 
on the innovation 
rate δI (which is 
always contractible.)
4.
With probability δI an innovation occurs: 
the current supplier gets a technology γ
times higher, and suppliers who were two 
steps below obtain the technology one
step below. With probability
1- δI productivity levels do not change
5. 
The supplier decides 
on how much high 
quality input to 
provide in the non-
contractible case
6. 
Revenues are 
split
through ex-post 
Nash 
Bargaining
27
4.1 Contractible and Nash cases.
We can solve for the equilibrium for each product line independently and start with the
contractible and Nash cases. In both cases, when a producer is born he starts working
with a supplier and remains indifferent across suppliers until one successfully innovates
and becomes an augmented supplier. From then on, the producer picks this supplier.
Therefore, either all suppliers are identical, or one has access to a technology which is
one step higher than the others. We normalize value functions and profits by the chosen
supplier technology at the beginning of the period before innovation occurs. When an
augmented supplier exists the joint value is:
V T1 = −ψ
(
δI1
)
+
(
1− δI1 + δI1γ
)(
Π (z) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T1
)
, (23)
where δI1 is the equilibrium innovation rate when the producer has access to an augmented
supplier, z = m in the contractible case and z = n in the Nash one. After the innovation
cost has been paid, innovation fails with probability 1− δI1 , in which case the producer
and the supplier obtain the profit Π (z) and the continuation value V T1 . Alternatively, if
an innovation occurs, the situation is identical except that the technology used by the
supplier is γ times more productive.
The equilibrium innovation rate δI1 must therefore maximize V
T
1 . Taking the first
order condition and solving for V T1 (using (23)) one obtains that the (unique) rate δ
I
1
must obey:
ψ′
(
δI1
)
= (γ − 1)
(
Π (z) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T1
)
= (γ − 1) Π (z) (1 + ρ)−
(
1− δD)ψ (δI1)
1 + ρ− (1− δI1 + δI1γ) (1− δD)
.
(24)
In particular, the scale effect implies that the innovation rate is lower in the Nash case
than in the contractible case: δI,Nash1 < δ
I,cont
1
Alternatively, there is no augmented supplier in which case the joint value is:
V T0 = −ψ
(
δI0
)
+
(
1− δI0
)(
Π (z) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T0
)
+ δI0γ
(
Π (z) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T1
)
, (25)
with z = m,n and δI0 denoting the innovation rate. If no innovation occurs, then
the supplier and the producer share the profits Π (z), and in the following period the
producer will be in the same situation with homogeneous suppliers who are in Bertrand
competition, so that the producer will capture the full value of the relationship. On the
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other hand, if an innovation occurs the producer will stay with the innovating supplier.
Using that δI0 must maximize V
T
0 in (25), we obtain:
ψ′
(
δI0
)
= (γ − 1) Π (z) + 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(
γV T1 − V T0
)
. (26)
It is straightforward to check that δI0 = δ
I
1 = δ
I and V T0 = V
T
1 is a solution to
the problem (see Appendix B.7 for a proof that it is the unique solution), so that
the innovation rate is constant. Intuitively, whether a producer knows an augmented
supplier or deals with a set of homogeneous supplier has no impact on the joint value
of the relationship (beyond the technology level and the innovation rate). Yet, since
innovation maximizes the joint value of the relationship, the problem is fully symmetric
and the innovation rates must be the same. Moreover, we have δI,Nash < δI,cont.
4.2 Cooperative equilibrium
We build a cooperative equilibrium similarly to section 2 such that suppliers are willing
to cooperate as much as possible with a producer they have never worked with before
(i.e. the equilibrium must satisfy a bilateral rationality constraint). Such equilibria
can only exist if the present supplier is different from other suppliers, since rents in
the following period are required to reward cooperation. Here, the relationship-specific
innovation takes the role of the good/bad matches from above and ensures some level of
cooperation. In Appendix B.7, we demonstrate that there exists an equilibrium where on
equilibrium path an augmented supplier would cooperate at a constant level x∗ ∈ (n,m],
while a supplier with whom no innovation has occurred would play the Nash level of
investment n. In such an equilibrium, a producer chooses a supplier when he is born.
He is indifferent about switching suppliers until a supplier successfully innovates and
until that happens, the suppliers invest n. Once a supplier has successfully innovated,
the producer sticks with that supplier (the innovator) forever and she invests x∗.
Below, we take this structure of the equilibrium as given and derive the innovation
rate on the equilibrium path. First, consider a producer who knows an augmented
supplier with whom no deviation has occurred. Then, the joint value obeys (23) but
with z = x∗. As a result, the innovation rate is given by (24). Denoting the solution for
the cooperative case as δI,coop1 , we get that δ
I,Nash < δI,coop1 ≤ δI,cont, with equality if and
only if x∗ = m, since x∗ ∈ (n,m]. This directly results from the scale effect.
Second, let us focus on a producer who has never matched with a supplier who
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successfully innovated. We can write the joint value of their relationship as:
V T0 = −ψ
(
δI0
)
+
(
1− δI0
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T0
)
+ δI0γ
(
Π (x∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T1
)
. (27)
If no innovation occurs, the supplier does not cooperate (since she will be identical to all
other suppliers next period) and the continuation value is V T0 . If an innovation occurs,
the technology improves by a factor γ but the supplier also starts cooperating (and the
continuation value is V T1 ). The equilibrium innovation rate maximizes V
T
0 since it is
contractible. Therefore, we have:
ψ′
(
δI0
)
=
(
γ − Π (n)
Π (x∗)
)
Π (x∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
γ − V
T
0
V T1
)
V T1 . (28)
Since x∗ > n, Π (n) < Π (x∗) and V T0 < V
T
1 . Comparing this equation with (24), with
z = x∗, we obtain that δI,coop0 > δ
I,coop
1 . Innovation is higher with a supplier that has not
yet innovated, because in addition to pushing the technological frontier, innovation in
that case also allows for starting cooperation. The innovation rate is then higher than
in the Nash case, both because of the scale effect and the cooperation effect (δI,coop0 >
δI,Nash), while it might be higher or lower than in the contractible case as the scale and
cooperation effects push in different directions (δI,coop0 ≶ δI,cont). In particular, if the
level of cooperation is low (x∗ is close to n), the scale effect dominates and there is more
innovation in the contractible than in the cooperative case. If the level of cooperation is
high, then innovation is higher in the cooperative case than in the contractible one (in
particular if the first best is achieved, x∗ = m, then δI,coop0 > δ
I,coop
1 = δ
I,cont).
Therefore, with relationship-specific innovations, cooperation in a setting of poor
contractibility strengthens innovation, up to a point that the innovation rate may even
be larger than in the contractible case. The growth rate of the economy depends on
the innovation rates and, in the cooperative case, on the share of firms who know an
innovator and their average productivity. We obtain (proof in Appendix B.7):
Proposition 4. The growth rate is higher in both the contractible and cooperative cases
than in the Nash one. The growth rate is higher in the contractible case than in the
cooperative one if cooperation is low (x∗ close to n), and lower if cooperation is high (x∗
close to m).
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5 Relationships, Japan and the United States: A
reversal of role models
The central message of our paper is that although the existence of relational contracts
can overcome contractual incompleteness, it will simultaneously affect the type of in-
novation undertaken. In particular, strong relationships, compared to the Nash case,
will encourage relationship-specific innovations, but might discourage more general in-
novations that would require the break-up of such relationships. The positive effects
of relationships have long been recognized. Dore (1983) first discusses the Japanese
economy as a whole and argues that relational contracts within the “keiretsu” system
overcome opportune behavior and allow for risk sharing. He suggests that the origins of
relational contracts could be found in cultural differences. Blinder and Krueger (1996)
compare US and Japanese labor markets and suggest that lower labor turn-over allows
firms in Japan to invest more in training. Helper (1990) and Helper and Henderson
(2014) argue that the Japanese auto-industry is a lot more productive than the Amer-
ican. They emphasize that the ongoing tight relationships allow for better sharing of
information and fewer hold-up problems. We think of this as a higher provision of the
non-contractible input, which is consistent with the ‘cooperative’ equilibrium. In ad-
dition, Toyota’s suppliers are encouraged by the promise of continued cooperation to
devote resources to innovation specifically designed for Toyota, in line with the results
of section 4. This contrasts with their description of the three big automakers in the
United States where the lack of trust meant that relationships had to be arm’s length,
contracts were met to the letter and no more, and relationship-specific investment or
innovation were limited (an alternative was for the automakers to vertically integrate).
Consequently, we think of the United States as being more closely represented by the
‘Nash’ equilibrium.29 Similarly, Bolton, Malmrose and Ouchi (1994) argue that rela-
tional contracts in the Japanese semi-conductor industry allows for more participation
by suppliers in Japan than in the United States.
Since the 1990s and following the poor economic performance of Japan, the litera-
ture has focused more on the disadvantages of the keiretsu system.30 In a case study
29Here our paper bears some similarities with Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) who also develop a model
with multiple equilibria and associate Germany with one and the US with the other. Interestingly, their
model shows that relationships (more specifically the informational advantage that an employer has
over an employee) can encourage the investment in general human capital, whereas we show that
relationships can discourage general innovations and encourage relationship-specific innovations.
30Interestingly, a common quote in the economic sociology literature is from Dore (1983) considers
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of a Japanese chemical company and a Japanese steel company, Collinson and Wilson
(2006) argue that the keiretsu system led these companies to develop numerous but
barely profitable incremental innovations tailored to the needs of their customers to the
detriment of broad and flexible innovations. As mentioned in the introduction Dujarric
and Hagiu (2009) argue that although Japanese prowess in efficient manufacturing is
beyond question, the existence of very strong relationships leads suppliers to focus their
innovation primarily on the needs of existing business partners and not new opportu-
nities to increase market share. In addition to the software industry discussed in the
introduction, they study the Japanese cellphone industry. There too, carrier providers
formed closed relationships with their handset manufacturers, which produced carrier-
specific phones. The industry was in fact quite innovative and several features (camera,
3G networks, payment systems, ...) were introduced in Japan before the rest of the
world. Yet, handset manufacturers never managed to export their products as they
were focused on developing incremental innovations specific to their carrier.31 And they
missed the radical, general, innovation of the smartphone (which included a global open
platform for applications and a touchscreen). In 2008, Apple’s retail share was 2%, in
2015 it reached 44% (Euromonitor International, 2015).32
As a result, while Japan was the role model for business relationships in the man-
agement literature in the 80s and the early 90s, the subsequent realization that Japan
rarely introduces new technologies to the world market and lags behind in major inno-
vations, has led to a reversal in the management literature which again focuses on the
the Japanese textile industry and discusses the case of the entry of a new and more efficient supplier.
The response from the producer to his old supplier is given as : “Look how X has got [sic] his price
down. We hope you can do the same because we really would have to reconsider our position if the price
difference goes on for months. If you need bank finance to get the new type of vat [bucket for dyeing] we
can probably help by guaranteeing the loan.” This is intended as a positive feature of Japanese business
relationships, whereas our paper shows the negative effects on incentives for outside innovators.
31Japanese cellphones were referred to as “Galapagos” phones as their kind only existed in Japan.
Carrier-specific online platforms also developed and the associated Japanese firms did not manage to
compete abroad (see Kushida, 2011). Kushida (2011) gives an illustration of the relationship-specific
innovations and the lock-in effect: After the government implemented “number portability” which al-
lowed consumers to keep their numbers after changing carriers, “carriers’ responses were, however, to
accelerate their development of proprietary features to create new lock-in effects. As the date for num-
ber portability approached, carriers engaged in a massive push towards electronic money, music players,
thumbprint scans, ever high resolution cameras, and digital television broadcast receivers. As it turned
out, widely used elements such as email addresses with carrier-specific domain names, data from various
applications, song downloads, games, and other content were widely used, but not “portable.”
32To be sure, innovation is not the only problem facing Japan. Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) focus on
the financial sector and criticizes the willingness of the Japanese government to keep ‘zombie’ banks
alive and with them insolvent borrowers. In Appendix B.10, we consider a model in which relationships
also allow unproductive firms to remain in operation, though without a financial sector.
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Count Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
Generality 337,913 0.40 0.48 0.28 0 0.93
Differentiated 337,799 0.81 0.88 0.18 0.16 1
Table 1: Summary Statistics
U.S. system (Pudelko and Mendenhall, 2009). Perhaps it is no surprise that the limits
of the Japanese system became apparent as they approached the world technological
frontier, in line with Remark 2. The common argument behind these case studies is
that the focus on incremental instead of broad innovations help explain why Japanese
companies failed at becoming world leaders in certain sectors. As argued in the intro-
duction, the associated welfare losses may be amplified by the fact that the spillovers of
broad innovations are larger than that of incremental ones.
Although, Japan is a canonical example of business relationships, the tension be-
tween the dynamism of new suppliers and the reliability of old suppliers is more general.
Uzzi (1996, 1997) collects quantitative and qualitative data on a set of high-end apparel
producers in NYC. He shows that relying on a set of reliable suppliers is essential to
overcome problems of contractual incompleteness and facilitate the transmission of in-
formation, but that only relying on existing relationships risks stifling innovation and
adaptation to new trends. Both sets of suppliers are hence necessary.
To further support our discussion of Japan and the United States, we use the patent
data from European Patent Office (details in Appendix C). We use patents originating
in the United States and Japan, filed between 1978 and 2009. We focus on the measure
of generality from Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) (defined in the introduction) which
is the closest empirical parallel to our notion of the broad appeal of innovation: in this
framework low generality corresponds to relationship-specific innovations and high gen-
erality corresponds to the broader more general innovations of Section 2. The generality
measure is available for 337,913 Japanese or U.S. patents (44.5% are US patents). Table
1 shows summary statistics on the two variables of interest. In column (I) in table 2 we
simply regress the generality of a patent on a dummy for the United States being the
country of origin. This is an analogue of Figure 1, which shows that US patents are on
average more general than Japanese. In the regression the ‘generality’ measure has been
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1, so the estimate suggests that a
US. patent is 5.5 percent of a standard deviation more general than a Japanese patent.
In column (II) we introduce fixed effects for the two-digit NACE code as well as the year
of filing for the patents. This isolates the difference for Japanese and US patents within
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(I) (II) (III)
Generality Generality Generality
US. 0.055∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.007
(13.47) (6.69) (1.18)
US x Differentiated 0.012∗∗
(2.09)
Fixed Effects None NACE, Year NACE, Year
Observations 337,913 337,913 337,799
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. Std. errors clustered at NACE x country level for (III)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: Regression Results for 2 digit NACE
a NACE code and reduces the estimate by around half.33 Our theory further predicts
that this effect should be more pronounced in sectors that are more differentiated. To
test this we associate each NACE code of the patents with a corresponding standardized
“Rauch” measure of the extent to which the product is differentiated which slightly re-
duces the number of observations (details in Appendix C).34 We include fixed effects for
the NACE codes as well as time and year fixed effects in column (III). The coefficient
of interest is the interaction term between the dummy for the United States and the
measure of differentiated products, which is both substantially positive and significant
(standard errors are clustered at NACE x country level). The difference in generality
between a U.S and a Japanese patent increases by 1.2% of a standard deviation when
moving from one sector to a sector which is one standard deviation more differentiated.
We conclude that the predictions of our model are consistent with the literature on
the Japanese and U.S. patterns of innovations and are met by the empirical analysis of
Japanese and U.S. patents. In Appendix C, we use a larger set of countries to perform
an analogous analysis and find results consistent with our theory.
33Controlling for the NACE controls for the fact that the United States patents more heavily in
industries with a higher average generality. This is the most direct test of our model. However, one
could argue that the size of each industry is endogenous to equilibrium play, in which case the result in
Column (I) would be a better test.
34PATSTAT attributes 2 to 4 digit NACE code to each patent depending on the sector, and the
Rauch’s data are available in the SITC classification. We choose to do the regressions at the 2 digit
NACE level to have a uniform aggregation level across industries and because the conversion from SITC
to NACE introduces some ‘noise’ at the 4 digit level. Nevertheless, table C.2 in the Appendix shows
that our results are similar when we use the lowest level of disaggregation available.
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6 Extensions
In this section, we first combine our general innovation model and our relationship-
specific innovation model. Second, we extend our analysis of the general innovation
model to allow for slow diffusion of innovation. Appendix A.5 makes the point that
relational contracts can create macroeconomic inefficiencies in other contexts than inno-
vation by looking at a model which features an information externality.
6.1 Combining the two models
We combine the models of sections 2-3 and section 4 into a single model (the details are
in Appendix B.8). With exogenous probability, in some periods, suppliers can engage in
relationship-specific innovations, while in others a potential supplier gets the opportunity
to undertake a general innovation which pushes the frontier in each line by the same
factor. Relationship-specific innovations can only occur in good matches. We denote by
δA and γA the innovation rate and size for general innovations. We refer to a relationship
between a producer and a good match supplier where the last innovation to occur was
a relationship-specific innovation by the supplier as an “augmented” good match. Other
good matches are referred to as“regular”. δB2 denotes the relationship-specific innovation
rate for the augmented good matches and δB1 for the regular good matches (x
∗
2denotes
the investment level in augmented good matches and x∗1 regular good matches when the
supplier has access to the frontier technology). γB is the size of relationship-specific
innovations. Although the two innovation processes interact with one another, the spirit
of our analysis still applies: the cooperative equilibrium often favors relationship-specific
innovations relative to the Nash equilibrium but may lead to a lower rate of general
innovation.
Two subtleties complicate the analysis. First, the relationship-specific innovation rate
is determined by how a relationship specific innovation changes the producer-supplier
joint value, which depends on the effective discount rate. Since a higher rate of general
innovation reduces the effective discount rate, it also increases the rate of relationship
specific innovation. This effect makes the cooperative equilibrium look worse: if the
general innovation rate is sufficiently lower in the cooperative equilibrium than in the
Nash one, then the relationship specific innovation rate might also be lower in the co-
operative case than in the Nash case.35 Second, the higher is the rate of relationship
35Note that as in section 4, we assumed that relationship-specific innovations are contractible. Were
35
specific innovation, the larger is the average technology gap between lines where the
producer is in a good match and those where he is not (since there is no relationship
specific innovation in a bad match).36 At the same time, for a given line, the general
innovator’s rents are proportional to the technology used with a coefficient which is lower
in lines where producers are in good matches. Since the innovation cost is scaled by the
average technology in the economy, this creates a force which pushes towards less general
innovation in the equilibrium where more relationship specific innovation occurs.37 To
summarize, we can show the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Assume that innovation costs are sufficiently small that ψ(δB,coop2 ) ≤
Π(x∗1)(ν/ (1− ν) + 1 − δB,coop2 + δB,coop2 γB). a) Assume that the death rate of producers
is low enough δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
, then for an intermediate range of innovation sizes, γA ∈(
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) ,
1
1−b(1−δD)
)
the general innovation rate is higher in the Nash case
than in the contractible one: δA,Nash > δA,coop. b) If the general innovation rate is
weakly higher in the cooperative than in the Nash case (δA,Nash ≤ δA,coop) then the rate of
relationship specific innovation is also lower in the Nash case: δB,Nash < δB,coop2 , δ
B,coop
1 .
Part a) of the Proposition is equivalent to Part c) of Proposition 3: the sufficient
conditions under which the innovation rate in the baseline model is higher in the Nash
than in the cooperative equilibrium are also sufficient conditions to ensure that the gen-
eral innovation rate in the combined model is higher in the Nash than in the cooperative
equilibrium. Yet, the range of parameters for which this is true is expanded in the
combined model because of the second effect described above (for instance the “only if”
part of Remark 1 does not hold any more). Part b) corresponds to Proposition 4, but it
introduces the assumption δA,Nash ≤ δA,coop as a caveat because, as argued above, a low
general innovation rate can end up hurting relationship-specific innovation.38
this not the case, then there would be an additional force pushing for a higher level of relationship-
specific innovation in cooperative equilibrium than in the Nash one.
36This is by assumption but even if we were to allow for relationship specific innovation in bad matches
the rate would be lower.
37In other words, the share of producers in a bad match ω in equation (18) is replaced by a share
weighted according to the average technology level in the lines of producers in bad matches relative to
the average frontier technology in the economy. The average technology level in the lines of producers
in a bad match is lower because they do not benefit from relationship specific innovations.
38The assumption ψ(δB,coop2 ) ≤ Π(x∗1)(ν/ (1− ν) + 1 − δB,coop2 + δB,coop2 γB) is necessary because of
an additional interaction between general and relationship-specific innovation: a higher rate of general
innovation discourages relationship-specific innovation as the relationship-specific innovation diffuses in
this case. This assumption ensures that this effect is always dominated by the discount rate effect, so
that a higher rate of general innovation increases relationship-specific innovation.
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As in the models of sections 3 and 4, the scale effect proportionately increases the
value of any form of innovation in the cooperative equilibrium relative to the Nash equi-
librium; while the other effects push toward less general and more relationship specific
innovation in the cooperative than in the Nash equilibrium. Although the interaction
between the two innovation processes prevents us from showing analytically that the
ratio of general to relationship specific innovation is always higher in the cooperative
equilibrium than in the Nash one; we can show such a result in a partial equilibrium
setting: for given common future exogenous innovation rates then the relative incentive
to innovate today in general innovations is higher in the Nash than in the cooperative
case under mild conditions. More specifically, we show:
Remark 3. Assume that the innovation rates are exogenous and common to both equi-
libria, except at time 0 where they are endogenous. Assume that the normalized cost
functions at time 0 are given by ψA
(
δA
)
= ψ˜
A
ψ
(
δA
)ψ
and ψB
(
δB
)
= ψ˜
B
ψ
(
δB
)ψ
. In other
periods, exogenous innovation is either free or the cost function is the same as in time
0. Then the ratio of general innovation (δA0 ) to relationship specific innovations (δ
B
2,0) at
time 0 in augmented good match is higher in the Nash than in the cooperative case:
δA,Nash0 /δ
B,Nash
2,0 > δ
A,coop
0 /δ
B,coop
2,0 .
Further provided that either the exogenous rates satisfy γBψB
(
δB2
) ≥ ψB (δB1 ) or that
exogenous innovation is free, we get that the ratio of general innovation (δA0 ) to rela-
tionship specific innovations (δB1,0) at time 0 in regular good match is also higher in the
Nash than in the cooperative case:
δA,Nash0 /δ
B,Nash
1,0 > δ
A,coop
0 /δ
B,coop
1,0 .
6.2 Slow diffusion of innovations
Here we generalize the results of the general innovation model to slower diffusion of
technology. At the beginning of every period, an outdated supplier gets access to the
frontier technology with probability ∆ ∈ (0, 1] if there is no innovation and catches
up with the previous frontier technology if further innovation occurs. We consider a
cooperative equilibrium with the same structure as in Proposition 1. In particular, an
outdated supplier forgives the producer if the producer tries a frontier supplier who
turns out to be a bad match (similar results would hold without such “forgiveness”, see
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Appendix A.4). For simplicity, we focus our analysis on the case where after a deviation
the producer would rather try a new supplier than stay with a non-cooperating good
match. Finally, a producer can only keep track of one good match supplier: as soon
as he meets another good match supplier, he forgets the identity of the previous good
match he knew. This assumption simplifies the exposition in the contractible and Nash
cases.39
We now describe the incentive constraints that a good match supplier faces in the
cooperative case, letting the normalized value functions be V s1 if she has access to the
frontier technology and W s1 if she has not.
40 Consider first the case in which she has
access to the frontier technology at time t. Then, if she cooperates, in the following
period she will enjoy V s1 At if there is no innovation and W
s
1At+1 if an innovation occurs.
If she does not produce the required quantity her continuation value is 0 as the producer
never comes back to a supplier after a deviation. Therefore the reward from cooperating
at time t is given by 1−δ
D
1+ρ
((1 − δI)V s1 + δIγW s1 )At.41 The problem is the same as in
section 2 and there is a unique level of normalized investment undertaken by a frontier
good match supplier, x∗, which must satisfy the IC constraint (10).
Consider now the case of an outdated good match at time t, with level of investment
y∗. In period t+1, this good match supplier will become a good match supplier with the
frontier technology with probability ∆, otherwise she stays a good match supplier with
an outdated technology. Therefore, in the cooperative equilibrium, the IC constraint for
an outdated good match is given by:
γ−1ϕ (y∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)∆V s1 + ((1− δI) (1−∆) + δIγ)W s1 ) . (29)
39Otherwise, one would have to keep track of the number of good match suppliers that a producer
knows. A producer who knows more good matches is more likely to benefit from diffusion in the future,
which affects his decision to try the innovator or not. Since we focus on the case where he chooses
never to work again with a non-cooperating good match in the cooperative case, this assumption only
matters for the Nash and contractible cases. Moreover, making this assumption in section 2 would not
affect our results, so that the model of this section is a generalization of that of section 2.
40As before W s1 is positive even if the producer chooses to work with a new frontier supplier instead
of an outdated good match as cooperation can resume if the new supplier turns out to be a bad match
and the outdated good match benefits from imitation.
41Importantly this also applies to the innovator. Consider a period t where an innovation occurs,
then cooperation by the innovator depends on the outside option of the producer at time t+ 1 (as this
determines the value that a cooperating good match can capture). Similarly, the incentive to cooperate
for any good match frontier producer at time t + 1 depends on the producer’s outside option at time
t+2. But, at time t+1, a mass of firms will already have imitated the innovator, so that the producer’s
outside option is the same 1 or 2 periods after an innovation. Hence the problem faced by the innovator
at t is identical to that faced by any cooperating frontier good match supplier.
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As before, the encouragement effect pushes towards a higher level of cooperation in out-
dated relationships than in frontier relationships (the term γ−1 on the LHS of (29) pushes
for y∗ ≥ x∗). Yet, for ∆ < 1, the RHS in (29) is also lower than the RHS in (10) since
V s1 > W
s
1 , which pushes towards a lower level of cooperation in outdated relationships
(y∗ ≤ x∗). This occurs because starting a new relationship with a frontier supplier is a
more interesting outside option for a producer who is working with an outdated supplier
than for one who is already working with a frontier supplier. We refer to this effect as the
“outside option” effect. Overall the relationship between x∗ and y∗ is ambiguous and the
arrival of an innovation may weaken cooperation in established relationship. Neverthe-
less, in Appendix B.9, we show that ∆ ≥ (1 + ρ− b (1− δD)) / (γ (1 + ρ)− b (1− δD))
is a sufficient condition to ensure that y∗ ≥ x∗.
Furthermore, in Appendix B.9, we show that producers switch to the innovator in
the cooperative case if and only if
1− b+ bθ Π (n)
Π (x∗)
+ (1−∆)K
(
1− γ−1 Π (y
∗)
Π (x∗)
)
> γ−1
Π (y∗)
Π (x∗)
. (30)
with K ≡ (1−b)(1−δ
D)(1−δI)
1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI)(1−∆) > 0. This expression is the same as (13) except for
the last term on the LHS. That term captures the loss experienced by a producer who
stays with an outdated good match supplier (generating profits γ−1Π (y∗)) relative to
switching to a frontier good match supplier (with profits Π (x∗)) in all periods until either
the technology diffuses (which happens with probability ∆), or another innovation occurs
(which happens with probability δI). Everything else equal, slow diffusion of innovation
(a low ∆) encourages producers to switch to the innovator.
In the contractible and Nash cases, the producer switches suppliers when:
1− b+ bθ + (1−∆)K (1− γ−1) > γ−1. (31)
Comparing these two expressions reveals that, as before, the ease with which a switch
occurs in the cooperative compared with the contractible and Nash cases depend on the
different investment levels with a frontier good match (x∗), an outdated good match (y∗)
or a bad match (n). As before, the“worse bad match effect”(x∗ > n) makes relationships
more rigid in the cooperative case. In addition, if the encouragement effect dominates the
outside option effect, the investment of outdated suppliers is greater than that of frontier
suppliers in the cooperative equilibrium (y∗ > x∗), which also increases the rigidity of
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relationships in that case. On the other hand, it is now possible that relationships could
be less rigid in the cooperative case than in the contractible or cooperative case if the
outside option effect is strong enough (and y∗ < x∗).
Endogenizing the innovation rate in this set-up can be done as in section 3. As
before, the reward to innovation in the cooperative case depends positively on Π (x∗) and
Π (n) /Π (x∗) and negatively on Π (y∗) /Π (x∗), so that the comparison of the innovation
rate across the three cases depends on four effects. The scale effect pushes towards more
innovation in the contractible than in the cooperative case, and towards more innovation
in the cooperative than in the Nash case. The worse bad match effect pushes towards
more innovation in the contractible and Nash cases than in the cooperative case. And
if the encouragement effect dominates the outside option effect (y∗ > x∗), we obtain an
additional effect pushing towards less innovation in the cooperative case than in the two
other cases (having on the other hand y∗ < x∗ would push in the other direction). The
following Proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 6. Consider parameters such that ∆ >
1+ρ−b(1−δD)
γ(1+ρ)−b(1−δD) and assume that ψ
is sufficiently convex so that the equilibrium is unique, we then obtain: i) The level of
investment in outdated good matches is weakly higher than in frontier matches, y∗ ≥ x∗.
ii) For a given innovation rate, the parameter space under which relationships break
in the cooperative case is a subset of the parameter set under which they break in the
contractible or Nash case. iii) The innovation rate in the contractible case is larger than
in the cooperative case δcont > δcoop. iv) The innovation rate in the cooperative case may
be higher or lower than in the Nash case, but if δD is small enough and parameters are
such that relationships break in the Nash but not the cooperative case, then δcoop > δNash.
Therefore our earlier results are generalized to this case but only if innovations diffuse
sufficiently rapidly. How fast innovations diffuse depend on technological and institu-
tional characteristics, for instance weak intellectual property rights may favor rapid
technological diffusion. More generally, a slow diffusion of innovation seems to benefit
the innovation rate more in the cooperative case than in the two other cases because of
the outside option effect. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows how the three inno-
vation rates depend on the speed of diffusion for a low value of the probability of finding
a bad match b = 0.3 and a higher value b = 0.6.42 In both cases, for fast diffusion, the
innovation rate in the cooperative case is lower than both in the Nash and contractible
42The other parameters are the same and given by θ = 0.5, γ = 1.5, ρ = 0.05, δD = 0.04, σ = 3,
β = 0.5 and ψ (δ) = δ2/5.
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Figure 2: Innovation rate and speed of diffusion
cases. On the other hand, for slow diffusion, the innovation rate in the cooperative
case is even higher than in the contractible case. The innovation rates are lower when
innovation diffuses faster as fast innovation improves the outside option of producers
and therefore limits the reward that an innovator can capture. A lower share of bad
matches, b, reduces the importance of the worse bad match effect, which allows for a
higher innovation rate in the cooperative case relative to the two other cases. Overall,
our results suggest that IPR are a complement to contractual complexity and that weak
contractibility is particularly damaging in sectors of weak contractibility.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the development of relational contracts shifts technological
change away from broad to relationship-specific innovations. In a nutshell, our argument
goes as follows: Cooperative long-term relationships, can overcome the classic underin-
vestment associated with the lack of contractibility. However, it is only in relationships
which are a good fit—where parties understand that they are going to keep working to-
gether for a long time—that cooperation is sustainable in the first place. Consequently,
switching to a new supplier becomes a riskier activity because if the new supplier is a
bad fit, cooperation will not take place. More rigid relationships, in turn, slow down
the process of creative destruction. On the other hand, the complementarity between
cooperative behavior and relationship-specific innovations boosts the latter in a cooper-
ative equilibrium. We relate this to the recent economic experiences of Japan and the
United States. While Japan was highly praised in the 1980s and early 1990s for the
level of cooperation that firms demonstrated in the keiretsu system, Japan has been less
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successful than the United States in introducing new technologies to the global market
and the keiretsu system is now criticized for the rigidities that it has created.
An interesting extension to our analysis would be to include foreign outsourcing as
issues of incomplete contractibility and long-term relationships may be even more salient
when a firm is dealing with a supplier in a different country, as the firm may be less
familiar with the local judicial system.
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A Main Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix proves Proposition 1 in the case where a producer prefers working with a
new supplier over a non-cooperating good match in a period without innovation and with
a new outdated supplier over a non-cooperating good match in a period with innovation.
Since the incentive compatibility constraints of the supplier are satisfied, since the agents
revert to the one shot Nash strategy after a deviation, and since ex-ante transfers are
determined through Bertrand competition, it is direct that if the levels x∗and y∗ exist
then the strategies described in Proposition 1 lead to a SPNE. Proving the existence of
x∗and y∗ requires first showing that in all possible scenarii, on path or off path, there
are only two possible forms for the IC constraint of the supplier depending on whether
she has access to the frontier technology or not. Second, we need to show that these IC
constraints admit a solution with x∗, y∗ > n.
The proof proceeds in 4 steps: first we derive the condition under which a producer
in a good match tries out the innovator—equation (13) in the text. Second, we derive
the general form of the IC constraint. Third, we derive detailed expressions for the two
possible IC constraints in function of x∗and y∗—in this appendix we do it only when
a producer prefers working with a new supplier over a non-cooperating good match in
a period without innovation and with a new outdated supplier over a non-cooperating
good match in a period with innovation, the other cases are included in Appendix B.1.
Fourth, we show that there exist x∗, y∗ > n, satisfying the IC constraint under all possible
cases—in the same special case here and in general in Appendix B.1.
A.1.1 Step 1. Condition under which a producer in a good match switches
to the innovator (equation (13))
We consider a producer who knows a good match supplier with whom no deviation has
occurred and we study whether the producer would want to switch to the innovator
or not.43 We use the notations V zi and W
z
i , with i ∈ {0, 1} and z ∈ {s, p, T} defined
in the text. Furthermore, in periods with an innovation and for a relationship with the
innovator, we denote by V z,tI the value of the producer (z = p), or the supplier/innovator
43This analysis always applies on path. Off path it also applies except when the producer already
knows a non-cooperating good match and the value of a relationship with the innovator is lower than
the value of staying with this non-cooperating good match. That case is treated in Appendix B.1.
47
(z = s), knowing that previously the producer was in a good match who did not deviate
(t = g), or in a bad match (t = b). As a supplier forgives a producer who switches to the
innovator if the innovator turns out to be a bad match, the continuation value of a good
match supplier who is not chosen by the producer in a period with innovation does not
fall to 0 as the producer may come back to her if the innovator turns out to be a bad
match. We denote the expected value of such an (outdated) supplier by V sA.
The innovator and the old supplier enter in Bertrand competition, the old supplier
would be willing to offer a transfer that would guarantee herself at least V sA in order to
keep the producer, hence SPNE requires that:
W s1 ≥ V sA. (A.1)
Moreover Bertrand Competition ensures that the supplier with whom the relationship
is the highest captures the entire benefit of the relationship over the second best one,
hence the value of the producer whether he switches supplier or not is the same:
V p,gI = W
p
1 . (A.2)
The producer ends up switching if the highest amount that the innovator can offer is
higher than the highest amount that the old supplier can offer, that is if if the total
value of the producer and the innovator (V T,gI ) is higher than the surplus value of the
old relationship (W T1 − V sA).44
V T,gI > W
T
1 − V sA. (A.3)
The total value of a relationship with the innovator is given by:
V T,gI = (1− b) Π (x∗) + (1− b)
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 ) (A.4)
+ bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V p1 + δIγW p1 ) .
With probability 1 − b the relationship turns out to be good delivering profits Π (x∗)
in the first period and with continuation value V T1 if no innovation occurs and W
T
1 if
innovation occurs. With probability b, the relationship turns out to be a bad match, the
44Technically this is derived under the condition that the value a good match old supplier is willing
to offer is (weakly) higher than the value another outdated supplier would be willing to offer, when the
innovator is actually the best choice (otherwise it is obvious since an innovator necessarily offers more
than a new outdated supplier). We show in step 3 that this is necessarily true.
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continuation value for the supplier is then zero, and the producer goes back to his old
good match supplier, so that his value is V p1 if no innovation occurs and W
p
1 otherwise.
This leaves us with the expected value to the supplier from the possibility that the
producer returns, V sA as the only missing element. If the producer switches, the current
profits enjoyed by the old supplier are zero, but with probability b, the innovator will
turn out to be a bad match, in which case cooperation will resume, the old supplier will
get V s1 if no innovation occurs and W
s
1 otherwise, hence:
V sA =
1− δD
1 + ρ
b
((
1− δI)V s1 + δIγW s1 ) . (A.5)
Now combining (5), (A.4) and (A.5) one gets:
V T,gI −
(
W T1 − V sA
)
= (1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n)− 1
γ
Π (y∗) , (A.6)
which show that a good match producer switches to the innovator provided that equation
(13) holds.
A.1.2 Step 2. The general form of the incentive constraint
As argued in the text, the gain a supplier would get by deviating from the agreed level
of investment is given by ϕ(x)Ak with ϕ defined in (9). Should a deviation occurred,
the continuation value of the supplier may not always be 0 as in the case studied in the
text. Therefore, in general the incentive constraints obey:
ϕ (x∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
I and γ−1ϕ (y∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
I, (A.7)
where we define the effect of cooperation on the continuation value of the supplier:
I ≡ (1− δI)V s1 + δIγW s1 − ((1− δI)V sN + δIγW sN) . (A.8)
V sN and W
s
N are the value the supplier would get if she becomes a non-cooperating
good match (and investment would then be given by the Nash level), in periods where,
respectively, there is not and there is innovation. If the supplier cooperates, her value in
the following period is given by V s1 if there is no innovation and W
s
1 otherwise. The factor
γ−1 on the LHS of the second IC constraint comes from the fact that the technology of
the outdated supplier is only γ−1A.
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Combining (A.1), (A.2) and (A.6), we get:45
W s1 = V
s
A +
(
1
γ
Π (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n))
)+
, (A.9)
where X+ ≡ max {X, 0}.
Using equation (A.5) and (A.9) we get:
(
1− δI)V s1 + δIγW s1 (A.10)
=
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
((
1− δI)V s1 + δIγ (1γΠ (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n))
)+)
.
Finally note that V T1 must satisfy (4) which combined with (5) leads to:
V T1 =
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ)Π (x∗) + (1− δD) δIΠ (y∗)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) . (A.11)
If the producer does not already know a non-cooperating good match, we necessarily
get through Bertrand competition:
V p1 = V
T,n
0 and V
s
1 = V
T
1 − V T,n0 , (A.12)
where V T,n0 is the value of starting a new relationship when the producer knows a non-
cooperating good match (this is the general expression, see footnote 16). Indeed, the
outside option for the producer is to start a new relationship, but should he do so,
he would now know a non-cooperating good match, namely the good match he was
previously working with. If the producer knows a non-cooperating good match, then
his second best option will either be to resume a relationship with the non-cooperating
good match or to start a new relationship, now knowing two non-cooperating good match
suppliers, so that we get, through Bertrand Competition:
V s,n1 = V
T,n
1 −max
(
V TN , V
T,n
0
)
, (A.13)
where V TN denotes the joint value of a relationship with the non-cooperating good match.
As mentioned in the text, depending on parameters, there is a number of different
45That still requires that switching to the innovator is a better option than switching to a potential
non-cooperating good match when the producer knows one (see footnote 43).
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cases to consider. In order to save space we will consider only the case where in case of a
deviation the producer always seeks out a new producer. The other cases are considered
in Appendix B.1. The results of the paper hold in all cases.
A.1.3 Step 3 in a special case: When a deviation always leads the producer
to try out a different supplier
Assume that in periods without innovation, the producer would always rather try out a
new supplier than a non-cooperating good match, and, in periods with innovation, the
producer would prefer both the innovator or an outdated new supplier to an (outdated)
non-cooperating good match. That is, we assume:
V TN < V
T
0 and W
T
N < W
T
0 . (A.14)
and we need not index V T0 and W
T
0 by n as whether a producer knows a non-cooperating
good match or not is now irrelevant. As the producer will never return to a non-
cooperating good match, the continuation value of a non-cooperating good match (with
that producer) is 0:
(
1− δI)V sN + δIγW sN = 0. In (A.8), we can therefore focus on(
1− δI)V s1 + δIγW s1 which is given by equation (A.10). (A.12) implies that in this
case (8) holds. Therefore the incentive to cooperate is directly related to the value a
good match supplier captures in periods without innovation (V s1 ). In addition, whenever
the profits generated by an outdated good match supplier exceed the expected profits
with the innovator, the difference contributes to the value of the outdated supplier and
therefore to her incentive to cooperate.
(6) and (7) imply that the joint value W T0 obeys:
W T0 = V
T
0 − (1− b)
(
Π(x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− bθ (1− γ−1)Π (n) . (A.15)
This equation, together with (4) and (8) determine V s1 as a function of x
∗, y∗ and n:
V s1 =
b
((
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ) (Π (x∗)− θΠ (n)) + b (1− δD) δI (Π (y∗)− θΠ (n)))
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) .
(A.16)
Therefore V s1 corresponds to the appropriately discounted and weighted sum between the
difference in profits between a good match and bad match in periods without innovation
(Π (x∗)−θΠ (n)) and in periods with innovation (γ−1 (Π (y∗)− θΠ (n))). The factor b in
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front of the fraction reflects that a new supplier is a bad match with probability b. Even
for x∗, y∗ arbitrarily close to n, V s1 is positive as a good match supplier can capture the
rents associated with having revealed her type.
Combining (A.16) and (A.10), we find
I =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
 (1− δI) b((1+ρ−b(1−δD)δIγ)(Π(x∗)−θΠ(n))+b(1−δD)δI(Π(y∗)−θΠ(n)))1+ρ−b(1−δD)(1−δI+δIγ)
+δIγ
(
1
γ
Π (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n))
)+
 .
(A.17)
This establishes the IC constraints together with (10) and (11) in the main text and
determines the equilibrium investment levels x∗ and y∗.
Further, we had to check that in a period with innovation, when the producer switches
to the innovator, staying with a previous outdated good match supplier is still a better
outside option than trying a new outdated supplier (this is not obvious since the good
match supplier only offers W T1 − V sA to the producer). That is we need to check that
W T1 − V sA > W T0 . Combining (7) with (5), (A.5) and using (A.12) we obtain:
W T1 − V sA −W T0 =
b
γ
(Π (y∗)− θΠ (n)) + 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
bδIγ
(
W T1 − V sA −W T0
)
,
which shows that W T1 − V sA −W T0 > 0.
A.1.4 Step 4: Existence of a solution for x∗, y∗ in the same special case
Here we show that should the economy be in the case described above, then there is
a solution x∗, y∗ > n to the problem. To do that we simply need to show that the IC
constraints do not bind for (x, y) just above n. Because n minimizes ϕ, we have
ϕ (x) = o (x− n) and γ−1ϕ (y) = o (y − n) .
Therefore, we simply have to check that I is positive at the first order in (x− n) and
(y − n) when x and y are greater than n. Using (A.17), we get:
I =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
(
1− δI) b (1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)) (1− θ)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) Π (n) +
+
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ δ
Iγ
(
1
γ
− (1− b+ bθ)
)+
Π (n) ,
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which is positive at first order in (x− n), (y − n). This proves existence provided that
the conditions to be in this case are met (see Appendix B.1 for the rest of the proof).
A.2 Cooperative equilibrium characterization
In this appendix we provide a set of conditions on the equilibrium strategies that imply
that the agents must play according to Proposition 1. We denote by Hnt (j, k) the set
of histories of the game after t repetitions just after phase 5 has occurred (just after
the type has been revealed) when producer j and supplier k are matched for the first
time and supplier k has turned out to be a good match. We define a symmetry and
information condition:
Condition 1. Symmetry and Information (SI) i) For any history belonging to
∪
k
Hnt (j, k) where the supplier k has access to the frontier technology, the path of normal-
ized investment undertaken in the following histories by the new supplier k are the same,
and the decision of the producer to continue the relationship with the supplier k or not
is the same; similarly for any history belonging to ∪
k
Hnt (j, k) where the supplier k does
not have access to the frontier technology; ii) the strategies played with one producer are
independent of the history of the game played with other producers; iii) if a supplier has
been chosen by the producer, her normalized investment is independent of the ex-ante
transfer paid by the supplier.
Part i) is a symmetry condition. Provided that the supplier has access to the frontier
technology, every new good match relationship is identical in terms of the level of nor-
malized investment and of the producer’ decision to retain the supplier or not (both on
and off the equilibrium path). In particular, if a producer starts a relationship with the
innovator and the innovator turns out to be a good match, the outcome is symmetric to
the case where the producer started his first relationship. We cannot however require
that the strategies are identical, because, in general, the ex-ante transfer exchanged de-
pends on whether the producer knows a good match supplier or not. This condition
rules out equilibria where there is never cooperation with the innovator even if she is a
good match—without this condition it would be possible to build equilibria where the
path of investment levels is systematically lower with a new supplier than with the first
supplier. Part ii) allows us to keep the strategies with other producers independent, so,
for instance, producers cannot coordinate on punishing a supplier. Part iii) is necessary
to ensure that the supplier gets the full value of the relationship when the first best
53
is achieved. Otherwise it is possible to build equilibria where part of the surplus of a
relationship would go to the producer, despite Bertrand competition. It should be clear
that conditions i) and ii) avoid equilibria where players could coordinate their actions
on histories that should have no direct impact on their interactions. Such restrictions
would necessarily operate in an alternative environment where we directly restricted
the information available to the players. Condition iii) does not affect our results but
simplifies the exposition.
As described in the text, we define a forgiveness condition which ensures that a
supplier does not punish a producer who switched to the innovator if the innovator
turns out to be a bad match.
Condition 2. Forgiveness. The strategy played by a good match supplier at time t,
is the same when the producer has worked with the supplier at time t− 1 and when the
producer has worked with an innovator but the innovator turned out to be a bad match.
Denoting respectively by V p,j (σ) and V s,k (σ) the values of producer j and supplier
k, when the profile of strategy is σ, we formally define the bilateral rationality condition
as follows.
Condition 3. Bilateral rationality. At any history ht ∈ Hnt (j, k) , σ|ht is such
that there is no σ′ =
(
σ′j|ht, σ′k|ht, σ−k|ht
)
(where σ−k denotes the profile of the other
suppliers) where σ′j|h′t = σj|h′j for all histories h′t ∈ Hnt (j, k′) (k 6= k′), σ′ satisfies
condition 2, and neither player j nor player k have an incentive to deviate from σ′, such
that V p,j (σ′) + V s,k (σ′) > V p,j (σ) + V s,k (σ) .
Bilateral rationality here means that a new pair chooses strategies that maximize
their joint value under the condition that the strategy of the producer with a new good
match is given (the producer is expected to renegotiate his strategies once he has found a
new good match), strategies are enforceable (neither the producer nor the supplier have
an incentive to deviate), and the forgiveness condition is not violated. This condition
rules out “collusive” behavior by suppliers: in a good match, suppliers are willing to
cooperate as much as possible right away.46 Finally, we impose:
Condition 4. No investment in bad matches. Normalized investment levels in bad
matches are given by the Nash investment level, n.
46This condition should not be confused with a “renegotiation-proof” condition. If one of the players
deviates from the prescribed strategies a punishment phase is allowed even if it yields lower profits.
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If the productivity level θ is sufficiently low, this condition is automatically met as a
producer would continue to search for a new supplier regardless of whether cooperation
in bad matches is possible or not. We then obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 7. In any symmetric SPNE satisfying conditions 1-4, agents’ strategies
are given as in Proposition 1.
Proof. It is direct to check that the strategies of Proposition 1 obey conditions 1-4.
Appendix B.2 shows that conditions 1-4 imply the strategies of Proposition 1.
A.3 Level of cooperation
In this section we study how the levels of investment in the cooperative equilibrium
depend on the model’s parameters. We restrict attention to the case where the innovation
rate is exogenous. We obtain the following proposition and remark, which are proved in
Appendix B.3.
Proposition 8. (i) The investment levels (x∗, y∗) weakly increase with the number of bad
matches, b, and decrease with the relative productivity of bad matches, θ, the discount
rate, ρ, and the probability of death δD; (ii) when the innovator captures the entire
market, the investment levels (x∗, y∗) increase in the size of innovations γ.
Remark 4. When a producer would always rather try a new supplier than work with a
non-cooperative good match supplier, and the innovator captures the entire market, the
investment levels (x∗, y∗) decrease with the rate of innovation δI provided that innova-
tions are not too large ( γb
(
1− δD) (2− δI) < 1 + ρ is a sufficient condition).
How much suppliers cooperate depends on how bad the alternative option is. There-
fore if the probability of a bad match, b is higher, or if they are more severe (low θ), a
good relationship will have more value, and the potential for cooperation is higher. A
higher value of the future (lower ρ and δD) have the same effect. This follows directly
from (A.16) and (A.10) in the specific case where a producer does not work again with a
good match supplier who has stopped cooperating. Furthermore, we get that when the
innovator captures the entire market (γ > γcoop), large innovations favor cooperation.
The reason is that larger innovations lead to a higher growth rate, which increases the
expected value a supplier can capture by cooperating, favoring more investment in good
matches. If the innovator does not capture the entire market then larger innovations
also reduce the value a good match supplier can capture in periods with innovation.
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Finally, the effect of the rate of innovation is in general ambiguous, even when the
innovator captures the entire market. More frequent innovations will have three effects on
investment levels: (i) a positive effect through a higher growth rate, (ii) a negative effect
through a higher probability of ending the relationship, and (iii) a further negative effect
which reflects that the benefit of being in a good match over a random match is higher
in periods without innovation (and this benefit is precisely what drives the incentive
to cooperate). For sufficiently small innovations, effect (ii) dominates effect (i), so that
more frequent innovations lower the level of cooperation. We can compare this result to
Francois and Roberts (2003), who show that an increase in innovation can push firms
towards providing short-term contract arrangements instead of implicit guarantees of
lifetime employment to their workers. In our model, the same idea is captured by the
possible decrease in cooperation following an increase in the innovation rate.
A.4 Alternative equilibrium where suppliers systematically pun-
ish producers who switch to the innovator
In this appendix, we describe an alternative cooperative equilibrium where the supplier
always refuses to reengage in cooperation if the producer switches to the innovator.
That is the strategy of the supplier described in Proposition 1 is modified such that a
cooperating good match becomes a non-cooperating good match as soon as a producer
switches to the innovator (regardless of the innovator’s type). For the sake of simplicity,
we focus on parameters value for which a producer would rather switch supplier than
stay with a non cooperative good match. We also assume that when innovators decide
on how much to invest, they are unaware of when the last innovation occurred.47 We
prove the following proposition (where the innovation rate in the alternative cooperative
case refers to the highest equilibrium level) in Appendix B.6.
Proposition 9. (i) The parameter set for which innovators capture the whole mar-
ket in the alternative cooperative case is strictly smaller than the parameter set for
which innovators capture the whole market in the contractible or the Nash cases; in
particular, the minimum technological leap required for an innovator to capture the
whole market in the alternative cooperative case (γcoop2) is higher than that in the con-
tractible or Nash cases (γcon, γNash): γcoop2 > γcon = γNash. (ii) For ρ small enough
47Otherwise there would not be a steady-state because the share of producers who are not in an
ongoing good match relationship depends on when the last innovation occurred if innovations are large
enough.
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(ρ < (γ/δcoop2 − 1) (1− b (1− δD))+ b (1− δD) δcoop2 (γ − 1) is a sufficient condition),
the innovation rate in the alternative cooperative case is lower than in the contractible
case. (iii) The innovation rate in the alternative cooperative case may be lower or higher
than in the Nash case, it is lower if γ ∈ (γcont, γcoop2) and δDis sufficiently small.
This proposition stipulates that our results carry through in this alternative equilib-
rium. This is not surprising and in some sense the results are reinforced. Indeed, if a
producer switches to the innovator, and the innovator turns out to be a bad match, the
producer would have to suffer additional losses in the periods following innovation as he
would have to keep looking for a good match, since the previous one would have stopped
cooperating. This loss of cooperation effect pushes towards more rigid relationships in
the cooperative case than in the contractible or Nash cases. In Appendix B.6, we show
that producers would switch to the innovator if and only if
(1− b) + bθ Π (n)
Π (x∗)
− b1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(
1− δI) (V T1 − V T0 )+ δIγ (W T1 −W T0 )
Π (x∗)
> γ−1
Π (y∗)
Π (x∗)
,
(A.18)
The third term in (A.18) (which is absent in (13)) reflects the loss of cooperation effect.
It is equal to the loss in expected profits which occurs if the innovator turns out to be a
bad match and the producer has to look for a new supplier in the subsequent periods,
scaled by the profits in a good match at the frontier (Π (x∗)). This loss corresponds to
the difference in the joint value of a relationship with a good match compared to a new
relationship, namely V T1 − V T0 in periods without innovation and W T1 −W T0 in periods
with an innovation. Therefore, Proposition (2) carries through.
The scale effect still pushes towards more innovation in the cooperative case than in
the Nash case, but towards less innovation than in the contractible case. The encourage-
ment effect, the worse bad match effect and now the loss of cooperation effect, by making
relationships more rigid, push towards less innovation in the cooperative case than in
both the Nash and contractible cases. There is however a counteracting general equi-
librium effect : when innovations are sufficiently large to break up existing relationships
(γ > γcoop2), there will be more producers not in an ongoing good match relationship
in the cooperative than in both the contractible and Nash cases.48 As an innovator
captures more value from producers who are not in an ongoing good match relationship,
48In the cooperative case, the share of producers previously not in a good match is given by
δD+bδI(1−δD)
1−b(1−δD)(1−δI) when γ > γ
coop but by δ
D
1−b(1−δD) when γ < γ
coop or in the Nash or contractible
cases.
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this force pushes towards more innovation in the cooperative than in the Nash but also
contractible cases. As a lower discount rate strengthens the loss-of-cooperation effect,
the general equilibrium effect is dominated for a sufficiently low discount rate ρ, which
explains Part ii) of Proposition 9.49 As before if γ ∈ (γNash, γcoop2) , the innovator breaks
relationships in the Nash case but not in the cooperative case, this implies that if the
death rate of producers δD is sufficiently small, the innovator gets a much smaller market
so that the innovation rate is lower in the cooperative case than in the Nash (Part iii)
of Proposition 9).50
Loss of good matches in the contractible and Nash cases. Alternatively, it
may be that even in the contractible or Nash cases, a producer cannot resume working
with a supplier after the relationship was halted, either because the two parties suffer
a utility loss, or because the producer forgets the identity of a good match once he
has stopped working with her. Under this scenario, switching to an innovator involves
losing a good match supplier also for the contractible and Nash cases. Nevertheless,
our results carry through: the parameter space for which a switch occurs is smaller in
the cooperative case than in the contractible or Nash cases; the innovation rate is lower
in the cooperative case than in the contractible case; and it is also lower than in the
Nash case for an intermediate range of innovation sizes provided that the death rate of
producers is low enough.51
A.5 Rigidity in relationships and information externalities
Though we have used an endogenous growth model, the point that relationships can
be detrimental to welfare can be made in other contexts. Instead of the externalities
associated with the endogenous growth model (imitation and standing-on-the-shoulders-
49The condition in the proposition 9 will be satisfied for reasonable parameter values since γ >
γcoop2 > (1− b+ bθ)−1 is necessary for the general equilibrium effect to exist, and δcoop2 is small.
50The proposition focused on the cooperative equilibrium with the highest innovation rate. Yet, in the
cooperative case, the expected share of producers who are not with a good match supplier (ω) increases
with the innovation rate for γ > γcoop2, so that there is significant room for multiple equilibria. For
instance, there could be an equilibrium where innovation is scarce, so that most producers have found
a good match supplier and cooperation is widespread, and another equilibrium, where innovation is
frequent and cooperation is rare.
51We obtain that γNash = γcont =
[
1− b+ bθ − (1−δ
D)b2(1−θ)
1+ρ−b(1−δD)(1−δI+δIγ)
]−1
. Hence the worse bad
match and the encouragement effects make the loss of a good match supplier relatively more costly in
the cooperative than in the Nash or contractible cases. In addition, for a given rate of innovation, the
share of producers who do not know a good match at the beginning of a period in steady-state is the
same in all cases, so that the general equilibrium effect described above ceases to play a role.
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of-giants) we consider here an information externality: firms are more likely to choose a
supplier who is already active. Therefore a producer who decides to keep a supplier who
has suffered a negative productivity shock because of their ongoing relationship exerts a
negative externality on other producers. This externality is needed for relationships to
reduce welfare.
As before, a producer needs to pick a supplier to produce and the match can be either
good or bad. For simplicity we set δD = 0 such that all producers are infinitely-lived
and therefore know a good match supplier. Contrary to section 2, we now assume that
there is no growth in productivity. Instead a supplier’s productivity Ak is drawn each
period and takes three values with equal probability: 1, γ and γ2. Productivity draws
are independent. The reason for three values will become apparent below. We formalize
the information externality as follows. Suppliers cannot make take-it or leave-it offers
to all producers. Instead producers must choose between a limited set of suppliers in a
staggered fashion. At the beginning of the period a share λ of producers can costlessly
choose one additional potential supplier. They do not yet have any information on the
productivity shocks of suppliers and will choose one at random. The potential supplier
and the previous good match then make take-it or leave-it offers to the producer who
decides with whom to work.52 The remaining 1−λ producers observe these choices—but
not any productivity shocks—before choosing their potential supplier. They also receive
take-it or leave-it offers from the potential new supplier and the previous good match
supplier before choosing a supplier. Since the choice of the first λ producers on whether
to continue operation with a supplier contains information on the productivity shock of
this supplier, we label it an “information” externality. More generally, this is meant to
capture that for a variety of reasons—search costs, reputation benefits etc.—firms are
more likely to choose business partners already in operation.
In the cooperative case, we consider an equilibrium which is similar to that described
in section 2. In particular, there is no cooperation in bad matches and there are 3 levels
of cooperation in good matches (x0, x1 and x2 depending on the technology level Ak), but
for simplicity we consider parameters such that x0 = x1 = x2 = m in the text. Further,
cooperation between a good match supplier and a producer ceases if either the supplier
deviated on her investment level, the producer switched to a supplier with a weakly
worse technology or the producer switched to a supplier with a better technology and
that supplier turned out to be a good match. As a result, in all cases (cooperative, Nash
52At this stage the productivity of each supplier becomes known by the alternative supplier, the
previous supplier and the producer.
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and contractible) a producer chooses to switch supplier if and only if current expected
profits are higher with the new supplier than with the previous good match.
A producer keeps his good match supplier if she has a higher productivity than
the alternative supplier. In the Nash or contractible case, he switches to a supplier
with a technology that is γ times more productive than the existing one if and only if
γ (1− b+ bθ) > 1 (as in (12)). Similarly, he switches to an alternative supplier with
a technology γ2 times more productive if and only if γ2 (1− b+ bθ) > 1. And for
reasons analogous to (13), in the cooperative case, he switches to a supplier with a
technology γ times more productive if γ ((1− b) Π (m) + bθΠ (n)) > Π (m) and to one
with a technology γ2 times more productive if γ2 ((1− b) Π (m) + bθΠ (n)) > Π (m). As
before cooperation creates rigidity for intermediate values of γ: if γ ∈ (γNash, γcoop), a
producer switches supplier if her previous one does not have the higher technology in
the Nash but not in the cooperative case.
Assume that γ ∈ (γNash, γcoop) but γ2 > γcoop: a producer switches supplier if and
only if that supplier has a technology at least 1 step ahead in the Nash case but 2 steps
ahead in the cooperative case. The first round of producers choose their alternative
supplier at random who are therefore equally likely to have productivities 1, γ and γ2.
Now, consider the remaining (1 − λ) producers. If they choose among suppliers
randomly they have an equal probability of meeting a supplier with probability 1, γ
and γ2. However, as derived in Appendix B.10 if they choose their potential suppliers
among those that are already in production, the distribution of productivity will be 1
with probability 1/9, γ with probability 1/3 and γ2 with probability 5/9 in the Nash
or contractible cases. Since their alternative supplier has already been judged a better
option by another producer, their odds are better than for the first group.
By comparison, in the cooperative case, the alternative supplier’s productivity in the
second round is distributed as follows: 1 with probability 2/9, γ with probability 1/3
and γ2 with probability 4/9. As the first round producers prefer to stick to a supplier
who has a technology one step below that of their alternative supplier, the average
productivity of suppliers who secure a market during the first round in the cooperative
case is worse than in the Nash or contractible cases. This information externality reduces
the appeal of the cooperative equilibrium relative to the Nash case. More specifically,
we demonstrate in Appendix B.10 the following proposition.
Proposition 10. i) If all producers are in the first group (λ = 1), welfare is always
higher in the cooperative than in the Nash case. ii) Otherwise, welfare may be lower in
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the cooperative case than in the Nash case; in particular this happens when λ is close to
0, cooperation achieves the first best in good matches, γNash < γ < γcoop < γ2 and the
level of investment in the Nash case is sufficiently high. iii) Welfare is the highest in the
contractible case.
Absent the information externality, cooperation necessarily increases welfare despite
the additional rigidity. This is because producers choose the supplier who maximizes
their expected profits, which maximizes aggregate profits. In addition, producers are
less likely to switch in the cooperative case, which increases the average expected level
of investment from suppliers. Since from a welfare stand-point, investment is too low
because of the standard monopoly distortion, it must be the case that welfare is higher
in the cooperative than in the Nash case.
On the other hand, the interaction between the information externality and the
excess rigidity of relationships in the cooperative case reduces welfare in the cooperative
case. Although, it requires somewhat specific parameter combinations, this effect can be
sufficiently strong to make cooperation welfare reducing.53 This is a general lesson of the
paper: as long as producers choose their suppliers efficiently from the point of view of
the expected profits in their line, an externality (here the information externality, earlier
the imitation and standing on the shoulders of giants externality) is necessary to make
rigid relationships potentially welfare reducing.
53This does not rest on the monopoly distortion, as cooperation also reduces aggregate profits. More-
over, one can increase the parameter space for which cooperation is welfare reducing, for instance by
adding a share of one-period lived producers who get to pick their supplier after the first round of
long-lived producers do so.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Cooperative equilibrium characterization: complements
In this appendix we complete the proof of Proposition 7 in Appendix A.1 by going
through steps 3 and 4 in all possible cases and showing that they cover the full range of
possibilities.
B.1.1 Step 3: deriving the IC constraint in all cases.
Whether a producer would rather stick to a non-cooperating good match (a good match
playing the Nash level because a deviation has occurred) or keep looking for a new
supplier will affect the IC constraint. We derive it in all the possible cases:
- case 1, when the producer will choose the non-cooperating good match in any
circumstances,
- case 2, when the producer will choose the innovator over the non-cooperating good
match, but stick to the non-cooperating good match otherwise,
- case 3, when the producer will choose the non-cooperating good match in period
without innovation, but in period with innovation the non-cooperating good match is
worse than even an outdated supplier,
- case 4, when the producer will choose a new match in periods without innovation,
but in period with innovation, the non-cooperating good match is better than trying an
outdated supplier,
- case 5, when the non-cooperating good match is never one of the two best options
(which is the special case studied in Appendix A.1).
Moreover, in cases 1, 2 and 3, the non-cooperating good match could be chosen one
step away from the equilibrium path, we then need to check that whether the producer
knows only one non-cooperating good match or more matters.
Case 1.1 We consider the case where the non-cooperating good match is always better
than starting a new relationship. We consider a producer who only knows one non-
cooperating good match (and no other good match), we derive the conditions under
which this case applies, and the incentive constraint of a producer who would be in a
good match relationship and would not know any non-cooperating good match. We still
denote by V TN the joint value of the producer and the non-cooperating good match in
periods without innovation and we define W TN as the corresponding value in periods with
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innovation. We then get:
V TN = Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγW TN) , (B.1)
W TN = γ
−1Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγW TN) . (B.2)
Now recall that V T,n0 denotes the joint value when a producer starts a new relationship
(n indicates that the producer knows a non-cooperating good match) in periods without
innovation, we denote by V T,nI the same value in periods with innovation, and we get:
V T,nI = V
T,n
0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V pN + δIγW pN) , (B.3)
with probability (1− b) the new supplier is a good match and the joint value becomes
V T1 , with probability b the new supplier is a bad match, in which case the producer
should revert back to the non-cooperating good match in the following period. Bertrand
competition ensures that:
V pN = V
T,n
0 and V
s
N = V
T
N − V T,n0 , (B.4)
W pN = V
T,n
I and W
s
N = W
T
N − V T,nI . (B.5)
The condition to be in that case is that in periods with innovation the producer would
rather stick to the non-cooperating good match than choose the innovator, note that if
the producer chooses the innovator, the value of the non-cooperating good match is not
null, instead it is given by:
V sAN =
1− δD
1 + ρ
b
((
1− δI)V sN + δIγW sN) , (B.6)
as with probability b the innovator will be a bad match and the producer would revert
back to the non-cooperating good match in the following period. The condition to be in
that case can then be expressed as:
W TN ≥ V T0 + V sAN . (B.7)
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Combining (B.1) and (B.2), we get:
W TN = V
T
N −
(
1− γ−1)Π (n) , (B.8)
so that:
V TN =
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)Π (n) . (B.9)
Combining (B.3), (B.6) and (B.8), we can rewrite (B.7) as:
V TN −
(
1− γ−1)Π (n) ≥ (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b1− δD1 + ρ ((1− δI)V TN + δIγW TN) ,
which using (B.9) translates into:(
γ−1 (1 + ρ)− b (1− δD)+ (1− δD) (1− δI) (1− γ−1))Π (n)
(1 + ρ) (1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)) (B.10)
≥ ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)) .
Now we want to express the IC constraint of a producer in a good match who does
not know any non-cooperating good match. To do so, we first need to compute the
expected value of a non-cooperating good match. Combining (B.3), (B.4) and (B.5) we
get:
V T,nI = V
T,n
0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
1− δI + δIγ)V T,n0 ,
so that:
V T,nI = V
T,n
0 =
1 + ρ
(1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ))
(
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
)
, (B.11)
which combined with (B.9) gives:
V sN =
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)Π (n)
− 1 + ρ
(1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ))
(
(1− b)V T ′1 + bθΠ (n)
)
,
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W sN =
γ−1 (1 + ρ) + (1− γ−1) (1− δD) (1− δI)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) Π (n)
− 1 + ρ
(1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ))
(
(1− b)V T ′1 + bθΠ (n)
)
.
Therefore we can write:
(
1− δI)V sN + δIγW sN (B.12)
=
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)Π (n)
− (1 + ρ)
(
1− δI + δIγ)
(1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ))
(
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
)
Using (A.12) and (B.11) we get:
V s1 = V
T
1 −
1 + ρ
(1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ))
(
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
)
. (B.13)
Combining (A.8), (A.10), (B.12), (B.13) and (A.11), and knowing that if the non-
cooperating good match is better than the innovator, then a good match supplier is
also necessarily better than the innovator, we get:
I =
(1 + ρ)
((
1− δI)Π (x∗) + δIΠ (y∗)− Π (n))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1 + δI (γ − 1)) .
Case 1.2 We consider now the same situation except that the producer already knows
at least two non-cooperating good match suppliers. Note that Bertrand competition
implies that the producer can then capture the entire value of the relationship so that:
V sN = W
s
N = V
s
AN = 0, V
p
N = V
T
N and W
p
N = W
T
N (B.14)
(B.1), (B.2) and therefore (B.9) still hold. However (B.3) combined with (B.14) now
gives:
V T,n0 = V
T,n
I = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγW TN) , (B.15)
and the condition to be in that case is now
W TN ≥ V T,n0 ,
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instead of (B.7) (as the value of the non-cooperating good match is always null). This
condition then leads to:(
γ−1 (1 + ρ)− b (1− δD)+ (1− δD) (1− δI) (1− γ−1))Π (n)
(1 + ρ) (1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ))
≥ ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)) .
which is the same condition as in case 1.
(A.13) gives:
V s1 = V
T
1 − V TN .
Now note that we are precisely in the case where the analysis leading to (A.9) may not
apply. If the producer would rather switch to the non-cooperating good match than the
innovator, we get that:
W p1 = W
T
N and W
s
1 = W
T
1 −W TN ,
so that we get:
I =
(1 + ρ)
((
1− δI)Π (x∗) + δIΠ (y∗)− Π (n))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1 + δI (γ − 1)) .
The incentive constraint for a supplier with a producer who knows a non-cooperating
good match is the same as in case 1, which is a necessary requirement for the existence
of the equilibrium (because condition 1 requires that the profile of investment with a
good match supplier is always the same even if the good match supplier is not the first
good match supplier).
We need however to check that switching to the innovator when one is in a good match
remains worse than switching to the non-cooperating good match (this is conceptually
not equivalent as saying that a producer with a non-cooperating good match would not
switch to the innovator, indeed for a producer in a good match, switching to the innovator
does not necessarily lead to punishment in the following period, whereas switching to the
non-cooperating good match does so54). We prove this by contradiction, assume that a
producer in a good match would rather deviate by switching to the innovator than to
54We will not have to worry about this in the following cases because there the non-cooperating
good match will be worse than the innovator for a producer not in a good match (by assumption),
which therefore implies that the non-cooperating good match will be worse than the innovator also for
a producer in a good match.
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the non-cooperating good match. We would then get:
W p1 = V
T,g
I = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) +
b
(
1− δD)
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγV T,gI ) ,
with the condition V T,gI > W
T
N , however this condition leads to the reverse of condition
(B.10).
Case 2.1 We now consider again a producer who knows only a single non-cooperating
good match. We assume that sticking to the non-cooperating good match is preferred
to trying out a new supplier in periods without innovation, or an outdated supplier in
periods with innovation, but remains worse than switching to the innovator in periods
with innovation. In other words, we assume:
V TN ≥ V T,n0 and W T,n0 ≤ W TN − V sAN ≤ V T,nI . (B.16)
Bertrand competition leads to (B.4) and to:
W sN = V
s
AN and W
p
N = V
p,n
I = W
T
N − V sAN , (B.17)
the value of the non-cooperating good match in periods with innovation is not null
because if the innovator turns out to be a bad match, the producer would come back to
the non-cooperating good match in the following periods.
(B.1), (B.2) (and therefore (B.8) and (B.9)), (B.3) and (B.6) still hold. (B.6), (B.17)
and (B.4) give:
V sAN =
b
(
1− δD) (1− δI)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ
(
V TN − V T,n0
)
. (B.18)
Moreover, we get (using (B.8), (B.17) and (B.18)):
W pN = V
p,n
I =
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ V
T
N−
(
1− γ−1)Π (n)+ b (1− δD) (1− δI)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγV
T,n
0 .
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Plugging this into (B.3) leads to:
V T,n0 =
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ) (1− b)V T1
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
δIγV TN
+
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)bθΠ (n)
− 1 + ρ−
(
1− δD) bδIγ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)b
1− δD
1 + ρ
δIγ
(
1− γ−1)Π (n) .
Using (B.9), we further get:
V T,n0 =
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ) ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n))
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) (B.19)
+ b
1− δD
1 + ρ
δIγ
×
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ (1− γ−1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) −
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
(
1− γ−1))Π (n) .
We can then express the conditions of (B.16) as:
γ−1 (1 + ρ)− b (1− δD)+ (1− δD) (1− δI) (1− γ−1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) Π (n) (B.20)
≤ (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
≤
(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1))Π (n)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
− ((1− γ−1) (1− bθ) Π (n)− (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)))+ .
We now move on to compute the incentive constraint of a producer in a good match.
Using (B.17) and (B.6), we get:
(
1− δI)V sN + δIγW sN = (1 + ρ) (1− δI)V sN1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ . (B.21)
In this case (A.10) and (A.12) apply, combining them with (A.11), (B.4) and (B.21) we
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can express the reward from cooperation I as:
I =
(1 + ρ)
((
1− δI)V s1 + δIγ ( 1γΠ (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n)))+)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ −
(1 + ρ)
(
1− δI)V sN
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ
(B.22)
=
(1 + ρ)
((
1− δI) (V T1 − V TN )+ δIγ ( 1γΠ (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n)))+)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
=
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
 (1−δI)((1+ρ−(1−δD)δIγ)Π(x∗)+(1−δD)δIΠ(y∗)−(1+ρ−(1−δD)δIγ(1−γ−1))Π(n))1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI+δIγ)
+δIγ
(
1
γ
Π (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n))
)+
 .
Recall that we needed to check that when a producer in a good match switches
to the innovator, sticking to the old supplier remains better than trying out a new
outdated supplier, that is we need to check that W p1 = W
T
1 − V sA > W T,n0 . Using that
V p1 = V
p
n = V
T,n
0 , we get:
W p1 =
1
γ
Π (y∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
(1− b) ((1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 )+ b((1− δI)V T,n0 + δIγW p1 ))
W T,n0 =
1− b
γ
Π (y∗) +
bθΠ (n)
γ
+
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
(1− b) ((1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 )+ b((1− δI)V T,n0 + δIγW T,n0 ))
so the inequality is satisfied.
Case 2.2 As for case 1 2, we now consider the same situation as in case 2.1 except that
the producer knows two non-cooperating good match suppliers. To ensure the existence
of the equilibrium we need that the conditions to be in case 2.2 are the same as the
conditions to be in case 2.1, and that the IC constraint that we derive here (the IC
constraint for a producer in a good match who knows a non-cooperating good match)
is the same as the incentive constraint derived in case 2..1. (B.1), (B.2) (and therefore
(B.8) and (B.9)) still hold. Bertrand competition now leads to (B.14), so that (B.3)
gives (B.15) as in case 1 2. The conditions to be in that case now writes as
V TN ≥ V T,n0 and W T,n0 ≤ W TN ≤ V T,nI , (B.23)
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as V sAN = 0. Using equations (B.15), (B.8) and (B.9) we get that these conditions are
equivalent to (B.20) as it should.
For the IC constraint, (A.13) gives V s1 = V
T
1 −V TN , (A.10) still holds, so using (B.14)
we directly get that I is given by (B.22) as it should.
Note that we need to check that when the producer does not switch to the innovator,
sticking to a good match supplier remains a better option than going for the innovator,
that is we need to check that W p1 = W
T
1 − V sA remains greater than W TN this is direct
because:
W p1 =
1
γ
Π (y∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
(1− b) ((1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 )+ b ((1− δI)V TN + δIγW p1 ))
W TN =
1
γ
Π (y∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγW TN) ,
and
(
1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 > (1− δI)V TN + δIγW p1 .
Case 3.1 We now consider the case where the producer would rather stick to the non-
cooperating good match in periods without innovation, but, in periods with innovations,
the non-cooperating good match is worse than even a new outdated supplier. We consider
a producer who only knows one non-cooperating good match. The conditions to be in
that case can then be expressed as:
V TN ≥ V T,n0 and
(
W TN − V sAN
) ≤ W T,n0 .
As a consequence, the value of a producer in a period without innovation when he knows
a non-cooperating good match is given by
V p,nI = W
T,n
0 . (B.24)
We get that (B.1) must be replaced by:
V TN = Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγ (W T,n0 + V sAN)) , (B.25)
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in a period with innovation, the value of the non-cooperating good match supplier is
indeed not null and given by V sAN , where V
s
AN is given by
V sAN =
1− δD
1 + ρ
b
((
1− δI)V sN + δIγV sAN) . (B.26)
Note that (B.8) still holds. (B.3) is replaced by:
V T,n0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V pN + δIγV p,nI ) , (B.27)
while the value of starting a relationship with an outdated supplier is given by:
W T,n0 = V
T,n
0 − (1− b)
(
Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y))− bθ (1− γ−1)Π (n) . (B.28)
Bertrand competition still leads to (B.4), which, together with (B.24), (B.27) and (B.28)
gives:
V T,n0 =
(1 + ρ)
(
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) −
δIγb
(
1− δD) (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
(B.29)
− b
(
1− δD) δIγbθ (1− γ−1) Π (n)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) .
Now (B.4) and (B.26) give:
V sAN =
b
(
1− δD) (1− δI)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ
(
V TN − V T,n0
)
. (B.30)
Combining (B.25), (B.28), (B.29) and (B.30), we get:
V TN =
1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ
1 + ρ− (1− δI) (1− δD)− (1− δD) bδIγΠ (n) +
(
1− δD) δIγ ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n))
1 + ρ− (1− δI) (1− δD)− (1− δD) bδIγ
(B.31)
−
(
1− δD) δIγ (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))
1 + ρ− (1− δI) (1− δD)− (1− δD) bδIγ −
(
1− δD) δIγbθ (1− γ−1) Π (n)
1 + ρ− (1− δI) (1− δD)− (1− δD) bδIγ .
71
The condition V TN ≥ V T,n0 and
(
W TN − V sAN
) ≤ W T,n0 then translate into:(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1))Π (n)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) (B.32)
− ((1− bθ) (1− γ−1)Π (n)− (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)))
≤ (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
≤ 1 + ρ− b
(
1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) Π (n)
+
(
(1− b) δIγ (1− δD)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
)(
(1− bθ) (1− γ−1)Π (n)− (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))) ,
this case exists only when (1− bθ) (1− γ−1) Π (n)− (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)) ≥ 0.
We now move to express the IC constraint. First note that (B.4) and (B.30) lead to
(
1− δI)V sN + δIγV sAN = (1 + ρ) (1− δI)1 + ρ− (1− δD) bδIγ (V TN − V T,n0 ) .
Combining this with (A.10), (A.12), (A.11) and (B.31), we get:
I =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
 (1−δI)((1+ρ−b(1−δD)δIγ)(Π(x∗)−Π(n))+b(1−δD)δI(Π(y∗)−θΠ(n)))(1+ρ−(1−δI)(1−δD)−(1−δD)bδIγ)
+δIγ
(
1
γ
Π (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n))
)  .
(B.33)
Checking that trying a new outdated supplier is worse than staying with a good match
supplier for a producer when innovation occurs proceeds as in case 2.
Case 3.2 As before we redo this case assuming that there are several non-cooperating
good match suppliers. The condition now writes as:
V TN > V
T,n
0 and W
T
N < W
T,n
0 . (B.34)
Bertrand competition leads to
V sN = W
s
N = V
s
AN = 0, V
p
N = V
T
N and V
p,n
I = W
T,n
0 . (B.35)
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(B.25) is replaced by
V TN = Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγW T,n0 ) , (B.36)
and (B.27) by:
V T,n0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V TN + δIγW T,n0 ) , (B.37)
while (B.8) and (B.28) still hold. Using (B.28) and (B.37) we can now write:
V T,n0 =
(1 + ρ)
(
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ +
b
(
1− δD)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
(
1− δI)V TN (B.38)
− b
(
1− δD) δIγ ((1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)) + bθ (1− γ−1) Π (n))
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ ,
which combined with (B.8) and (B.36) gives:
V TN =
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI)− b (1− δD) δIγΠ (n) (B.39)
+
δIγ
(
1− δD) ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI)− b (1− δD) δIγ
− δ
Iγ
(
1− δD) ((1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)) + bθ (1− γ−1) Π (n))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI)− b (1− δD) δIγ ,
which plugged back in (B.38) leads to:
V T,n0 =
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI)) ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI)− b (1− δD) δIγ
+
b
(
1− δD) (1− δI)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI)− b (1− δD) δIγΠ (n)
− b
(
1− δD) δIγ ((1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)) + bθ (1− γ−1) Π (n))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI)− b (1− δD) δIγ
Using these last expressions, we can rewrite (B.34) as (B.32) (which is necessary to get
the equilibrium in the first place).
Finally (A.13) gives V s1 = V
T
1 − V TN , (A.10) still holds, so using (A.11), (B.35) and
(B.39), we can express I exactly as in (B.33).
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Case 4. We now consider the case where a producer not in a good match would rather
look for a new supplier than stick to a non-cooperating good match in periods without
innovations, while in periods with innovation he tries out the innovator but the non-
cooperating good match represents a better alternative than trying out an outdated
supplier. Note that no matter what, the non-cooperating good match actually never
works with the producer, his value is then always null and it does not matter whether
the producer knows only one non-cooperating good match or more. The conditions to
be in that case can then be expressed as:
V TN < V
T,n
0 and W
T,n
0 < W
T
N . (B.40)
Bertrand competition implies that
V p,nI = W
T
N .
We then get
V TN = Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T,n0 + δIγW TN) , (B.41)
and
V T,n0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T,n0 + δIγW TN) , (B.42)
while (B.8) and (B.28) still hold.
Using (B.8), (B.41) and (B.42), we can write V T,n0 as:
V T,n0 =
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ) ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n))+ bδI (1− δD)Π (n)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ − b (1− δD) (1− δI) , (B.43)
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plugging this back in (B.41) and using (B.8), we get:
V TN
=
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ (1− γ−1)) (1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ − b (1− δD) (1− δI))Π (n)
(1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ) (1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ − b (1− δD) (1− δI))
=
−bδI (1− δD)2 (1− δI)Π (n)
(1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ) (1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ − b (1− δD) (1− δI))
+
(
1− δD) (1− δI)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (δIγ)− b (1− δD) (1− δI)
(
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
)
.
Now combining these two last expressions with (B.8) and (B.28) we can rewrite (B.40)
as:(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1))Π (n)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) (B.44)
< (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n)
<
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)− b (1− δD))Π (n)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
+
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI)− (1− δD) δIγ
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
(
(1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− (1− bθ) (1− γ−1) θΠ (n)) ,
note that this case requires that (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)) > (1− bθ) (1− γ−1) θΠ (n) .
Finally to express the incentive constraint, first note that (A.12) holds so combining
(A.11) and (B.43), we get:
V s1 =
b
((
1 + ρ− (1− δD) δIγ) (Π (x∗)− θΠ (n)) + (1− δD) δI (Π (y∗)− Π (n)))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (δIγ)− b (1− δD) (1− δI) ,
now, as (A.10) holds, we get:
I =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
 (1− δI) b(1+ρ−(1−δD)δIγ)(Π(x∗)−θΠ(n))+(1−δD)δI(Π(y∗)−Π(n))1+ρ−(1−δD)(δIγ)−b(1−δD)(1−δI)
+δIγ
(
1
γ
Π (y∗)− ((1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n))
)+
 .
Further, note that when a producer in a good match switches to the innovator, we
do get that staying with the good match supplier is indeed the second best option and
not switching to the non-cooperating good match, that is W p1 = W
T
1 − V sA > W TN .
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Case 5. We treated that case in Appendix A.1, except that we did not derive the
conditions to be in it. Case 5 occurs when V TN < V
T
0 and W
T
N < W
T
0 .
In a period without innovation, the joint value of a relationship with the non-
cooperating good match now obeys
V TN = Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T0 + δIγW T0 ) . (B.45)
Indeed, after one period, the producer will look for a new supplier in a period without
innovation, and in a period with innovation a new outdated supplier will be his second
best option (after the innovator). Similarly in a period with innovation, the joint value
of a relationship with a non-cooperating good match (necessarily outdated) is given by:
W TN =
1
γ
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T0 + δIγW T0 ) . (B.46)
Combining (B.45) and (B.46) with (6) and (A.15), we obtain that:
W T0 −W TN = V T0 − V TN −
(
(1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− (1− bθ) (1− γ−1)Π (n))
(B.47)
Therefore if (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)) > (1− bθ) (1− γ−1) Π (n), then W TN < W T0 is
the stricter constraint and otherwise V TN < V
T
0 is the stricter one.
Combining (B.45), (6) and (A.15), we further get:
V T0 − V TN (B.48)
=
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)) ((1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n))
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
−
(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1))Π (n)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
−
(1− b) (1− δD) δIγ [(1− bθ) (1− γ−1) Π (n)− (1− b)(Π (x∗)− 1
γ
Π (y∗)
)]
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
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Therefore V T0 > V
T
N is equivalent to
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) (B.49)
>
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) Π (n)
+
(1− b) (1− δD) δIγ [(1− bθ) (1− γ−1) Π (n)− (1− b)(Π (x∗)− 1
γ
Π (y∗)
)]
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
Combining (B.47) with (B.48), we obtain that W T0 > W
T
N is equivalent to:
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) (B.50)
>
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) Π (n)
+
(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI)− (1− δD) δIγ)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
× ((1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− (1− bθ) (1− γ−1)Π (n)) .
Recalling thatW TN < W
T
0 is the stricter constraint if and only if (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)) >
(1− bθ) (1− γ−1) Π (n), we can combine (B.49) and (B.50), to get that the equilibrium
is in case 5 if and only if:
(1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) (B.51)
>
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)− (1− δD) δI (γ − 1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) Π (n)
+
(1− b) (1− δD) δIγ
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
(
(1− bθ) (1− γ−1) θΠ (n)− (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)))+
+
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (b (1− δI)+ δIγ)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ)
(
(1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− (1− bθ) (1− γ−1) θΠ (n))+ .
Summary Overall conditions (B.10), (B.20), (B.32), (B.44) and (B.51) span all the
possibilities. Moreover, a producer who knows a non-cooperating good match and one
who does not always face the same incentive constraint, so that the profile of investment
levels played by a new supplier can indeed be the same no matter whether the producer
knows other good matches or not. The IC constraint of a good match supplier only
takes two forms depending on whether the supplier has access to the frontier technology
or not.
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B.1.2 Part 4
Therefore to prove the existence of the equilibrium, the last step is to show that there
always exists a solution to x∗ and y∗ such that IC constraint binds or the first best is
achieved. As argued in Appendix A.1, we simply need to show the IC constraints do
not bind for (x, y) just above n, and since n minimizes ϕ, it is enough to show that I is
positive at the first order in (x− n) and (y − n) when x and y are greater than n.
Note that as ((1− b) (Π (x)− γ−1Π (y))− (1− bθ) (1− γ−1) Π (n)) = − (1− θ) (1− γ−1) bΠ (n)+
O (x− n) +O (y − n), the only possible cases when x, y are close to n are 1, 2, 3 and 5.
We have already checked that I is positive for x and y just above n in case 5. In case 1,
we get
I = Π′ (n)
(1 + ρ)
((
1− δI) (x− n) + δI (y − n))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1 + δI (γ − 1)) + o (x− n) + o (y − n) ,
which is positive at first order in (x− n), (y − n) when x and y approach n by superior
values. In case 2, we get
I =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
 Π′ (n) (1−δI)(1+ρ−(1−δD)δIγ)(x−n)+(1−δD)δI(y−n)1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI+δIγ)
+δIγ
(
1
γ
Π (y)− ((1− b) Π (x) + bθΠ (n))
)+
 (B.52)
+ o (x− n) + o (y − n) ,
also positive at first order in (x− n), (y − n) when x and y approach n by superior
values. In case 3, we get
I
=
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ
(
1− δI) b (1− δD) δI (1− θ) Π (n)
1 + ρ− (1− δI) (1− δD)− (1− δD) bδIγ
+
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) δIγ δ
Iγ
(
1
γ
Π (y)− ((1− b) Π (x) + bθΠ (n))
)+
+O (x− n) +O (y − n) ,
which is positive at first order in (x− n), (y − n). Therefore, there always exist x∗ and
y∗ solutions to the problem above n. This achieves the proof.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Here we prove Proposition 7.
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Step 1: Incentive constraint
The incentive constraint must be of the following form. After a history of ht when
a good match supplier makes her investment decision she can invest n instead of the
prescribed z (ht), which would increase ex-post profits this period by ϕ (z (ht))Ak (ht),
where Ak (ht) is the technology of supplier and
ϕ (z) ≡ βR (n)− n− (βR (z)− z)
Denoting by I ∈ {0, 1} either no new innovation (I = 0) or a new innovation (I = 1)
we can express the incentive constraint as:
ϕ (z (ht))Ak (ht) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
× (B.53)
( (
1− δI)V s,k (ht ∪ {z (ht)} ∪ {I = 0}) + δIV s,k (ht ∪ {z (ht)} ∪ {I = 1})
− ((1− δI)V s,k (ht ∪ {n} ∪ {I = 0}) + δIV s,k (ht ∪ {n} ∪ {I = 1}))
)
,
where V s,k (h) denotes the value of the supplier after history h (The continuation value
after a deviation other than n could be different, but the producer has no reason not to
punish any deviation in the same way so we focus on the incentive not to play n).
Step 2: Producers in a good match do not switch suppliers in periods without
innovation
Let us consider the first time the producer meets a good match supplier. Then this
good match supplier has an advantage over any other supplier in the future except for
a possible innovator, as a consequence any payoff achievable with another supplier is
achievable with the good match supplier in periods without innovation. In order to
maximize the joint value of the producer and the supplier, the producer should then
stick to the supplier at least as long as no innovation occurs. Moreover if an innovation
occurs, and the equilibrium is such that the producer should not switch to the innovator,
the argument carries through. Note that the argument applies no matter whether the
first good match supplier happens to be outdated or not, moreover, because of condition
1, this must be true for any relationship not only the first time the producer starts a
relationship with a good match supplier.
Step 3 Bertrand competition
Condition 1 imposes that strategies once a producer has chosen a supplier are in-
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dependent of the ex-ante transfer that was made, so that the ex-ante transfer does not
affect the joint value of a relationship if the producer and the supplier end up working
together. As a consequence the supplier whom the producer ends up working with,
must offer an ex-ante transfer low enough that the value of the producer is the same as
it would have been if he had chosen another supplier. In return, the supplier with whom
the producer ends up being just indifferent to start working with or not must make an
ex-ante transfer sufficiently high that he is himself just indifferent between working with
the producer or not. A new supplier will then just break-even (as his value is zero if
the producer does not choose him); and, the value of a good match supplier when an
innovation occurs and for parameters such that the producer switches to the innovator,
V s,k (ht ∪ {z (ht)} ∪ {I = 1}) , is not zero because the producer may go back to the old
supplier after having tried the innovator.
Without condition 1 it is possible to build equilibria where the value of the producer
is strictly higher than the value he gets with his second best option by conditioning
normalized investment levels on the ex-ante transfer offered.
Step 4: The joint value of a producer and a supplier is the value on the path where
they never stop working together
This is obvious in the case where the producer does not switch to the innovator. In
the case where the producer does switch to the innovator, the take-it or leave-it offer
of the innovator implies that the value of the producer should be equal to the value of
the producer had he stayed with his old supplier, as specified by step 3. Now the old
supplier is willing to offer an ex-ante transfer that leaves the producer with the entire
joint value of a relationship with him had they stayed together minus what the supplier
still gets when the producer switches to the innovator. Therefore the joint value of the
producer and the old supplier is the joint value of the producer and the supplier on the
path where the producer and the supplier do not break-up their relationships when there
is an innovation. Note that on this path the argument of step 2 applies and the producer
and the supplier never break up.
Step 5: The value of the supplier is also determined by the value on the path where
the producer and the supplier never stop working together
Combining steps 3 and 4, the value of the supplier in periods without innovation is
simply given by the joint value of the producer and the supplier on the path where they
relationship never breaks down minus the value of the second best relationship that the
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producer can get. This reasoning extends to periods with innovations when the producer
does not switch. When the producer switches, the value of the supplier is given by the
rents he can capture in the future if the innovator turns out to be a bad match, so that
the producer comes back to the supplier, and by condition 2, we know that the strategies
must then be identical to the strategies if the producer had not switched. Therefore in
this case too, the value of the supplier is ultimately determined by the joint value of
the producer and the supplier in the future, on the path where they never stop working
together.
Step 6: Higher investment levels in the future increase the RHS of the IC constraint
Higher investment levels on the path where the relationship does not break down
then necessarily increases the joint value of the relationship of the producer and the
supplier (step 4), as a consequence, they also increase the value of the supplier and make
the IC constraint looser (step 5).
Note that condition 2 stipulates that if the producer switches and the innovator has
turned out to be a bad match, the behavior of the producer and the supplier is identical
to what they would have done had they stick together, so that the investment levels in
that case are in fact the investment levels in the path where the producer and the supplier
never break up. On the contrary, if the innovator turns out to be a good match, we know
from step 2 that the producer would then stay with the innovator. As a consequence,
the previous claim (the higher the investment on the path where the relationships does
not break, the looser the IC constraints in previous periods) implies that the higher the
investment in the relationship on the equilibrium path, the looser the IC constraints in
the previous period.55
Step 7: Investments are at first best or the IC constraint binds
From step 6, it is then direct that investment in a good match relationship should
be as high as possible (on the equilibrium path and on the path where the relationship
never breaks down), therefore either the first best must be achieved or the IC constraint
binds.
Step 8: Punishment strategies
To achieve the highest possible investment level, the RHS of the incentive constraint
must in return be the highest possible. Therefore, the value of the supplier in case a
55Without condition 2 this would not necessarily be the case, lower investment levels if the producer
switches to the innovator and comes back could reduce the incentive for the innovator to switch and
therefore increase the joint value of the relationship.
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deviation occurs must be as low as possible, this occurs if the supplier plays the Nash
level of investment n in any future interaction between the producer and the supplier.
The value of the supplier if no deviation occurs must be as high as possible.
Let us first consider the case of periods without innovation. Step 5 already ensures
that the suppliers gets the largest possible value out of the relationship, so that the
producer is just indifferent between staying in the current relationship or starting a new
one (from which he would capture the entire benefit).56 Now, to still ensure the highest
value for the supplier it is then necessary that the value the producer can get with his
second best option must be as low as possible. If the producer switches to a new supplier
who turns out to be a bad match, then the producer may be willing to come back to
the old supplier; as long as the first best is not achieved, the strategy of the old supplier
should then be never to cooperate in that case, as cooperation in the future increases
the value that the producer could capture by switching. If the producer switches to a
new supplier and this supplier turns out to be a good match, then condition 1 specifies
what the outcome is (and we come back to that case to discuss what the strategy of the
old supplier must be in step 9). If the producer switches to a good match with whom
a deviation has occurred, then the strategy of the old supplier should be such that -
on that path- the producer does not cooperate again with him (for the same reason).
In periods where innovation occurs, the same reasoning applies: Bertrand competition
ensures that the supplier already gets the largest possible value of the relationship if the
producer does not switch, while, otherwise, the value of the supplier is fixed according to
step 5; if the producer deviates to an old good match supplier with whom a deviation has
occurred, the strategy of the supplier must be such that he does not cooperate with the
producer again in the future (a producer will necessarily prefer to deviate by switching
to the innovator than a new outdated good match, so we don’t have to specify what
happens in that case); however condition 2 stipulates that if the producer switches to
the innovator and the innovator turns out to be a good match, the old supplier must
forgive the producer.
Step 9: Investment by good match suppliers when a deviation has occurred
Step 8 already specified that if a supplier deviates, his investment in the future must
be at the Nash level. It also specified the behavior of the supplier if the producer has
56One could then dispense with the assumption that normalized investment levels do not depend on
the ex-ante transfers if the first best is not reached: condition 3 would then ensures that the supplier
would capture the entire benefit of the relationship.
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deviated but only found bad matches. Now let us focus on the case where the producer
deviates and finds a new good match, we denote by k the previous supplier and by k′
the new supplier. Condition 1 stipulates that the outcome should be identical to the
outcome in the first interaction between the producer and a good match supplier. As
explained in step 8, the investment level in the relationship with supplier k′ is going to
directly depend on the outside option of the producer. A better outside option for the
producer implies a lower lower value for supplier k′, and therefore (unless the first best
is achieved), lower investment levels. When the producer met a good match supplier
for the first time, however, there was no other good match supplier that the producer
knew, so his outside option was a priori worse. To satisfy condition 1, we must then
ensure that the value of the producer once he has started a relationship with supplier k′
must be as low as possible if he is to switch to a different supplier. If switching to a new
match is better than resuming working with the old good match supplier, then what the
old good match supplier would do does not matter, however, if resuming working with
supplier k is the best option, the value of a relationship with the supplier k must be as
low as possible, which is achieved if supplier k plays the Nash level of investment in any
possible future interaction.57
Therefore, as soon as the producer switches suppliers58 (except if it is the innovator
and the innovator turns out to be a bad match), or the supplier under-invests, investment
in any future interaction between the producer and the supplier leads to the Nash level
of normalized investment.
Step 10: Excepted strategies of the other players are identical in all periods.
Condition 1 stipulates how new good match suppliers are expected to behave in the
future. Condition 4 stipulates that the investment level of bad matches is n, and we
derived that the investment level of good match suppliers with whom a deviation has
occurred must be at the Nash level n too. Moreover Bertrand competition determines
57Note that without condition 1, the value of the supplier k could be increased if when the producer
switches to the supplier k′, some cooperation were to arise if the producer comes back to the supplier
k in the future. This does not contradict condition 3 though, because condition 3 takes as given the
strategy of the producer once the producer has started working with a new good match supplier. Note
also that even if the old good match supplier keeps playing the Nash level in any future interaction there
is no guarantee that it is possible to satisfy condition 1, part 3 of the proof of Proposition 1 showed
that there is no contradiction though.
58Technically this needs to be true only if working again with a good match supplier with whom a
deviation has occurred is a better second option than starting over a relationship, for a producer who
is in a new good match relationship. Of course, in the other case, the strategy of the old good match
does not matter, so we can assume that he plays the Nash level without affecting the analysis.
83
the form of the ex-ante transfer that these suppliers are willing to offer: in periods
without innovation they should all break even, in periods with innovation the innovator
can capture the surplus from his innovation if the producer switches. Therefore when the
supplier makes his investment decision all periods are identical in term of the strategies
played by the other players, the only difference is that in periods where the supplier has
access only to an outdated technology he knows that he will get access to the frontier
technology in the next period.
Step 11: Investment levels are constant
The only thing that remains to be proved is that investment levels are the same in
good matches in all periods when the supplier has access to the frontier technology and
when the supplier has access only to an outdated technology, step 8 has already proved
that the situation was symmetric in all periods where the supplier has access to the
frontier technology and in all periods where he does not, so if a path of investment is
sustainable after one given history, it is also sustainable after any other history (provided
that the access to the frontier technology for the supplier is the same).
Let us then consider a history ht0 , where a producer and a good match supplier starts
working together for the first time. Let us denote by x (ht) and y (ht) the investment
levels in all histories ht belonging to the set of histories Ht0 of histories following ht0 on
the path where the relationship between the producer and the supplier never break-up
their relationship, where x (ht) is used for histories where the supplier has access to the
frontier technology and y (ht).for when he does not. The joint value of the producer and
a supplier at an history h˜t ∈ Ht0 is then simply the discounted sum of the expected
values of profits on the path following h˜t where the producer and the supplier never
break up their relationship, that is it a discounted sum of the Π (x (ht)) and Π (y (ht))
for ht following h˜t in Ht0 Therefore, there is a M1 such that if for all ht following h˜t in
Ht0 , |Π (x (ht))− Π (x̂)| < ν/M1 and [Π (y (ht))− Π (ŷ)] < ν/M1, then the joint value of
the relationship is within ν of what the joint value of the relationship would have been
if the investments levels where x̂ at all histories where the producer has access to the
frontier technology and ŷ in histories where he does not, and by symmetry between the
different periods, we can choose the same M1 for all histories ht ∈ Ht0 .
Now because of step 5, the value of the supplier (in all cases) is determined by the
joint value of the producer and the supplier on the history path where the relationship
does not break down, and, because of step 10 the strategies of the other players are the
same over time, therefore there exists a M2, such that if the joint value of the producer
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and the supplier is within v/M2 of the joint value of the producer and the supplier if
investment levels had been x̂ in periods where the supplier has the frontier technology
and ŷ in the other periods, the value of the supplier is within ν of the value of the
producer and the supplier if investment levels had followed the same alternative (and
this M2 can be the same for all histories ht ∈ Ht0). Finally because the RHS of the
IC constraint is just the discounted expectation of the value of the supplier in the next
period, there is therefore a M3 such that if the value of the supplier is (in both the
case with innovation and the case without innovation) within ν/M3 of the value of the
supplier if the investment levels were given by x̂ in periods where the supplier has the
frontier technology and ŷ otherwise, then the RHS of the IC constraint is within ν of
the RHS of the IC constraint under the alternative profile.
Let us define x = sup (x (ht) |ht ∈ Ht0) and y = sup (x (yt) |ht ∈ Ht0). Then, for any
ε > 0, there exists some η > 0 such that if x (ht) ∈ [x− η, x] and y (ht) ∈ [y − η, y],
for all histories ht ∈ Ht0 , the RHS of the IC constraint after any history ht ∈ Ht0 when
the profile of normalized investment is given by x
(
h˜t
)
y
(
h˜t
)
where h˜t are the histories
following ht in the set Ht0 , is weakly smaller than ε + the RHS of the IC constraint if
the profile of normalized investment was given by x− η, y− η (we just have to choose η
such that if x ∈ [x− η, x], and y ∈ [y − η, y], then |Π (x)− Π (x)| < ε/ (M1M2M3) and
|Π (y)− Π (y)| < ε/ (M1M2M3)). Let us then define ϕε ≡ ϕ− ε.
Moreover there exists a history h1t ∈ Ht0 , where x (h1t ) ∈ [x−min (η, ε) , x], so that
x (h1t ) must satisfy the IC constraint at history h
1
t , therefore it necessarily satisfies the IC
constraint if the normalized investment in the future were given bymax
(
x
(
h˜t
)
, x−min (η, ε)
)
and max
(
y
(
h˜t
)
, y −min (η, ε)
)
instead of the actual path x
(
h˜t
)
y
(
h˜t
)
where h˜t
are the histories following h1t in the set Ht0 . Note then that, by the definition of η,
x (h1t ) would satisfy the IC constraint if the incentive to deviate was given by ϕε instead
of ε and the profile of normalized investment levels was given by x − min (η, ε) and
y − min (η, ε) in any future histories. Similarly we can find a history h2t ∈ Ht0 , where
y (h2t ) ∈ [y −min (η, ε) , y], and the same property arises.
Now let us consider the profile of normalized investment where for all histories ht ∈
ht0 , we replace x (ht) bymax (x (ht) , x−min (η, ε)) and y (ht) bymax (y (ht) , y −min (η, ε)),
then this alternative profile necessarily leads to a strictly higher investment joint value
(as long as x (ht) is not always equal to x, and y (ht) is not always equal to y) and for
any history where the normalized investment level has not changed, the IC constraint re-
mains satisfied. Let us now consider a history h′t where the investment level has changed
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under the alternative profile and the supplier has access to the frontier technology, the
profile of future investment levels is within [x−min (η, ε) , x] and [y −min (η, ε) , y], and
we know that x (h1t ) (which is weakly larger than x − min (η, ε)) satisfies the IC con-
straint if the profile of future investment is given by x − min (η, ε) and y − min (η, ε)
and ϕ is replaced by ϕε, therefore the investment level x−min (η, ε) also satisfies the IC
constraint at history h′t under the alternative profile provided that ϕ is replaced by ϕε.
The same logic applies to periods where the supplier does not have access to the frontier
technology.
Thus, the alternative profile leads to a higher joint value and is sustainable up to
replacing ϕ by ϕε, letting ε goes to 0, we get that a profile with constant investment x, y
satisfies the IC constraint and yields a higher joint value. As a consequence, normalized
investment must take two values only one for when the supplier has access to the frontier
technology and one for when he has access to the outdated technology.
Furthermore the situation is symmetric whether during their first interaction the
supplier has access to the frontier technology or not, so if he does not, investment levels
are also determined by the same two constants. Finally, condition 1 stipulates that the
profile of investment levels needs to be the same in any new good match relationship.
Step 12 Summary
So far we have then shown that in a SPNE equilibrium satisfying conditions 1-4:
1. investment levels in all good matches are given by two constant x∗ and y∗, where
the former is undertaken when the supplier has access to the best technology and
the latter when he does not, as long as no deviation has occurred in the relationship
between the producer and the supplier;
2. investment levels are at the first best level if possible and otherwise the IC con-
straint binds;
3. producers stay with the same supplier until an innovation or a deviation occurs, if
an innovation occurs, the producer may or may not switch, but if he switches and
the innovator turned out to be a bad match, he goes back to his old supplier;
4. producers are just indifferent between choosing the supplier they are supposed to
work with on equilibrium path and choosing the“second best”supplier, the“second
best” supplier is just indifferent between being chosen and not being chosen by the
producer;
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5. if a supplier deviates once, investment is at the Nash level in any further interaction,
and - without loss of generality-59 if the producer deviates (by switching to another
supplier except if it is the innovator and the innovator turned out to be a bad
match) investment is also at the Nash level in any future interaction.
These conditions correspond to the strategies described in Proposition 1.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 8 and Remark 4
We seek to demonstrate that both x∗ and y∗ are (weakly) increasing in γ and the condi-
tions under which x∗ and y∗ are decreasing in δI . The proof of the rest of Proposition 8
follows along the same lines and is omitted. We prove the proposition in the same special
case as considered in the main text. The proof for the remaining cases is analogous and
is omitted. Trivially, the effect is zero when x and y are equal to the first best m. When
they are not, equations (10) and (11) deliver:60
ϕ(x)− f(x, y, γ) = 0, (B.54)
ϕ(y)− γf(x, y, γ) = 0, (B.55)
where
ϕ(x) = (βR(n)− n)− (βR(x)− x) ,
f(x, y, γ) =
(
1− δD) b (1− δI)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI)− b (1− δD) δIγ×(
Π(x)− θΠ(n)
+
b(1−δD)δI
1+ρ−b(1−δD)δIγ (Π(y)− θΠ(n))
)
.
We define g0(x, y, γ) ≡ ϕ(x) − f(x, y, γ) and g1(x, y, γ) ≡ ϕ(y) − γf(x, y, γ) and note
that g0,γ < 0 and g1,γ < 0, where a subscript denotes a partial derivative.
61 Then there
are three cases i) both x and y equal to m if g0(m,m) ≤ 0 and g1(m,m) ≤ 0, ii) y = m
and x < m as a solution to g0(x,m) = 0 if g1(x,m) ≤ 0 and iii) x and y are solutions to
g0(x, y) = 0 if g1(x, y) = 0.
59Stricto sensu, this is not necessary if a good match supplier with whom a deviation has occurred
does not count, in the sense that he represents a worse alternative than trying a new supplier.
60To be consistent we should use (x∗, y∗) as these are the equilibrium values. This omission will not
lead to confusion.
61In order to avoid cluttering the notation we will suppress the dependence of g0 and g1 on γ
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As ϕ(y) is convex and f(x, y) is concave in y (as Π(y) is concave in y) on y [n,m]
it follows that g1(x, y) is convex in y. Let us define y = h(x) such that h(x) = m if
g1(x,m) < 0 and otherwise g1(x, h(x)) = 0 (h(x) is single-valued as g1(x, h(x)) = 0 has
a unique solution from g1(x, n) < 0 and convexity of g1(x, y) in y). Note that h(x) is
trivially increasing in x. Further, define g˜(x) = g0(x, h(x)) such that either i) x = m
and g˜(m) ≤ 0 ii) x is a solution to g˜(x) = 0. Note that g˜(n) < 0 and that g˜(x) is convex
when h(x)(= y) is constant and equal to m.
We first seek to demonstrate that h(x)′′ < 0 (when not equal to m). Note first, that
by concavity of Π(x) it follows that g1,x < 0 and g1,xx > 0 and it has already been argued
that g1 is convex with g1,y > 0 and g1,yy > 0 (for y < m). Differentiate g1(x, h(x)) = 0
twice and get:
g1,xx + 2g1,xyh
′(x) + g1,yy (h′(x))
2
+ g1,yh
′′(x) = 0.
By inspection g1,xy = 0 and hence h
′′(x) < 0 when h(x) 6= m. Along the same lines and
using the properties of h(x) we can show that g˜(x) is increasing and strictly convex in
x(n,m). Hence, if g˜(m) ≤ 0 then x = m is optimal. As g˜(x) is decreasing in γ this
implies that x is decreasing in γ and so is y.
To study the impact of an increase in the innovation rate, δI , note that we can rewrite
f(x, y, γ) as: (
1− δD) b (1− δI)
[1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1 + δI(γ − 1))] (1 + ρ− b(1− δD)δIγ)× (B.56)(
(1 + ρ) (Π(x)− θΠ(n))
−δI(1− δD)b (γ (Π(x)− θΠ(n))− (Π(y)− θΠ(n)))
)
.
Below, we demonstrate thatγ (Π(x)− θΠ(n)) > Π(y) − Π(n). Under this condition, a
sufficient condition for the expression in equation (B.56) to be decreasing in δI (and
thereby for x and y to be decreasing in δI) is that γ < 1+ρ
b(1−δD)(2−δI) as written in the
proposition. All we need is therefore γ (Π(x)− θΠ(n)) > Π(y) − Π(n) which we now
demonstrate.
First, define a function κ(x) which is κ(x) = ϕ−1(γϕ(x)) if γϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(m) and
κ(x) = m otherwise. We then define the function:
λ(x) ≡ γ (Π(x)− θΠ(n))− (Π(κ(x))− θΠ(n)) . (B.57)
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Note that as κ(n) = n (as ϕ(n) = 0), λ(n) > 0, and
λ′(x) = γΠ′(x)− Π′(κ(x))κ′(x). (B.58)
Obviously, on parts where κ is constant λ will be increasing. Where κ is not constant,
κ′(x) = γϕ′(x)/ϕ′(κ′(x)). Using this in equation (B.58) returns:
λ′(x) = γΠ′(x) [1− Π′(κ(x))ϕ′(x)/ (Π′(x)ϕ′(κ′(x)))] .
With κ(x) ≥ x,Π(x) concave and ϕ(x) convex, we get that λ′(x) ≥ 0, hence for any
pair x[n,m], λ(x) > 0, in particular λ(x) > 0 for the equilibrium investment pair (x, y),
which completes the proof.
B.4 Proof of Propositions 3 and Remark 1
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which δNash > δcoop in each of the
three cases (γ ≤ γNash, γ ∈ (γNash, γcoop] and γ > γcoop). Then we combine them to
prove Propositions 3 and Remark 1.
First case: Assume γ < γNash
As part of Appendix B.3 we demonstrated that the function λ (x) defined in (B.57)
was increasing in x (note that this held regardless of whether after a deviation a producer
preferred a non-cooperating good match to a new supplier or not). This directly implies
that Π (x)− γ−1Π (κ (x)), where κ is defined as in Appendix B.3, is also increasing in x.
Therefore we must always have
(
1− γ−1)Π (n) < Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗) ≤ (1− γ−1)Π (m) .
This shows directly that ZNash−Zcoop in (20) is strictly negative, and that if γ ≤ γNash
then δNash < δcoop (which proves the first part of Part b)).
Third case: Assume γ > γcoop
Then using (23), we obtain that
ZNash > Zcoop ⇔ γ < 1
1− b (1− δD)
Π (y∗)− Π (n)
Π (x∗)− Π (n) . (B.59)
Since Π (y∗) ≥ Π (x∗), then γ < 1
1−b(1−δD) is a sufficient condition to achieve ZNash >
Zcoop. On the other hand, this equality must be violated for γ large enough (since
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Π (x∗) > Π (n)), proving the second part of Part b).
Second case: Assume γNash < γ ≤ γcoop
Then using the definition of ω and (21), we can rewrite:
ZNash − Zcoop =
1− b
1− (1− δD) b
[(
1− δD) (1− b+ bθ − γ−1)Π (n) + δD ((1− γ−1)Π (n)− (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)))] .
Hence we can rewrite that in this case:
ZNash > Zcoop ⇔ δD < 1− b+ bθ − γ
−1
Π(x∗)
Π(n)
− b+ bθ − γ−1 Π(y∗)
Π(n)
.
To derive this we used that since γ−1 < 1 − b + bθ, and Π(x∗)
Π(n)
− γ−1 Π(y∗)
Π(n)
> 1 − γ−1,
then both the numerator and the denominator are positive. We can also rewrite this
equivalence as
ZNash > Zcoop ⇔ γ−1
(
1− δDΠ (y
∗)
Π (n)
)
< 1− δDΠ (x
∗)
Π (n)
− b (1− θ) (1− δD) .
Hence we have that if 1 − δD Π(x∗)
Π(n)
− b (1− θ) (1− δD) > 0, then ZNash > Zcoop is
equivalent to:
γ >
1− δD Π(y∗)
Π(n)
1− δD Π(x∗)
Π(n)
− b (1− θ) (1− δD) . (B.60)
Proof of Part c).
Therefore we get that δcoop < δNash if γ > γcoop and γ < 1
1−b(1−δD) or if γ
Nash < γ ≤
γcoop and γ >
1−δD Π(y
∗)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(x∗)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) with 1 − δ
D Π(x
∗)
Π(n)
− b (1− θ) (1− δD) > 0. Assume
that δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
, this ensures that for any x∗, y∗ we have 1−δD Π(x∗)
Π(n)
−b (1− θ) (1− δD) >
0 and 1− δD Π(y∗)
Π(n)
> 0. Moreover we get that
1− δD Π(y∗)
Π(n)
1− δD Π(x∗)
Π(n)
− b (1− θ) (1− δD) <
1− δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1− δD Π(m)
Π(n)
− b (1− θ) (1− δD)
Hence γ >
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) is a stricter condition than γ >
1−δD Π(y
∗)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(x∗)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) .
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In addition we have:
1− δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1− δD Π(m)
Π(n)
− b (1− θ) (1− δD) =
1
1− b (1− θ) 1−δD
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
>
1
1− b (1− θ) = γ
Nash
since Π (m) > Π (n) .
Hence we have that δcoop < δNash if γ ∈
(
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) ,max
(
γcoop, 1
1−b(1−δD)
))
,
which implies that δcoop < δNash if γ ∈
(
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
−b(1−θ)(1−δD) ,
1
1−b(1−δD)
)
. This interval
is non-empty as long as δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
.
Proof of Remark 1
We now assume that we are in the first best, so that x∗ = y∗ = m and γcoop =(
1− b+ bθ Π(n)
Π(m)
)−1
, further we still have that δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
. Then we get that as long as
γ ∈ (γNash, γcoop), then δNash > δcoop if and only if γ > 1
1−b(1−θ) 1−δD
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
(using (B.60)).
Furthermore if γ > γcoop, then δNash > δcoop if and only if γ < 1
1−b(1−δD) (using (B.59)).
Further with δD < θ Π(n)
Π(m)
, we must have that 1
1−b(1−θ) 1−δD
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
< γcoop < 1
1−b(1−δD) , so
that we obtain:
δNash > δcoop ⇐⇒ 1
1− b (1− δD) 1−θ
1−δD Π(m)
Π(n)
< γ <
1
1− b (1− δD) .
B.5 Proof of Remark 2
Denote by Bt the number of producers who do not know a good match at the start of
period. We obtain the law of motion
Bt+1 =
(
1− δD) bBt + δDNt +Nt+1 −Nt.
Indeed, among the producers that were in the same situation in the last period, only
a fraction 1 − δD survived and of those a fraction b met a bad match. Moreover, the
new producers, namely those that correspond to new products plus those that replace
producers who died, also count as producers who do not know a good match at the
beginning of the period. The share of producers who do not know a good match then
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obeys:
ωt+1 = 1−
(
1− δD) (1− bωt)
1 + gN
,
so that its steady-state value is given by:
ω =
gN + δ
D
1 + gN − b (1− δD) .
Using this expression in (21), we get that for γ ∈ (γNash, γcoop) ,
ZNash − Zcoop = 1− b
1 + gN − b (1− δD)
(
1− δD) (1− b+ bθ − γ−1)Π (n)
+
gN + δ
D
1 + gN − b (1− δD) (1− b)
((
1− γ−1)Π (n)− (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))) .
Therefore if x∗ = y∗ = m, we have:
ZNash > Zcoop ⇐⇒(
1− δD) (1− b+ bθ − γ−1) Π (n)− (1− γ−1) δD (Π (m)− (Π (n))) > gN (1− γ−1) (Π (m)− Π (n)) .
This expressions clearly shows tat the higher is gN , the more difficult is it to get δ
Nash >
δcoop.
Similarly, if γ > γcoop, then using (15), (16), 17) and the new expression of ω, we
obtain:
ZNash − Zcoop =
1−b
1+gN−b(1−δD)
( (
γ−1Π (y∗)− (1− b (1− δD))Π (x∗))− (γ−1 − 1 + b (1− δD))Π (n)
− ((Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− (1− γ−1) Π (n)) gN
)
In the special case where x∗ = y∗ = m, this translates into
ZNash > Zcoop ⇐⇒ γ−1 − 1 + b
(
1− δD)− gN (1− γ−1) > 0,
so that in that case too, a higher growth rate gN makes it more difficult to get δ
Nash >
δcoop.
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B.6 Proof of Proposition 9
In this appendix we consider the case where the strategy of suppliers is to punish the
producer - by playing the Nash strategy - if we he switches to an innovator that turns
out to be a bad match. We derive expression (A.18) in the special case in which the
expected value of a new relationship is higher than remaining with a non-cooperating
good match, such that if the innovator turns out to be a bad match the producer will
seek out a new supplier rather than stick with the old one.
Compare to the situation in Appendix A.1, if the producer switches the old supplier
loses all its value, hence V sA = 0. The producer will now switch if and only if:
V T,gI > W
T
1 , (B.61)
that is the total value of a new relationship with the innovator is higher than the total
value of a relationship with the old supplier instead of (A.3). If the innovator turns out
to be a bad match, the producer will try another new supplier in the following period,
so the total value of the relationship with the innovator does not depend on whether the
producer already knew a good match or not:
V T,gI = V
T,b
I = V0.
Equation (A.4) is replaced by:
V T,gI = V
T
0 = (1− b) Π (x∗) + (1− b)
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 ) (B.62)
+ bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T0 + δIγW T0 ) .
Using that (5) still holds, we get:
V T,gI −W T1 = (1− b) Π (x∗)+bθΠ (n)−γ−1Π (y∗)−b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI) (V T1 − V T0 )+ δIγ (W T1 −W T0 )) .
We use (5), (B.62) and (A.15) and (A.11) which both still hold to obtain
(
1− δI) (V T1 − V T0 )+δIγ (W T1 −W T0 ) = b (1 + ρ) [(1− δI) (Π (x∗)− θΠ (n)) + δI (Π (y∗)− θΠ (n))]1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + γδI) .
(B.63)
Therefore, a producer in a good match will switch to the innovator if and only if (A.18)
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holds, which defines a γcoop2. Note, that equation (A.18) differs from equation (13) only
in the last term, it then follows that γcoop2 > γcon = γNash.
To show that the incentive to innovate is lower we need the fraction of the firms
that are in good matches. In all cases, a producer in a bad match switch. If γ < γcoop2
then only producers in bad matches in the cooperate equilibrium will switch, implying
that in steady state (weakly) more producers will be in good matches in the cooperative
equilibrium than in the contractible equilibrium. As the extra benefit for the innovator
from contractibility is higher for good matches than bad matches, it follows that the
incentive to innovate is higher in the contractible case, δcoop2 < δcon.
Now, consider the case where γ > γcoop2, such that good matches remain with the
same producer when innovation takes place. Use the fact that in the contractible case
a fraction ω˜c = δ
D
1−b(1−δD) of producers will not be in good relationships, whereas in the
noncontractible case a fraction ω˜nc =
δD+bδI(1−δD)
1−b(1−δD)(1−δI) will not be in a good relationship.
Inserting into the expressions for expected profits in the contractible and noncontractible
case, respectively:
(ω˜c (γ − 1) (1− b+ bθ) + (1− ω˜c) ((1− b+ bθ) γ − 1)) Π (m)
Cooperative case:
ω˜nc ((1− b) (γΠ (x∗)− Π (y∗)) + bθ (γ − 1) Π (n))
+ (1− ω˜nc) (γ (1− b) Π (x∗) + γbθΠ (n)− Π (y∗))
− (1− ω˜nc) γ
(
1− δD) b2 ((1− δI) (Π (x∗)− θΠ (n)) + δI (Π (y∗)− θΠ (n)))
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) ,
straightforward, but somewhat tedious algebra demonstrates that the condition
δcoop2
(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1 + δcoop2 (γ − 1))) < γ (1− b (1− δD)) is sufficient to ensure
that the incentive to innovate is lower: δcoop2 < δcon.
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B.7 Appendix: Proofs for section 4
B.7.1 Contractible and Nash cases
Here we show that the solution must satisfy δI0 = δ
I
1 and V
T
0 = V
T
1 . Taking the difference
between (23) and (25) and using (24) one obtains that:
V T1 − V T0 =
(1 + ρ)
(
ψ
(
δI0
)− ψ (δI1)+ (δI1 − δI0)ψ′ (δI1))
1 + ρ− (1− δI0) (1− δD)
.
Next taking the difference between (26) and (24), one gets:
ψ′
(
δI0
)− ψ′ (δI1) = (1− δD) (ψ (δI0)− ψ (δI1)+ (δI1 − δI0)ψ′ (δI1))1 + ρ− (1− δI0) (1− δD)
The LHS is increasing in δI0 (since ψ is convex). On the RHS, the denominator is positive
and increasing in δI0 , while the numerator is positive and decreasing in δ
I
0 (once again
thanks to the convexity of ψ), therefore the RHS is decreasing in δI0 . As a result this
equation has a unique solution: δI0 = δ
I
1 . In return, this ensures that V
T
0 = V
T
1 .
B.7.2 Cooperative case
Here, we describe the cooperative equilibrium in more details. To do so, we first spell
out the strategies followed by the different agents, then we derive the results written in
the main text, characterize the equilibrium level of cooperation and prove the existence
of the equilibrium.
Strategies The strategies are characterized as follows:
• An augmented supplier refers to a supplier who has access to a technology which
is higher than the fringe (if deviations have occurred there could be more than one
augmented supplier).
• An augmented supplier with whom no deviation ever occurred offers an ex-ante
transfer which allows her to capture the full surplus of the relationship over the
second best option for the producer (namely going with a new supplier or choosing
one with whom a deviation has occurred). If she is chosen by the producer, she
invests x∗.
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• Non-augmented suppliers with whom no deviation ever occurred, offers an ex-ante
transfer which make them break even. If they are chosen, they invest x∗ if there
is an innovation and n otherwise.
• An augmented supplier with whom a deviation occurred, offers an ex-ante transfer
that allows her to break even if either there are several suppliers in her situation,
or she cannot offer the highest value for their joint relationship. She offers an ex-
ante transfer that allows her to capture the surplus of a relationship with her over
starting a new relationship if the producer does not know any other augmented
supplier and if that surplus is positive. She invests n.
• A non-augmented supplier with whom a deviation occurred, offers an ex-ante trans-
fer that allows her to break even and invests n.
• A producer chooses the supplier that offers him the highest value. If several suppli-
ers offer the same value, he chooses one with whom the joint value is the highest.
• x∗ is the highest level of cooperation within (n,m] which does not violate the
incentive constraint of the supplier.
• The innovation rate is chosen so as to maximize the joint value of the relationship.
Proof of Proposition 4 We first need to prove that V T0 < V
T
1 . To show that, we
first use (27) to derive
V T0 =
(1 + ρ)
[(
1− δI0
)
Π (n) + δI0γΠ (x
∗)− ψ (δI0)]+ δI0γ (1− δD)V T1
1 + ρ− (1− δI0) (1− δD)
. (B.64)
Since x∗ > n, we obtain:
V T0 <
(1 + ρ)
[(
1− δI0 + δI0γ
)
Π (x∗)− ψ (δI0)]+ δI0γ (1− δD)V T1
1 + ρ− (1− δI0) (1− δD)
.
We denote the right hand side as f
(
δI0
)
. We then get that
V T0 < f
(
δI0
) ≤ max
δ
f (δ) .
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To find max
δ
f (δ), we take a first order condition and obtain that the solution δ˜ must
satisfy:
ψ′
(
δ˜
)(
1 + ρ−
(
1− δ˜
) (
1− δD))− (1− δD)ψ (δ˜)
=
(
(γ − 1) (ρ+ δD)− (1− δD))Π (x∗) + γ 1− δD
1 + ρ
V T1
(
ρ+ δD
)
.
Since the LHS is increasing in δ˜ and the RHS is independent of it, this uniquely defines
δ˜. Using (23) and (24) with z = x∗, we can check that δ˜ = δI1 satisfies the previous
equation. Then, using (23), one gets
V T0 < f
(
δI1
)
= V T1 .
Comparing (28) and (24) with z = m,n or x∗, it is then direct that δI,coop0 > δ
I,coop
1 and
that δI,coop0 > δ
I,Nash. Further, we get that if x∗ is close to n, δI,coop0 is close to δ
I,Nash
(and lower than δI,cont), and if x∗ is close to m, δI,coop0 > δ
I,cont.
The growth rate of the economy in the cooperative case depends on the share of
producers who know an augmented supplier and their average productivity. Nevertheless,
this growth rate must be larger in the cooperative case than in the Nash case (since the
innovation rate is larger whether the producer knows an innovator or not). Similarly, as
long as δI,coop0 < δ
I,cont (which is true if x∗ is close to n), growth is lower in the cooperative
than contractible case. If on the other hand δI,coop0 > δ
I,cont and δI,coop1 = δ
I,cont (which is
obtained if x∗ = m), then the innovation rate is weakly higher (and in some line strictly
higher) in the cooperative case than in the contractible one, leading to a higher growth
rate in the former.
Characterizing the equilibrium Here we first characterize the equilibrium and then
prove its existence. There are two possible cases, either after a deviation the producer
stays with an augmented supplier which has deviated, or he ignores that firm and looks
for a new supplier. Depending on whether the producer knows one or more deviating
firms, his behavior may be different, because he can capture a different value from a
relationship with such a non-cooperating good match. However, we demonstrate below
that the number of known non-cooperating good match suppliers in fact does not matter
for the producer’s decision.
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Case where the producer does not stick with a non-cooperating good
match. In this section, we consider the case where a producer does not stick with a
non-cooperating good match (regardless of the number of known non-cooperating good
match suppliers). We characterize the level of cooperation x∗, the condition under
which this scenario applies and demonstrate that if a producer does not stick with a
non-cooperating good match if he only knows one of them, then he will not do so if he
knows more than one of them either.
Characterizing x∗. Consider a producer and supplier on equilibrium path, then the
incentive compatibility constraint for the supplier is given by
ϕ (x) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(V s1 − V sN) , (B.65)
where V sN is the value the innovator would capture at the beginning of the following
period should a deviation occurs (so that the supplier would play the Nash level). Note
that no γ term appear here because the technology level at the time of investment in
x is the same as the technology level at the beginning of the following period. Since
we have assumed that the producer would not want to work with the supplier after the
deviation, we obtain V sN = 0, such that the incentive constraint is
ϕ (x) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
V s1 .
Following the innovator’s strategy, the value she captures from a relationship with
the producer corresponds to the surplus over the producer’s second best option. Namely
we have
V p1 = γ
−1V T,n0 and V
s
1 = V
T
1 − γ−1V T,n0 . (B.66)
Indeed, at the beginning of a period, the second best option of the producer is to look
for another supplier, whose technology is γ lower (recall that the V ’s are normalized by
the supplier’s technology here, which is why γ−1appears). Importantly, if the producer
where to switch to a new supplier, he would now be off-equilibrium path and knowing one
innovator-non-cooperating good match. The value from a relationship in that situation
V T0,n may differ from the value V
T
0 on equilibrium path.
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In fact, we can write the law of motion:
V T,n0 = −ψ
(
δI,n0
)
+
(
1− δI,n0
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n0
)
+ δI,n0 γ
(
Π (x∗n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n1
)
.
(B.67)
V T,n1 denotes the joint value of a relationship with an innovator (non non-cooperating
good match) when the producer knows an innovator-non-cooperating good match and
x∗n is the cooperation level in that case. If the new supplier fails to innovate, then
the producer’s situation does not change and by assumption he would then prefer to
stay away from the innovator-non-cooperating good match (who plays Nash); so that
the continuation value in that case is V T,n0 . If on the other hand, an innovation oc-
curs, the producer knows both an innovator-non non-cooperating good match and an
innovator-non-cooperating good match and the joint value of the relationship is V T,n1 .
δI,n0 maximizes the joint value V
T,n
0 (when deriving the law of motion for any V
T
X below,
the notation δIX denotes the equilibrium innovation rate, which must maximize V
T
X ).
To go further, we need to think about the IC constraint of an innovator when the
producer knows an innovator who deviated. This can be written as
ϕ (xn) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(V s,n1 − V s2N) , (B.68)
where the index n in V s,n1 indicates that the producer knows a non-cooperating good
match and in V s2N that he knows at least 2. When the producer knows at least 2 innovator
non-cooperating good match suppliers, Bertrand competition ensures that he captures
the whole value, hence, in all cases we will have that V s2N = 0. Further with Bertrand
competition, V s,n1 = V
T,n
1 − γ−1V T,2n0 , where V T,2n0 indicates the joint value of a new
relationship when the producer knows at least 2 non-cooperating good match suppliers
(indeed whether a producer knows two or more non-cooperating good match suppliers
does not matter since with Bertrand competition he would receive the same offers of
ex-ante transfers by the non-cooperating good match—namely, one which allows him to
capture the whole value). This ensures that V T,n1 and x
∗
n also apply when the producer
knows more than 1 non-cooperating good match.
Then, since we have assumed that regardless of the number of non-cooperating good
match suppliers the producer would rather keep looking for new suppliers, V T,2n0 must
obey the same law of motion as V T,n0 given by (B.67). This ensures that V
s,n
1 = V
s
1 so
that x∗n = x
∗. In return we then obtain V T,n0 = V
T
0 and δ
I,n
0 = δ
I
0 .
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Using (23) with z = x∗, we get that
V T1 =
(1 + ρ)
((
1− δI1 + δI1γ
)
Π (x∗)− ψ (δI1))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI1 + δI1γ)
, (B.69)
while using (27) we get (B.64). Combining this equation with (B.69), we obtain:
V s1 = V
T
1 − γ−1V T0
=
1 + ρ
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI0)
 (ρ+δD)((1−δI1+δI1γ)Π(x∗)−ψ(δI1))1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI1+δI1γ)
−γ−1 ((1− δI0)Π (n) + δI0γΠ (x∗)− ψ (δI0))

Therefore we have that the IC constraint can be written as
ϕ (x∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI0)
 (ρ+δD)((1−δI1+δI1γ)Π(x∗)−ψ(δI1))1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI1+δI1γ)
−γ−1 ((1− δI0)Π (n) + δI0γΠ (x∗)− ψ (δI0))
 .
(B.70)
x∗ = m if (B.70) holds in that case, or x∗ is such that (B.70) holds with equality
Condition under which the producer does not stay with the non-cooperating
good match. We have assumed that the innovator would rather try a new supplier than
stay with an innovator who has deviated. We need to check under which conditions,
this is an equilibrium. To do that, we derive the joint value of a producer who knows a
non-cooperating good match and decides to stay with her. This joint value obeys:
V TN = −ψ
(
δIN
)
+
(
1− δIN
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
γ−1V T0
)
+ δIN
(
γΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T0
)
.
(B.71)
If there is no innovation then in the following period, by assumption, the producer would
rather try a new supplier (with a lower technology). If innovation occurs, the producer
would rather try a new supplier as well (and the technology of that new supplier is the
same as today). Moreover the strategy of a non-cooperating good match is to invest the
Nash level n. The innovation rate must satisfy:
ψ′
(
δIN
)
= (γ − 1)
(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
γ−1V T0
)
.
Since x∗ > n and γV T1 − V T0 > (γ − 1) γ−1V T0 , then it must be that δI0 > δIN .
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Using (B.71) and (B.64), we find that
γ−1V T0 − V TN
=
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δIN + δINγ))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI0)
((
1− δI0
)
γ−1Π (n) + δI0Π (x
∗)− γ−1ψ (δI0)+ δI0 1− δD1 + ρ V T1
)
− ((1− δIN + δINγ)Π (n)− ψ (δIN)) .
Therefore the strategies described form an equilibrium if x∗ satisfies the IC constraint
(with equality unless x∗ = m) and the following condition is satisfied(
1− δI0
)
γ−1Π (n) + δI0Π (x
∗)− γ−1ψ (δI0)+ δI0 1−δD1+ρ V T1
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI0)
≥
(
1− δIN + δINγ
)
Π (n)− ψ (δIN)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δIN + δINγ)
.
(B.72)
Case where the producer would stay with a non-cooperating good match
if he knows at least 2 of them but not if he only knows one of them. Here, we
show that this case is impossible. Assume otherwise, then we still have γ−1V T,n0 > V
T
N
(a producer would rather try a new supplier than stick with a single non-cooperating
good match) but γ−1V T,2n0 < V
T
2N : a producer would rather work with an innovator-non-
cooperating good match than a new supplier when he knows at least two non-cooperating
good match suppliers. Then, the value of starting a relationship with a new supplier
for a producer who knows at least 2 innovator-non-cooperating good match suppliers,
V T,2n0 , obeys the following law of motion:
V T,2n0 = −ψ
(
δI,2n0
)
+
(
1− δI,2n0
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
γV T2N
)
+δI,2n0 γ
(
Π (x∗2n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,2n1
)
.
(B.73)
If there is no innovation, then in the following period, the producer should revert back
to choosing one of the two non-cooperating good match suppliers (by assumption). In
that case, he will capture the full joint value of the relationship (because the two non-
cooperating good match suppliers Bertrand compete). If there is an innovation, then
the producer will now be working with an augmented supplier, while simultaneously
knowing two innovator-non-cooperating good match suppliers. The level of cooperation
x∗2n could in principle be different from x
∗
n.
The IC constraint that determines x∗n is given by (B.68) with V
s,2n
N = 0 and V
s,n
1 =
V T,n1 −V T2N : indeed, should the producer not stick with an innovator who has not deviated
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he could either try a new supplier or go to the non-cooperating good match he knows,
but he would now know two non-cooperating good match suppliers. The latter is by
assumption the second best option here.
The IC constraint that determines x∗2n is:
ϕ (x∗2n) ≤
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
V s,2n1 − V s2N
)
.
We still have V s2N = 0 and V
s,2n
1 = V
T,2n
1 −V T2N as the second best option of the producer
is to go with a non-cooperating good match now that he knows at least two of them.
Hence we must have that x∗2n = x
∗
n, δ
I,2n
0 = δ
I,n
0 and V
T,2n
1 = V
T,n
1 . This allows us to
rewrite (B.73) as:
V T,2n0 = −ψ
(
δI,2n0
)
+
(
1− δI,2n0
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
γV T2N
)
+δI,2n0 γ
(
Π (x∗n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n1
)
.
(B.74)
The joint value of a relationship between a producer and an innovator-non-cooperating
good match when the producer only knows one such non-cooperating good match, still
obeys (B.71) but with V T,n0 instead of V
T
0 (as we cannot establish that they are the same
here), hence:
V TN = −ψ
(
δIN
)
+
(
1− δIN
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
γ−1V T,n0
)
+ δIN
(
γΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n0
)
.
(B.75)
Finally, the joint value of a relationship between a producer and an innovator-non-
cooperating good match, when the producer knows at least 2 such non-cooperating
good match suppliers is given by:
V T2N = −ψ
(
δI2N
)
+
(
1− δI2N
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T2N
)
+ δI2N
(
γΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n0
)
.
(B.76)
If no innovation occurs then the best option is by assumption to stick with a non-
cooperating good match. If innovation occurs though, the producer would now know only
1 innovator-non-cooperating good match (the one with whom he has just worked), indeed
the other non-cooperating good match suppliers will not have access to the frontier
technology. By assumption, in the following period, the producer should then try a
new supplier (whose technology predates the last innovation) instead of staying with the
single innovator-non-cooperating good match.
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From (B.67) and (B.74) and using that δI,2n0 maximizes V
T,2n
0 , we have
V T,2n0 − V T,n0 ≥
(
1− δI,n0
) 1− δD
1 + ρ
(
γV T2N − V T,n0
)
> 0, (B.77)
by assumption. Using that γ−1V T,n0 > V
T
N and that V
T
2N > γ
−1V T,2n0 , we get V
T
2N > V
T
N .
Moreover, using that δIN maximizes the RHS in (B.75), we get:
V TN ≥ −ψ
(
δI2N
)
+
(
1− δI2N
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
γ−1V T,n0
)
+ δI2N
(
γΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n0
)
.
(B.78)
Further using that γ−1V T,n0 > V
T
N , we obtain:
V TN > −ψ
(
δI2N
)
+
(
1− δI2N
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V TN
)
+ δI2N
(
γΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n0
)
.
(B.79)
Take the difference between (B.76) and (B.79) to get
V TN − V T2N > 0. (B.80)
This contradicts the result we obtained above, which shows that this case is impossible:
if a producer would rather look for a new supplier when he knows one innovator-non-
cooperating good match, he should also do so if he knows more than one innovator-non-
cooperating good match.
Case where the producer stays with the non-cooperating good match
In this section, we consider the case where a producer sticks with an innovator-non-
cooperating good match if he does not know a non-non-cooperating good match in-
novator. We assume that the producer does so regardless of the number of known
non-cooperating good match suppliers. As above, we first characterize the level of coop-
eration x∗ and the condition under which this scenario applies. Then we show that if a
producer prefers a non-cooperating good match to trying a new supplier who does not
have access to the latest technology when he knows one non-cooperating good match,
then he must also prefer doing so when he knows several non-cooperating good match
suppliers.
Characterizing the level of cooperation x∗.
Consider a producer who is matched with an innovator with whom no deviation
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ever occurred and further assume that the producer does not know any innovator-non-
cooperating good match (this corresponds to what happens after the first successful
innovation on equilibrium path). The IC constraint faced by the innovator still obeys
(B.65). V p1 and V
s
1 are still determined by (B.66) since the second best option of the
producer is to start a new relationship with a firm with an inferior technology but now
knowing one non-cooperating good match. The difference is that V sN 6= 0: by assumption
in case of a deviation the producer would rather stick with an innovator who has deviated
than try a new supplier with an inferior technology (the only outside option here). Hence
we obtain that
V sN = V
T
N − γ−1V T0,n and V pN = γ−1V T,n0 .
Therefore the IC constraint can be written as
ϕ (x∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(
V T1 − V TN
)
.
Note that V TN obeys (23) with z = n, and that the joint value of a relationship with a
non-cooperating good match when the producer knows at least 2 non-cooperating good
match suppliers (V T2N) also obeys the same law of motion (since the producer would
always prefer to stick with an innovator-non-cooperating good match rather than trying
a new supplier with an inferior technology). Hence we get V TN = V
T
2N = V
T,Nash
1 with
δIN = δ
I
2N = δ
I,Nash, so that
V TN =
(1 + ρ)
((
1− δIN + δINγ
)
Π (n)− ψ (δIN))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δIN + δINγ)
(B.81)
Further V T1 is still given by (B.69), combined with (B.81), we obtain that the level
of cooperation x∗ is characterized by the IC constraint:
ϕ (x∗) ≤ (1− δD)( (1− δI1 + δI1γ)Π (x∗)− ψ (δI1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI1 + δI1γ)
−
(
1− δIN + δINγ
)
Π (n)− ψ (δIN)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δIN + δINγ)
)
.
(B.82)
Therefore x∗ = m if (B.82) holds in that case and otherwise x∗ is such that (B.82) holds
with equality.
Condition under which the producer prefers an innovator-non-cooperating
good match to a new supplier.
We want to derive the conditions under which it is indeed the case that V TN > γ
−1V T,n0 .
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To do that, we first need to characterize V T,n0 . The incentive constraint faced by an
augmented supplier who is in a relationship with a producer that already knows a non-
cooperating good match is given by (B.68). Since the producer knows already one
innovator-non-cooperating good match, then V s2N = 0. Furthermore V
s,n
1 = V
T,n
1 − V TN ,
since the producer’s outside option next period is to start with one of the non-cooperating
good match (with whom he would capture the entire surplus), and as explained above
V T2N = V
T
N . Therefore, the IC constraint is still given by (B.82) with x
∗
n instead of x
∗,
which implies that V T,n1 = V
T
1 , δ
I,n
1 = δ
I
1 and x
∗
n = x
∗.
The value of a new relationship when a producer already knows exactly one innovator-
non-cooperating good match obeys the following law of motion:
V T,n0 = −ψ
(
δI,n0
)
+
(
1− δI,n0
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T,n0
)
+ δI,n0 γ
(
Π (x∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T1
)
.
(B.83)
Indeed, the continuation value of the producer if there is no innovation is V T,n0 only since
the non-cooperating good match would capture the surplus of the relationship; while,
following an innovation, the level of cooperation is given by x∗. We then directly obtain
that δI,n0 = δ
I
0 and that V
T,n
0 = V
T
0 .
Using (B.64) and (B.81), one gets
γ−1V T0 − V TN = (B.84)
(1 + ρ)
(((
1− δI0
)
γ−1Π (n) + δI0Π (x
∗)− γ−1ψ (δI0))+ δI0 1−δD1+ρ V T1
1 + ρ− (1− δI0) (1− δD)
−
(
1− δIN + δINγ
)
Π (n)− ψ (δIN)
1 + ρ− (1− δIN + δINγ) (1− δD)
)
To ensure that producers want to stick with the innovator-non-cooperating good match,
the RHS of this equation must be weakly negative. In other words, we obtain an equi-
librium provided that the weak opposite of (B.72) holds.
Ruling out the possibility for the producer not to stay with a non-cooperating
good match if he knows at least 2 of them. Furthermore, the value of starting a
relationship with a new supplier when the producer knows at least two innovator-non-
cooperating good match suppliers obeys the following law of motion:
V T,2n0 = −ψ
(
δI,2n0
)
+
(
1− δI,2n0
)(
Π (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
max
(
γV TN , V
T,2n
0
))
+δI,2n0 γ
(
Π (x∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
V T1
)
.
Indeed, if no innovation occurs the producer will then decide whether to try a supplier
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without the frontier technology or a non-cooperating good match. Since there are several
of each, the producer captures the whole value of the relationship. We either have
V TN > γ
−1V T,2n0 , that is a non-cooperating good match is preferred to a new supplier
with an outdated technology regardless of the number of non-cooperating good match
suppliers—which is what we have assumed; or V TN < γ
−1V T,2n0 . In that case though, V
T,2n
0
obeys the same law of motion as V T,n0 , namely (B.83), we then get V
T,2n
0 = V
T,n
0 < γV
T
N :
which is a contradiction. If the producer prefers a non-cooperating good match to a
relationship with a supplier with a non-frontier technology, he will do so regardless of
the number of non-cooperating good match suppliers (still we will have V T,2n0 6= V T,n0
and δI,2n0 6= δI,n0 ).
Existence We have derived necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
obtained with the strategies we described. It is direct to check that these are also
sufficient conditions. Therefore, the last thing to do is to ensure that there exists a x∗
such that all conditions are satisfied. That is we must show that either i) m satisfies
the IC constraint (B.70) together with (B.72) or m satisfies (B.82) together with the
opposite of (B.72); or ii) the IC constraint (B.70) binds and (B.72) holds or the IC
constraint (B.82) binds and the opposite of (B.72) holds.
To do that we first show that the IC constraint does not bind when x∗ is close to
n. For x∗ close to n, δI1 ≈ δI0 ≈ δI,Nash and we obtain that V T1 ≈ V T0 ≈ V T,Nash1 = V TN .
Therefore the opposite of (B.72) holds. Further for x∗ close to but above n, (B.82) holds
as (
1− δI1 + δI1γ
)
Π (x∗)− ψ (δI1)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI1 + δI1γ)
≥
(
1− δIN + δINγ
)
Π (x∗)− ψ (δIN)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δIN + δINγ)
>
(
1− δIN + δINγ
)
Π (n)− ψ (δIN)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δIN + δINγ)
.
The first inequality uses that δI1 maximizes
(1−δ+δγ)Π(x∗)−ψ(δ)
1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δ+δγ) and the second that Π (x)
is increasing over (n,m).
If there is a x∗ such that (B.82) binds while the opposite of (B.72) holds, then an
equilibrium exists. Otherwise, there must exist a x such that (B.72) holds with equality
at x (and holds strictly above x) with (B.82) not binding over [n, x]. Note that at x,
V TN = γ
−1V T0 , and as result (B.70) and (B.82) are identical. Therefore, by continuity
(B.70) still does not bind for x just above x. By continuity, an equilibrium exists: either
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the IC constraint never binds and the appropriate equilibrium condition at m ((B.72)
or its opposite) is satisfied, or the IC constraint binds and the appropriate equilibrium
condition holds.
B.8 Appendix: Combined model
B.8.1 Model description
The model combined the baseline model of general innovation of section 2 with the
relationship-specific innovation model of section 4. As in the latter model, the frontier
technology can now vary in each line. A general innovation pushes the frontier by a factor
γA in each line, but it is imitated after one period (so that all suppliers get access to
the frontier technology in that line at the beginning of the next period). A relationship
specific innovation pushes the frontier by a factor γB in the line in which it occurs.
The innovator is the only one with this technology until a further general or relationship
specific innovation, in which case the innovator gets access to the new frontier technology
and all other firms get access to the previous frontier technology. The two types of
innovations do not occur in the same period, instead a period is either one where general
innovation may happen (with probability ν) or one where relationship specific innovation
may happen (with probability 1−ν). For relationship specific innovation the innovation
cost is ψB
(
δB
)
Aj where ψ
B is a convex function of the innovation rate δB and Aj is
the pre-innovation frontier technology in line j. For general innovation, the innovation
cost is ψA
(
δA
)
A˜ where ψA is a convex function of the innovation rate δB and A˜ is the
average pre-innovation frontier technology in the economy. To ensure a steady-state,
we assume that the potential innovator cannot observe when the last general innovation
occurs.
As in the baseline model, there are good and bad matches. Cooperation is only
possible in good matches, moreover, we also assume that relationship-specific innovation
is impossible in bad matches.62 The nature of a match is revealed before relationship-
specific innovation or investment are undertaken but after a producer has decided to
start working with a supplier (so after a potential general innovation). If a relationship-
specific innovation occurs in a good match supplier, we will refer to the supplier as an
“augmented” good match until she is not the frontier supplier (by opposition we will
talk of a “regular” good match otherwise). As in the relationship-specific model, if a
62This is a simplifying assumption, without it the innovation rate would simply be lower in bad
matches and we would still obtain very similar results.
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producer dies, he is replaced by a new producer and for that line the technology level
(pre-innovation) is equal to the average technology level in the economy (pre-innovation).
Note that the baseline model is obtained in the specific case where ν = 1 and the
relationship-specific innovation only model is obtained for ν = 0 and b = 0.
We look at a cooperative equilibrium which has the same characteristics as that of
sections 2 and 4. In bad matches (or after a deviation occurred in the personal history
of the producer and the supplier), normalized investment level is n. Producers with a
good match supplier can be in four different scenarios: 1) the good match supplier has
access to the frontier technology and she is a “regular” good match; 2) the good match
supplier has access to a frontier technology and is an “augmented” good match; 3) in
a period where a general innovation occurred, the good match supplier does not have
access to the frontier technology and she is an “outdated” good match. In case 1), the
investment level in equilibrium is the same and denoted x∗1, in case 2) the investment
level is denoted x∗2 and in case 3) it is denoted y
∗. The baseline model made it clear
why we needed two different levels of investment depending on whether the supplier had
access to the frontier technology or not. In addition, the level of cooperation may differ
depending on whether a relationship-specific innovation was the most recent innovation
in the line or not, since the producer outside option is different. This was the case in
section 4 already: before the relationship-specific investment there was no cooperation
and afterwards some cooperation, the difference is that here because of the presence
of bad matches, some cooperation is possible right away; in line with that section we
assume that x∗1 ≤ x∗2. Finally, we denote δB1 the relationship-specific innovation rate in
periods where such innovations are possible in a “regular” good match, while δB2 denotes
the same rate for an “augmented” good match (in section 4 the corresponding notations
were δI0 and δ
I
1 , here we move the subscripts to 1 and 2 to have notations that mirror
those of the value functions).
We still assume that a supplier forgives a producer who tries out a general innovator
if that innovator turns out to be bad match. Finally, we consider parameters for which
off-equilibrium path the producer would rather try out a new supplier rather than staying
with a non-cooperating good match supplier playing the Nash level of investment (or
equivalently, we assume that a producer forgets the identity of previous good matches if
he starts working with one). Figure 3 summarizes the model by providing a timeline.
To use the same notations as in both sections 2 and 4, I normalize value functions by
the frontier technology just after a general innovation has occurred in general innovation
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1.
Final good produ-
cers die with pro-
bability δD and
a mass δD of new 
final good pro-
ducers are born.  
3.
Innovation occurs 
with probability δA
after innovator pays 
Ψ(δA ). Innovator has 
access to a technology 
γA>1 times more 
productive and all 
other suppliers get 
access to prev. 
frontier technology
4.
Each supplier makes 
a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer of an ex-ante 
transfer t to each producer. 
In the contractible case, 
she also commits to 
an amount of high quality 
input conditioned on the 
quality of the match.
5.
Each producer 
chooses  his sup-
plier and the 
transfer t from 
the supplier to the 
producer is paid. 
6.
The type of the 
match is revealed 
if the two parties 
are interacting for 
the first time (it is 
already known 
otherwise). 
7.
The supplier 
decides 
on how much 
high
quality input 
to pro-
vide in the 
noncom-
tractible case. 
8.
Revenues are sha-
red between the 
producer and the
supplier through 
ex post Nash bar-
gaining where the 
supplier has a 
weight of β . 
3. 
Each supplier makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it of-
fer of an ex-ante trans-
fer t to each producer.
5.
Within each good
match product line
the producer 
and supplier decide 
on the innovation 
rate δB (which is 
always 
contractible).
6.
With probability δB
an innovation occurs: 
the current supplier 
gets a technology γB  
times higher, and 
suppliers who were 
two steps below 
obtain the technology 
one step below. With 
probability 1- δB
productivity levels do 
not change
7. 
The supplier 
decides on 
how much 
high quality 
input to 
provide in the 
non-
contractible 
case
8. 
Revenues are 
split
through ex-post 
Nash Bargaining
2.
Nature chooses:
ν: General 
Innovation
(1- ν): 
Relationship
-specific 
innovation
ν
1-ν
4.
The type of the 
match is revealed 
if the two parties 
are interacting for 
the first time (it is 
already known 
otherwise). 
Figure 3: Timeline
periods but before a relationship-specific innovation has occurred in relationship-specific
innovation periods. I use the notations V , W with indexes 0, 1 or A and superscripts
s, p, T or g and b exactly as in the baseline model for periods where only general inno-
vation is possible. The superscript 2 is used to denote an augmented good match (while
1 is for a regular good match). I denote the value functions by U in periods where
relationship-specific innovations are possible. The superscripts s, p, T are used as before
and the indexes 0, 1 and 2 are used to denote a new match, a regular good match and
an augmented good match.
B.8.2 Value functions and equilibrium description
We derive the value functions to show that the cooperative equilibrium exists and even-
tually describe the innovation incentives.
Relationship-specific innovation period First consider a relationship-specific in-
novation period. Then the (normalized) joint value of a producer together with a new
supplier, UT0 , obeys:
UT0 = (1− b)UT1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
[
ν
((
1− δA)V T0 + δAγAW T0 )+ (1− ν)UT0 ] .
(B.85)
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With probability 1 − b, the new supplier is a good match (which cannot have been
augmented yet), leading to the joint value UT1 . With probability b, it is a bad match.
The flow of profits is then given by θΠ (n). In the next period, if the producer survives,
there are two cases. With probability 1− ν, the next period is also one of relationship-
specific innovations and the situation is the same as today (the producer value is then
the full joint value UT0 ). With probability ν, the next period is one of potential general
innovation leading to a producer value of V T0 , with probability 1 − δA, or γAW T0 , with
probability δA: if a general innovation does indeed occur the frontier moves by a factor
γA but the producer only captures the value of a relationship with his second-best option
available, namely starting a new relationship with an outdated good match.
Similarly the joint value of a relationship with a regular good match supplier obeys:
UT1 = −ψB
(
δB1
)
+
(
1− δB1
)(
Π (x∗1) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
[
ν
((
1− δA)V T1 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT1 ])
(B.86)
+ δB1 γ
B
(
Π (x∗2) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V T2 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT2 )) .
In the current period, the supplier invests ψB
(
δB1
)
(after having learned the nature of
the match). The innovation fails with probability 1− δB1 , in which case the investment
level will be x∗1. With probability δ
B
1 , the innovation succeeds, the frontier moves by a
factor γB, the investment level is x∗2 and the match becomes an augmented good match.
Note that if in the next period a general innovation does occur (which happens with
probability νδA), then the augmented good match supplier loses her advantage since she
ceases to be the frontier supplier for that line and the joint value is γBγAW T1 or γ
AW T1
depending on whether the relationship specific innovation occurs today or not.
The joint value of a relationship with an augmented good match obeys:
UT2 = −ψ
(
δB2
)
+
(
1− δB2 + δB2 γB
)(
Π (x∗2) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V T2 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT2 )) ,
(B.87)
if the innovation succeeds the frontier moves by a factor γB but nothing else changes.
Within a regular good match, the incentive compatibility constraint can be written
as:
ϕ (x∗1) ≤
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V s1 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s1) . (B.88)
In the next period, a supplier who cooperate captures U s1 if it is a period where relationship-
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specific innovation may occurs, while she captures V s1 in a general innovation period
without an actual general innovation and W s1 (with a higher technology level) in a pe-
riod where a general innovation did occur. Similarly in an augmented good match, the
incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
ϕ (x∗2) ≤
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V s2 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s2) . (B.89)
In equilibrium, the innovation rates δB1 and δ
B
2 maximize U
T
1 and U
T
2 so that the
following first order conditions must hold:
ψ′
(
δB1
)
= γB
(
Π (x∗2) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V T2 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT2 )) (B.90)
−
(
Π (x∗1) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V T1 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT1 )) .
ψ′
(
δB2
)
=
(
γB − 1)(Π (x∗2) + 1− δD1 + ρ (ν ((1− δA)V T2 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT2 )
)
.
(B.91)
General innovation period where innovation failed We turn to the case of a
general innovation period where innovation failed. Such a period is identical to the
previous case except that relationship specific innovations are ruled out. Yet since such
an innovation is undertaken before the relationship specific investment is undertaken,
its absence does not affect investment levels (conditional on the match being regular or
augmented at the time of the investment level). Therefore we get that the joint values
with a new supplier, a regular good match and an augmented good match obey (these
equations are the pendant to (B.85), (B.86) and (B.87) in the previous case):
V T0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
[
ν
((
1− δA)V T0 + δAγAW T0 )+ (1− ν)UT0 ] ;
(B.92)
V T1 = Π (x
∗
1) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V T1 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT1 ) ; (B.93)
V T2 = Π (x
∗
2) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V T2 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− ν)UT2 ) . (B.94)
Furthermore, the incentive compatibility constraints are still given by (B.88) and (B.89).
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Equilibrium properties: x∗2 ≥ x∗1 and δB2 ≤ δB1 We are here going to show that the
equilibrium can indeed feature x∗2 ≥ x∗1 and that we must have δB2 ≤ δB1 . To do that first
note that Bertrand competition implies:
U s1 = U
T
1 − UT0 and U s2 = UT2 −
1
γB
UT0 . (B.95)
V s1 = V
T
1 − V T0 and V s2 = V T2 −
1
γB
V T0 . (B.96)
Moreover, combining (B.86) with (B.93) and (B.87) with (B.94), we get:
UT1 = −ψ
(
δB1
)
+
(
1− δB1
)
V T1 + δ
B
1 γ
BV T2 , (B.97)
UT2 = −ψ
(
δB2
)
+
(
1− δB2 + δB2 γB
)
V T2 . (B.98)
Using (B.93) and (B.94), we can rewrite (B.90) and (B.91) as:
ψ′
(
δB1
)
= γBV T2 − V T1 and ψ′
(
δB2
)
=
(
γB − 1)V T2 . (B.99)
Using (B.93), (B.94) and (B.97), (B.98) and then (B.99), we can derive:
(
V T2 − V T1
)(
1− 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(
ν
(
1− δA)+ (1− ν) (1− δB1 ))) (B.100)
= Π (x∗2)− Π (x∗1) + (1− ν)
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ψ
(
δB1
)− ψ (δB2 )− (δB1 − δB2 )ψ′ (δB2 )) .
Since ψ is convex, ψ
(
δB1
) − ψ (δB2 ) − (δB1 − δB2 )ψ′ (δB2 ) ≥ 0, and since x∗2 ≥ x∗1, then
we get that V T2 ≥ V T1 . From (B.99), we then obtain that δB1 ≥ δB2 and the inequality is
strict unless x∗1 = x
∗
2.
Further, using (B.95) and (B.96), we get
ν
((
1− δA)V s2 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s2 − (ν ((1− δA)V s1 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s1)
= ν
(
1− δA)(V T2 − 1γB V T0
)
+ (1− ν)
(
UT2 −
1
γB
UT0
)
− [ν (1− δA) (V T1 − V T0 )+ (1− ν) (UT1 − UT0 )]
Then plug in (B.97), (B.98) and (B.99) to get:
ν
((
1− δA)V s2 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s2 − (ν ((1− δA)V s1 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s1)
=
(
ν
(
1− δA)+ (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (V T2 − V T1 )+ (1− ν) (ψ (δB1 )− ψ (δB2 )− (δB1 − δB2 )ψ′ (δB2 )) .
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As established before the last line is weakly positive as V T2 ≥ V T1 , this in return implies
that the IC constraint faced by suppliers in an augmented match is laxer than that
faced by suppliers in a regular good match, which justifies that the equilibrium features
xB2 ≥ xB1 (with equality if and only if xB1 = xB2 = m).
General innovation period when innovation succeeded Finally, we look at the
value functions in a general innovation period when innovation succeeded. The joint
value with a new outdated producer is given by:
W T0 = (1− b)W T1 + bθ
1
γA
Π (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
[
ν
((
1− δA)V T0 + δAγAW T0 )+ (1− ν)UT0 ] .
(B.101)
The logic is the same as in the baseline model except that the continuation value must
take into account that with probability 1−ν the following period is one where relationship
specific innovations are possible (so that n case of bad match this period, the continuation
value is UT0 ). The joint value with an outdated good match is then given by:
W T1 =
1
γA
Π (y∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
[
ν
((
1− δA)V T1 + δAγAW T1 )+ (1− v)UT1 ] . (B.102)
Note that there are no outdated augmented good matches, because the last relationship
specific innovation becomes freely available when the next general innovation becomes
available. Then, using (B.93), we get:
V T1 −W T1 = Π (x∗1)−
1
γA
Π (y∗) . (B.103)
The joint value of a relationship with the innovator when the producer does not know
a good match obeys:
V T,bI = V
T
0
as in the baseline model. Therefore we still have through Bertrand Competition, using
(B.92), (B.101) and (B.103) that:
V s,bI = V
T
0 −W T0 = (1− b)
(
Π (x∗1)−
1
γA
Π (y∗)
)
+ bθ
(
1− 1
γA
)
Π (n) . (B.104)
The joint value of a relationship with the innovator when the producer knows a good
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match is given by:
V T,gI = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V p1 + δAγAW p1 )+ (1− ν)Up1 ) .
(B.105)
The logic is the same as in the baseline model, if the innovator turns out to be a bad
match, then the producer can return to the previous good match supplier and earns V p1 ,
W p1 or U
p
1 depending on the situation (note that the next period the outdated producer
starts with the new frontier technology but cannot be an augmented good match).
As in the baseline model, the value of an outdated good match producer who is not
picked by the producer is still positive and given by:
V sA = b
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V s1 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s1) , (B.106)
so that we must have W s1 ≥ V sA and W p1 ≤ W T1 − V sA. The producer will then switch
suppliers whenever V T,gI > W
T
1 − V sA. Combining (B.102), (B.105) and (B.106), we get:
V s,gI =
(
(1− b) Π (x∗1) + bθΠ (n)−
1
γA
Π (y∗)
)+
, (B.107)
exactly as in the baseline model.
Further note that the incentive constraint in an outdated good match obeys:
1
γA
ϕ (y∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(
ν
((
1− δA)V s1 + δAγAW s1 )+ (1− ν)U s1) ,
so that y∗ ≥ x∗1 with equality if and only if the first best is achievable.
Recall that an innovator does not observe when the last general innovation took
place. The expected value of a general innovator, normalized by the pre-innovation
average technology (A˜t) in the economy is given by
Z = ωV s,bI
E
(
A˜jt|j ∈ b
)
A˜t
+ (1− ω)V s,gI
E
(
A˜jt|j ∈ b
)
A˜t
,
where A˜jt denotes the pre-innovation frontier technology in line j and j ∈ b means that
the producer j does not know a (cooperating) good match. When a producer does not
know a good match, then he cannot enjoy relationship specific innovations in his line.
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Therefore there exists a function λ
(
δB1 , δ
B
2 , δ
I
) ≥ 1 such that in expectation
E
(
A˜jt|j ∈ g
)
= λ
(
δB1 , δ
B
2 , δ
A
)
E
(
A˜jt|j ∈ b
)
,
and this function is increasing in δB1 ,δ
B
2 , since the more relationship specific innovation
occur, the more the average technology level of good match producers will pull ahead.
We can then rewrite
Z =
ω
ω + (1− ω)λ (δB1 , δB2 , δI)
V s,bI +
(1− ω)λ (δB1 , δB2 , δI)
ω + (1− ω)λ (δB1 , δB2 , δI)
V s,gI , (B.108)
and the innovation rate solves:
ψ′
(
δA
)
= γAZ. (B.109)
Relationship-specific innovation rate Here we rewrite the first order condition
(B.99) in function of profits only, which will be useful to prove Proposition 5. Use
(B.98) and (B.103) in (B.94) to get:
V T2 =
(1 + ρ) Π (x∗2) +
(
1− δD) (νδAγA (V T1 − (Π (x∗1)− 1γAΠ (y∗)))− (1− ν)ψ (δB2 ))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (ν (1− δA) + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
,
(B.110)
where we defined
ρ˜ ≡ ρ− (1− δD) ν (1− δA) ,
to simplify our expressions (1+ ρ˜ > 0 otherwise the value functions are not well defined).
Then use this equation together with (B.103) and (B.97) in (B.93) to get (after
rearranging terms):
V T1 (B.111)
=

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB)) ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB1 ))
− (1− δD) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + (δB2 − δB1 ) γB)) νδAγA (Π (x∗1)− 1γAΠ (y∗))
+
(
1− δD) (1− ν) δB1 γB ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗2)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 ))

[ (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
] .
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Combining this expression with (B.110), we get:
V T2 (B.112)
=

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗2)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 ))
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA [ ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB1 ))− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (Π (x∗1)− 1γAΠ (y∗))
] 
[ (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
] .
Combining this with (B.99), we get
ψ′
(
δB2
)
/
(
γB − 1) (B.113)
=

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗2)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 ))
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA [ ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB1 ))− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (Π (x∗1)− 1γAΠ (y∗))
] 
[ (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
]
B.8.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Nash case The Nash equilibrium obeys the same equation except that the investment
level is always n. Combining (B.99) and (B.100) implies that in the Nash equilibrium
δB,Nash1 = δ
B,Nash
2 = δ
B,Nash and V T,Nash1 = V
T,Nash
2 . Moreover, we get (using (B.113)
but replacing x∗1, x
∗
2 and y
∗ by n and δB1 , δ
B
2 by a single δ
B,Nash):
ψ′
(
δB,Nash
)
(γB − 1)
=
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) νδA,Nash (γA − 1))Π (n)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB,Nash)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (ν (1− δA,Nash + δA,NashγA) + (1− ν) (1− δB,Nash + δB,NashγB)) .
Establishing part b) We first establish part b) of the proposition. (B.99) implies
that:
ψ′
(
δB1
)
= ψ′
(
δB2
)
+ V T2 − V T1 .
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Using (B.100), we then get:
ψ′
(
δB1
)
=
[
ψ′
(
δB2
) (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 ))
+ (Π (x∗2)− Π (x∗1)) (1 + ρ) + (1− ν)
(
1− δD) (ψ (δB1 )− ψ (δB2 ))
]
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )
.
(B.114)
Because of the convexity of ψ, we have ψ
(
δB1
)− ψ (δB2 ) ≤ (δB1 − δB2 )ψ′ (δB1 ), using the
expression above we then get:
ψ
(
δB1
)− ψ (δB2 ) ≤ (δB1 − δB2 )ψ′ (δB2 )+ (1 + ρ) (δB1 − δB2 ) (Π (x∗2)− Π (x∗1))1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 ) . (B.115)
Rearrange (B.113) to obtain:
ψ′
(
δB2
)
γB − 1
( (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
)
=

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ) Π (x∗2)
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA [(1 + ρ) Π (x∗1)− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (Π (x∗1)− 1γAΠ (y∗))]
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )
− (1− δD) νδAγA (1− δD) (1− ν) (ψ (δB1 )− ψ (δB2 ))

Then use (B.115) and y∗ ≥ x∗1 to get:
ψ′
(
δB2
)
γB − 1
(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) ((1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (νδAγ + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))))
≥

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ) Π (x∗2)
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA [1 + ρ− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (1− 1γA)]Π (x∗1)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )
−νδAγA (1− δD)2 (1− ν) (1+ρ)(δB1 −δB2 )(Π(x∗2)−Π(x∗1))
1+ρ˜−(1−δD)(1−ν)(1−δB2 )
 .
Further reorder terms (and use that 1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 ) > 0) to obtain:
ψ′
(
δB2
) ((
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (νδAγ + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))))
≥ (γB − 1)
 (1 + ρ− (1− δD) νδA (γA − 1))Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )
+
(1+ρ˜−(1−δD)(νδAγA+(1−ν)(1−δB2 )))(1+ρ)(Π(x∗2)−Π(x∗1))
1+ρ˜−(1−δD)(1−ν)(1−δB2 )
 .
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Using that x∗2 ≥ x∗1 and that 1 + ρ˜−
(
1− δD) (νδAγA + (1− ν) (1− δB2 )) > 0 for value
functions to be defined, we get:
ψ′
(
δB2
) ≥ (γB − 1) [(1 + ρ− (1− δD) νδA (γA − 1))Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )]
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (ν (1− δA + δAγA) + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
.
Further, note that
∂
∂δA
[(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) νδA (γA − 1))Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )]
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (ν (1− δA + δAγ) + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
=
(
Π (x∗1)
(
ν + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))− (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )) (1− δD)2 ν (γA − 1)
[1 + ρ− (1− δD) (ν (1− δA + δAγA) + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))]2
> 0
under the assumption that ψ
(
δB2
)
<
(
ν/ (1− ν) + 1− δB2 + δB2 γB
)
. Therefore, if δA,coop ≥
δA,Nash, we get
ψ′
(
δB2
) ≥ (γB − 1) [(1 + ρ− (1− δD) νδA,Nash (γA − 1))Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )]
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (ν (1− δA,Nash + δA,NashγA) + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
.
Finally, x∗1 > n, therefore one gets:
ψ′
(
δB2
) (
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (ν (1− δA,Nash + δA,NashγA)+ (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB)))
− (γB − 1) [(1 + ρ− (1− δD) νδA,Nash (γA − 1))Π (n)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 )]
> 0.
Noting that the left-hand side is an increasing function of δB2 and that δ
B,Nash is the
solution to the left-hand side being equal to 0, we obtain
δB,coop1 ≥ δB,coop2 > δB,Nash.
Proof of Part a) Assume that δB,coop1 ≥ δB,coop2 > δB,Nash (otherwise we know for sure
that we must have δA,coop < δA,Nash per part b)). Then one gets that λ
(
δB,coop1 , δ
B,coop
2 , δ
A
)
>
λ
(
δB,Nash, δB,Nash, δA
)
, since V s,bI > V
s,g
I , this factor pushes towards relatively less gen-
eral innovation in the cooperative than in the Nash case. Other than that the expressions
for the incentive to innovate is the same as in the baseline model, therefore sufficient
conditions under which δA,coop < δA,Nash in the baseline model are still sufficient now
(but necessary conditions need not be so any more).
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B.8.4 Proof of Remark 3
Assume the same exogenous innovation rates in the Nash and the cooperative cases with
δB2 ≤ δB1 . Then one can use (B.113) and obtain:
ψ′
(
δB,coop2,0
)
γB − 1
=

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗2)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 ))
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA [ ((1 + ρ) Π (x∗1)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB1 ))− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (Π (x∗1)− 1γAΠ (y∗))
] 
[ (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
]
where ρ˜ is defined as above with the exogenous innovation rate δA, and similarly,
ψ′
(
δB,Nash2,0
)
γB − 1
=

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) ((1 + ρ) Π (n)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB2 ))
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA [ ((1 + ρ) Π (n)− (1− δD) (1− ν)ψ (δB1 ))− (1 + ρ− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ ν (1− δA)]) (1− 1γA)Π (n)
] 
[ (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
]
At the same time (B.104), (B.107), (B.108) and (B.109) give:
ψ′
(
δA,coop0
)
= γA
 (1−ω)λ(δ
B
1 ,δ
B
2 ,δ
A)
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δA)
(
(1− b) Π (x∗1) + bθΠ (n)− 1γAΠ (y∗)
)+
+ ω
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δI)
[
(1− b)
(
Π (x∗1)− Π(y
∗)
γA
)
+ bθ
(
1− 1
γA
)
Π (n)
]
 ,
ψ′
(
δA,Nash0
)
= γA
 (1−ω)λ(δ
B
1 ,δ
B
2 ,δ
A)
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δA)
(
1− b+ bθ − 1
γA
)+
+ ω
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δI)
(
1− 1
γA
)
[1− b+ bθ]
Π (n) .
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We then obtain(
δA,Nash0 /δ
B,Nash
2,0
δA,coop0 /δ
B,coop
2,0
)ψ−1
=
ψ′
(
δA,Nash0
)
/ψ′
(
δB,Nash2,0
)
ψ′
(
δA,coop0
)
/ψ′
(
δB,coop2,0
) = A
B
with
A ≡
(
(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δA)
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δA)
(
1− b+ bθ − 1
γA
)+
+ ω
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δI)
(
1− 1
γA
)
[1− b+ bθ]
)

(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δA)
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δA)
(
(1− b) + bθ Π(n)
Π(x∗1)
− 1
γA
Π(y∗)
Π(x∗1)
)+
+ ω
ω+(1−ω)λ(δB1 ,δB2 ,δI)
[
(1− b)
(
1− Π(y∗)
γAΠ(x∗1)
)
+ bθ
(
1− 1
γA
)
Π(n)
Π(x∗1)
]

;
and
B ≡

(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA])((1 + ρ)− (1− δD) (1− ν) ψ(δB2 )Π(n) )
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA

(
(1 + ρ) Π (n)− (1− δD) (1− ν) ψ(δB1 )
Π(n)
)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 )) (1− 1γA)



(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA])((1 + ρ) Π(x∗2)Π(x∗1) − (1− δD) (1− ν) ψ(δB2 )Π(x∗1)
)
+
(
1− δD) νδAγA

(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− ν) ψ(δB1 )
Π(x∗1)
)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB1 ))(1− 1γA Π(y∗)Π(x∗1)
)


.
Since Π(n)
Π(x∗1)
< 1 and Π(y
∗)
Π(x∗1)
≥ 1 then A > 1. In addition, Π(x
∗
2)
Π(x∗1)
≥ 1 and Π(y∗)
Π(x∗1)
≥ 1 plus
ψ(δB2 )
Π(x∗1)
<
ψ(δB2 )
Π(n)
and
ψ(δB1 )
Π(x∗1)
<
ψ(δB2 )
Π(n)
imply that B < 1, so that A/B > 1 and
δA,Nash0
δB,Nash2,0
>
δA,coop0
δB,coop2,0
.
If instead exogenous innovation is free, then the ψ terms disappear from B and we would
get B ≤ 1 so that we still have A/B > 1.
Using (B.99) together with (B.111) and (B.110)—these expressions are valid as they
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do not use (B.99) for δB1 —we obtain:
ψ′
(
δB,coop1,0
)
=

γB
(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [1− ν + νδAγA]) (1 + ρ) Π (x∗2)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [1− ν + νδAγA]) (γBψ (δB2 )− ψ (δB1 )) (1− δD) (1− ν)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (νγBδAγA + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))) (1 + ρ) Π (x∗1)
− (1− δD) (γB − 1) ((1− ν) δB2 + νδAγA)ψ (δB1 ) (1− δD) (1− ν)
− (γB − 1) (Π (x∗1)− 1γAΠ (y∗)) (1− δD) νδAγA (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 ))

[ (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
] ,
and similarly
ψ′
(
δB,Nash1,0
)
=
γB
(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [1− ν + νδAγA]) (1 + ρ) Π (n)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [1− ν + νδAγA]) (γBψ (δB2 )− ψ (δB1 )) (1− δD) (1− ν)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (νγBδAγA + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))) (1 + ρ) Π (n)
− (1− δD) (γB − 1) ((1− ν) δB2 + νδAγA)ψ (δB1 ) (1− δD) (1− ν)
− (γB − 1) (1− 1
γA
)
Π (n)
(
1− δD) νδAγA (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 ))[ (
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) (1− δB1 )+ νδAγA]) (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))
− (1− ν) δB1 γB
(
1− δD)2 νδAγA
] .
Therefore, we get:
(
δA,Nash0 /δ
B,Nash
1,0
δA,coop0 /δ
B,coop
1,0
)ψ−1
=
ψ′
(
δA,Nash0
)
/ψ′
(
δB,Nash1,0
)
ψ′
(
δA,coop0
)
/ψ′
(
δB,coop1,0
) = A
C
,
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with
C ≡
γB
(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [1− ν + νδAγA]) (1 + ρ)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (νγBδAγA + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))) (1 + ρ)
− (γB − 1) (1− 1
γA
) (
1− δD) νδAγA (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 ))
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) + νδAγA]) (γBψ(δB2 )−ψ(δB1 ))
Π(n)
(
1− δD) (1− ν)
− (1− δD) (γB − 1) ((1− ν) δB2 + νδAγA) ψ(δB1 )Π(n) (1− δD) (1− ν)
γB
(
1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [(1− ν) + νδAγA]) (1 + ρ) Π(x∗2)
Π(x∗1)
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (νγBδAγA + (1− ν) (1− δB2 + δB2 γB))) (1 + ρ)
− (γB − 1)(1− 1
γA
Π(y∗)
Π(x∗1)
)(
1− δD) νδAγA (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) (1− ν) (1− δB2 ))
− (1 + ρ˜− (1− δD) [1− ν + νδAγA]) γBψ(δB2 )−ψ(δB1 )
Π(x∗1)
(
1− δD) (1− ν)
− (1− δD) (γB − 1) ((1− ν) δB2 + νδAγA) ψ(δB1 )Π(x∗1) (1− δD) (1− ν)
.
Π(x∗2)
Π(x∗1)
≥ 1 and Π(y∗)
Π(x∗1)
≥ 1 both push towards C ≤ 1, we then get that C < 1 provided
that
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) [(1− ν) + ν (1− δA + δAγA)]) (γBψ (δB2 )− ψ (δB1 ))
+
(
1− δD) (γB − 1) ((1− ν) δB2 + νδAγA)ψ (δB1 )
> 0,
a sufficient condition is then that γBψ
(
δB2
) ≥ ψ (δB1 ). We then have
δA,Nash0
δB,Nash1,0
>
δA,coop0
δB,coop1,0
.
If innovation is free when exogenous then the ψ terms in C disappear and we directly
have C ≤ 1.
B.9 Slow diffusion of innovation
We consider a cooperative equilibrium where at the beginning of any relationship a good
match cooperates as much as possible whether at the frontier or not, while there is no
cooperation in bad matches. As explained in the text, the equilibrium is characterized
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by the levels of cooperation in frontier good matches (x∗) and in outdated good matches
(y∗). It is direct to derive the IC constraints (10) and (29).
On equilibrium path, a producer switches between suppliers (favoring those with the
frontier technology) until he finds a good match. Once he has found one, he optimally
decides between switching to an innovator (when innovation occurs) or staying with
the outdated good match supplier. If it is optimal to switch to the innovator and the
innovator turns out to be a good match, he stays in a relationship with that innovator.
If she turns out to be a bad match, then in the following period, the producer resumes
his relationship with his old supplier if that supplier obtained the frontier technology
and tries another frontier firm otherwise.
In this appendix, we first derive the condition under which a producer who knows
a good match switches to the innovator in the cooperative case. Then, we look at the
corresponding condition in the contractible or Nash cases. Afterward, we describe in
more details the IC constraints and check for the existence of the equilibrium. Finally
we derive the equations determining the innovation rates in the three cases.
B.9.1 Switching in the cooperative equilibrium
We focus on the cooperative equilibrium. As in the baseline model, Bertrand competition
ensures that
V s1 = V
T
1 − V T,b0 . (B.116)
V T1 is the joint value with a (cooperating) good match supplier. V
T,b
0 is the joint value
of starting a relationship with a frontier firm without the option to fall back on a co-
operating outdated good match, which we indicated through the superscript b. Making
this distinction is now helpful since a producer working with an outdated good match
supplier may try to start a new relationship with a frontier supplier (even in periods
without innovation), without necessarily being punished for doing so (as the outdated
supplier would forgive if the frontier supplier turns out to be a bad match). In this
case, the outside option of a producer working with a frontier supplier is to try another
frontier supplier, but his previous good match would not forgive him for doing so.
Consider now a cooperating outdated good match. If the producer were to try a
frontier firm, her expected value does not become 0 because she could get the producer
back in the following period if the frontier firm turns out to be a bad match. As before,
we denote by V sA, the expected value of an outdated good match when the producer
tries out a frontier firm. Bertrand competition ensures that the value of an outdated
123
good match W s1 must satisfy W
s
1 ≥ V sA. Following the same reasoning as in Appendix
A.1.1, we get that (A.2) holds. That is W p1 = V
p,g
I , where V
p,g
I is the value that a
producer obtains in a relationship with the innovator when the producer already knows
a cooperating outdated good match, and W p1 is the value the producer captures with an
outdated good match. This ensures that a producer (who knows a good match) switches
to the innovator if (A.3) holds that is V T,gI > W
T
1 − V sA, where V T,gI is the joint value
of a relationship with the innovator (when the producer knows a cooperating outdated
good match). As a result, we get that (as in the baseline model):
W s1 = V
s
A +
(
W T1 − V sA − V T,gI
)+
. (B.117)
Note that V T,gI is the same as V
T,g
0 , the joint value of starting a relationship with any
frontier firm in a period without innovation when the producer also knows a cooperating
outdated good match. Therefore in periods without innovation, a producer who knows a
good match switches to a frontier firm under the same circumstances (that is whenever
V T,gI = V
T,g
0 > W
T
1 −V sA). However, Bertrand competition ensures that V p,g0 = V T,g0 since
in periods without innovation there is more than one firm with the frontier technology,
so that, generally V p,g0 6= V T,gI .
We obtain the law of motion
V T,gI = V
T,g
0 = (1− b)V T1 +b
(
θΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI) (∆V p1 + (1−∆) max(V T,g0 ,W p1 ))+ δIγW p1 )) .
(B.118)
With probability 1 − b the match is good, and the value is given by V T1 . With
probability b the match is bad, generating profits θΠ (n) this period; in the following
period, there are three possibilities. i) No innovation occurred but the previous good
match got access to the frontier technology, then the producer resumes his previous
relationship and obtains V p1 . ii) No innovation occurred and the previous good match
did not inherit the technology, then the producer optimally decides between staying with
his previous good match or trying another frontier supplier; since there are now several
suppliers the producer would get the full value of a relationship with a frontier firm if
that is higher than W T1 − V sA; otherwise he stays with the outdated supplier and gets
W p1 = W
T
1 −
(
V sA +
(
W T1 − V sA − V T,gI
))
= V T,g0 in that case. iii) An innovation occurs,
in which case the producer can secure γW p1 (as the frontier has moved one step). We
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can then rewrite more simply:
V T,gI = V
T,g
0 = (1− b)V T1 +b
(
θΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI) (∆V p1 + (1−∆)V T,g0 )+ δIγW p1 )) .
(B.119)
The expected value of an outdated supplier when the producer tries a good match,
V sA, obeys the following law of motion:
V sA = b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)∆V s1 + ((1− δI) (1−∆) + δIγ)W s1 ) . (B.120)
With probability 1 − b, the producer met a good match and therefore the outdated
supplier turns into a non-cooperating good match and her value becomes 0. Otherwise,
she resumes her relationship with the producer in the following period and obtains V s1
if she imitates the frontier technology and no innovation occurred. If she does not get
access to the frontier technology (either because of a new innovation or because the
previous one did not diffuse), the supplier’s normalized value is W s1 .
Combining the two, we get that
V T,g0 + V
s
A (B.121)
= (1− b)V T1 + b
(
θΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)(∆V T1 + (1−∆)(V T,g0 + V sA + (W T1 − V sA − V T,g0 )+))+ δIγW T1 )) .
The joint value of a relationship with the frontier supplier is still given by (4), which
we reproduce here:
V T1 = Π (x
∗) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T1 + δIγW T1 ) . (B.122)
The joint value of a relationship with an outdated producer obeys the following law of
motion:
W T1 = γ
−1Π (y∗)+
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)(∆V T1 + (1−∆)(W T1 + (V T,g0 + V sA −W T1 )+))+ δIγW T1 ) .
(B.123)
The current flow of profits is given by γ−1Π (y∗) since the producer does not have access
to the frontier technology. In the following period, the relationship becomes a frontier
one if the supplier gets access to the frontier technology (which occurs with probability(
1− δI)∆). If the technology does not diffuse then the producer should try a frontier
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supplier if V T,g0 > W
T
1 −V sA, in that case he obtains V T,g0 (since there are several frontier
firms) and the supplier gets the expected value W s1 = V
s
A; on the other hand if V
T,g
0 <
W T1 −V sA, the producer stays with the outdated good match and they obtainW T1 together.
If another innovation occurs, then the innovator would be the only one with the frontier
technology and would obtain any surplus of a relationship with her, hence the joint value
of the producer and the (previous) supplier is W T1 .
Combine (B.121), (B.122) and (B.123) to obtain:
V T,g0 + V
s
A −W T1 (B.124)
= (1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n)− γ−1Π (y∗) + 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(
1− δI) (1−∆)×[
(1− b)V T1 + b
(
V T,g0 + V
s
A +
(
W T1 − V sA − V T,g0
)+)
−
(
W T1 +
(
V T,g0 + V
s
A −W T1
)+)]
.
Next, using (B.122) and (B.123), we get:
V T1 −W T1 = Π (x∗)−γ−1Π (y∗)+
1− δD
1 + ρ
(
1− δI) (1−∆)(V T1 −W T1 − (V T,g0 + V sA −W T1 )+) .
Hence
V T1 −W T1 =
(1 + ρ) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)−
(
1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)
(
V T,g0 + V
s
A −W T1
)+
.
(B.125)
Plugging this expression in (B.124), we get
V T,g0 + V
s
A −W T1
= (1− b) Π (x∗) + bθΠ (n)− γ−1Π (y∗)
+
(
1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆) (1− b)
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)
[(
Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− (V T,g0 + V sA −W T1 )+]
This implies that V T,g0 + V
s
A −W T1 > 0 if and only if (30) holds. Further(
V T,g0 + V
s
A −W T1
)+
= (B.126)
(
b
(
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)) (θΠ (n)− γ−1Π (y∗)) + (1 + ρ) (1− b) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗)))+
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆) .
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B.9.2 Switching in the contractible and Nash cases
In the contractible and Nash cases the same logic applies, since once a producer has found
two good matches he can only remember the last one. Therefore, as in the equilibrium
path described above, a producer would only return to the his last good match after
having tried out the frontier firm (which implies that whether the technology diffuses to
suppliers with whom he worked before does not matter). We can then directly copy the
previous equations but replacing all investment levels by m in the contractible case and
n in the Nash case. Therefore a producer switches if and only if (31) holds.
B.9.3 IC constraints in the cooperative case
To compare x∗ and y∗, we need to compare the right-hand side of (10) and (29). To do
that we first combine (B.117) and (B.120) to get
V sA =
b
(
1− δD)((1− δI)∆V s1 + ((1− δI) (1−∆) + δIγ) (W T1 − V sA − V T,gI )+)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) ((1− δI) (1−∆) + δIγ) ,
and
W s1 =
b
(
1− δD) (1− δI)∆V s1 + (1 + ρ)(W T1 − V sA − V T,gI )+
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) ((1− δI) (1−∆) + δIγ) . (B.127)
Define ICy ≡ γ
(
1− δI)∆V s1 + γ ((1− δI) (1−∆) + δIγ)W s1 and ICx ≡ (1− δI)V s1 +
δIγW s1 , then we can rewrite (10) and (29) as
ϕ (x∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
ICx and ϕ (y
∗) ≤ 1− δ
D
1 + ρ
ICy.
Then, using (B.127), we get:
ICy − ICx
=
1
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) ((1− δI) (1−∆) + δIγ) ((1 + ρ) (γ∆− 1) + b (1− δD) (1−∆) ((1− δI)+ δIγ)) (1− δI)V s1
+
((
1− δI) (1−∆) + δI (γ − 1)) γ (1 + ρ)(W T1 − V sA − V T,gI )+
 .
In equilibrium V s1 > 0, therefore a sufficient condition to ensure that ICy − ICx ≥ 0
is that (1 + ρ) (γ∆− 1) + b (1− δD) (1−∆) ((1− δI)+ δIγ) ≥ 0, which is satisfied for
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any δI as long as ∆ >
(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD)) / (γ (1 + ρ)− b (1− δD)).
To ensure that an equilibrium exists, we must check that the IC constraints are not
binding at n. This requires finding an expression for V s1 . To do that, first note that the
value of a relationship with a frontier firm for a supplier who does not know a cooperating
outdated good match, V T,b0 follows:
V T,b0 = (1− b)V T1 + bθΠ (n) +
1− δD
1 + ρ
b
((
1− δI)V T,b0 + δIγW T0 ) . (B.128)
With probability 1−b, the producer meets a good match. Otherwise, the situation is the
same in the next period if there has been no innovation, while if an innovation occurs,
the producer would try the innovator but would only capture his outside option, namely
starting a relationship with an outdated supplier (as there is only one frontier firm then,
V p,bI = W
T
0 ).
Similarly, the law of motion of W T0 is:
W T0 = (1− b)W T1 + bθγ−1Π (n) + b
1− δD
1 + ρ
((
1− δI)V T,b0 + δIγW T0 ) . (B.129)
With probability 1−b, the producer meets an outdated good match, generating the joint
value W T1 . Otherwise, the producer gets current profit θγ
−1Π (n) (with an outdated bad
match), and in the following period, he tries one of the frontier suppliers and capture the
full value if no innovation occurs, while he can only capture the value of a relationship
with a new outdated supplier if an innovation occurs.
Combining (B.128) and (B.129), we get
V T,b0 −W T0 = (1− b)
(
V T1 −W T1
)
+ bθ
(
1− γ−1)Π (n) . (B.130)
Further, combining (B.122), (B.129) and using (B.130), we get
V s1 = V
T
1 − V T,b0
= b
(
Π (x∗)− θΠ (n) + 1−δD
1+ρ
((
1− δI + δIγ)V s1 − bδIγ (V T1 −W T1 )+ δIbθ (γ − 1) Π (n))) .
Therefore, using (B.125), we get:
V s1 =
b (1 + ρ)
(1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)) (1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ))L (x
∗, y∗) ,
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with
L (x∗, y∗) ≡ (1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)− bδIγ (1− δD)) (Π (x∗)− θΠ (n))
+bδI
(
1− δD) (Π (y∗)− θΠ (n))
−bδIγ
(
1− δD)2
1 + ρ
(
1− δI) (1−∆)(θ (1− γ−1)Π (n) + (V T,g0 + V sA −W T1 )+)
Using (B.126), we get:
L (x∗, y∗)
≥ Π (x∗)− θΠ (n)− bδ
Iγ(1−δD)(Π(x∗)−γ−1Π(y∗))
1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI)(1−∆) +
bδIγ(1−δD)
1+ρ
θ (1− γ−1) Π (n) + bδIγ
1+ρ
×
(1−δD)2(1−δI)(1−∆)
1+ρ−b(1−δD)(1−δI)(1−∆)
[
b (θΠ (n)− γ−1Π (y∗)) + (1+ρ)(1−b)(Π(x
∗)−γ−1Π(y∗))
1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI)(1−∆)
]
Hence
L (n, n)
Π (n)
≥ (1− θ)
(
1− bδ
Iγ
(
1− δD)
1 + ρ
((
1− γ−1)+ b (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)
))
≥ (1− θ)
(
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI + δIγ) (1−∆)
1 + ρ− b (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆) +
bδI
(
1− δD)
1 + ρ
)
> 0
The last inequality is obtained because we must have ρ > δI (γ − 1) to ensure that utility
is finite. Therefore the IC constraints do not bind at x∗ = y∗ = n, which ensures that
there exist values such that x∗, y∗ ∈ (n,m] and either the IC constraints bind or the first
best is achieved without violating the constraints.
Our equilibrium assumes that in periods with an innovation, the best offer that a
producer receives comes from either the innovator or an outdated good match if he
knows one. Further, the outdated good match is not willing to offer the full value of
the relationship to the producer because even if the producer chooses the innovator, she
still secures a postie expected value from the relationship. Therefore, in principle, we
should check that the offer from a new outdated supplier cannot be better than that of
the current outdated good match supplier. First assume that the producer would rather
stay with her current supplier than switch to the innovator (W T1 − V sA > V T,g0 ), then
since the innovator dominates a new outdated supplier, it is clear that the good match
supplier’s offer is better than that of a new outdated supplier.
Let us then assume that W T1 − V sA < V T,g0 , we must then check that we have W T0 <
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W T1 − V sA. Combining (B.116), (B.120) with W s1 = V sA, (B.123), and (B.129), we get:
(
W T1 − V sA −W T0
)(
1− b1− δ
D
1 + ρ
δIγ
)
= bγ−1 (Π (y∗)− θΠ (n)) + b1− δ
D
1 + ρ
((
1− δI) (1−∆)(V T,g0 − V T,b0 )) .
Similarly using (B.118) and (B.128), we get:
(
V T,g0 − V T,b0
)(
1− b1− δ
D
1 + ρ
(
1− δI) (1−∆)) = b1− δD
1 + ρ
δIγ
(
W T1 − V sA −W T0
)
.
Therefore both V T,g0 > V
T,b
0 and W
T
1 − V sA −W T0 > 0, which ensures that the two best
options for a producer in a period with innovation are the innovator and a good match
outdated supplier if he knows one.
B.9.4 Endogenous innovation
Finally, we want to determine the innovation rates, which requires to find the reward
from innovation ZK (for K = cont, coop or Nash). ZK is still defined as ZK = ωV
s,b
I,K +
(1− ω)V s,gI,K , and we still have that the expected mass of producers who do not know a
good match supplier in steady-state is equal to ω = δD/
(
1− b (1− δD)).
In the cooperative case, we obtain V s,gI =
(
V T,gI −
(
W T1 − V sA
))+
which is given in
(B.126). For producers who do not know an outdated good match, an innovator captures
V s,bI = V
T,b
0 −W T,b0 , which using (B.130) and (B.125) is given by
V s,bI = (1− b)
(1 + ρ) (Π (x∗)− γ−1Π (y∗))− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)(V T,g0 + V sA −W T1 )+
1 + ρ− (1− δD) (1− δI) (1−∆)
+bθ
(
1− γ−1)Π (n) .
We then get that
Zcoop
=
Π (x∗)
1− b (1− δD)

δD(1−b)(1+ρ)
1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI)(1−∆)
(
1− γ−1 Π(y∗)
Π(x∗)
)
+ δDbθ (1− γ−1) Π(n)
Π(x∗)
+
(1−b)(1−δD)(1+ρ−(1−δI)(1−∆))
1+ρ−b(1−δD)(1−δI)(1−∆)
 b(θ Π(n)Π(x∗) − γ−1 Π(y∗)Π(x∗))
+ (1+ρ)(1−b)
1+ρ−(1−δD)(1−δI)(1−∆)
(
1− γ−1 Π(y∗)
Π(x∗)
) +
 .
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Therefore as in the baseline case Zcoop can be written as a function of Π (x
∗), Π(y
∗)
Π(x∗) and
Π(n)
Π(x∗) , which is increasing in Π (x
∗), decreasing in Π(y
∗)
Π(x∗) and increasing in
Π(n)
Π(x∗) . The same
expression applies in the contractible and Nash cases if one replaces Π (x∗) by Π (m) or
Π (n) respectively and the profit ratios by 1. For ψ sufficiently convex, we can compare
the innovation rates across the three cases by comparing the three ZK .
Therefore, if ∆ >
1+ρ−b(1−δD)
γ(1+ρ)−b(1−δD) , so that y
∗ ≥ x∗, we must have δcont > δcoop. More-
over, if relationships break in the Nash but not the cooperative case (so V T,g0 −V sA > W T1
holds in the Nash but not the cooperative cases), then δcoop < δNash for δD small enough
(as then Zcoop is proportional to δ
D but ZNash is not).
B.10 Proof of Proposition 10
As in the baseline model, the reward from cooperation for a good match supplier is
independent of his current productivity, as her next period productivity is independent
of the current one. Denoting IC, this reward from cooperation, we get that the incentive
constraints for a good match suppliers are
γ2ϕ (x2) ≤ IC, γϕ (x1) ≤ IC and ϕ (x0) ≤ IC.
The higher is current productivity, the larger is the incentive to deviate, so that we must
have x0 ≥ x1 ≥ x2.
Using (1), we can write welfare as
U =
1 + ρ
ρ
(
1 +
∫ 1
0
θjkAkW (x)
)
,
with W (x) ≡ σ
σ−1x
σ−1−x the normalized social surplus when the supplier’s normalized
investment is x. Note that on (n,m), W is increasing in x.
First part: We prove that when λ = 1, welfare is necessarily higher in the coopera-
tive case relative to the Nash case. In this case, producers face the same distribution of
productivities for the alternative supplier in the cooperative and Nash cases.
First, consider a producer who draws suppliers whose productivities are such that he
switches neither in the Nash nor in the cooperative case. Then, the social welfare from
that line is γiW (xi) with i ∈ {0, 1, 2} in the cooperative case and γiW (n) in the Nash
case, and we have γiW (xi) > γ
iW (n) since xi > n.
Then suppose draws such that the producer switches in both cases. Then the social
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welfare in the cooperative case is γi ((1− b)W (xi) + bθW (n)) versus γi (1− b+ bθ)W (n)
in the Nash case. Here as well, we have: γi ((1− b)W (xi) + bθW (n)) > γi (1− b+ bθ)W (n).
Finally, let us consider a situation where the producer switches in the cooperative
case but not in the Nash case (the reverse being impossible). For instance, assume that
the producer does not switch in the cooperative case when the previous good match’s
productivity is 1 and the alternative supplier’s productivity is γ. This requires that
γ ((1− b) Π (x1) + bθΠ (n)) < Π (x0). At the same time, the switch occurs in the Nash
case (γ > γNash). Note that:
((1− b) Π (x1) + bθΠ (n))W (x0)− ((1− b)W (x1) + bθW (n)) Π (x0)
=
(
(1− b)
[
x
−1
σ
1 − x
−1
σ
0
]
x1 + bθn
[
n
−1
σ − x
−1
σ
0
]) x0
σ − 1 > 0,
since n < x0 and x1 ≤ x0. As a result we must have ((1− b) Π (x1) + bθΠ (n)) /Π (x0) >
((1− b)W (x1) + bθW (n)) /W (x0). Hence we have that
W (x0) > γ ((1− b)W (x1) + bθW (n)) > γ (1− b+ bθ)W (n) .
Therefore in that case too, the social surplus is larger in the cooperative case than in the
Nash case. The same logic applies to the other cases with a switch in the cooperative
but not the Nash case.
We can then conclude that welfare is strictly higher in the cooperative than in the
Nash case.
Second part. For simplicity, we consider parameters such that x0 = x1 = x2 = m
(this occurs if b is high and ρ is low) and we focus on γ such that γNash = (1− b+ bθ)−1 <
γ < γcoop =
(
1− b+ bθ Π(n)
Π(m)
)−1
< γ2.
First let us look at the first round of producers in the Nash case. Since γ > γNash,
we get that the producer will pick the supplier with the highest productivity. Hence the
chosen supplier’s productivity is 1 only if both the original and the alternative suppliers’
productivities are 1, which only happens with probability 1/9. It is given by γ2 if either
supplier got a productivity γ2, which occurs with probability 1
3
+ 2
3
1
3
= 5
9
(either the
first supplier got γ2 or he did not but the second one did). Finally the chosen supplier’s
productivity is γ with probability 1− 1/9− 5/9 = 1/3.
Let us then consider the second round of producers:
• With probability 1
3
, the previous supplier’s productivity is γ2. Therefore that
supplier is chosen and the social surplus is given by γ2W (n).
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• With probability 1
3
, the previous supplier’s productivity is γ.
– Further, with probability 5
9
, the alternative supplier’s productivity is γ2. In
that case, the producer chooses the alternative supplier and the (expected)
social surplus is given by (1− b+ bθ) γ2W (n).
– Otherwise, the alternative supplier’s productivity is weakly lower. In that
case, the producer chooses the previous supplier and the social surplus is
given by γW (n).
• With probability 1
3
, the previous supplier’s productivity is 1.
– Then, with probability 5
9
, the alternative supplier’s productivity is γ2, so that
the social surplus is (1− b+ bθ) γ2W (n).
– With probability 1
3
, the alternative supplier’s productivity is γ, so that the
social surplus is (1− b+ bθ) γW (n).
– Finally with probability 1
9
, the alternative supplier’s productivity is 1, so that
the producer keeps his previous supplier, leading to a social surplus W (n).
Denote by L the set of lines for which the producer belongs to the second round. Then
the expected social surplus for these lines in the Nash case is given by:
E
(
WNashj |j ∈ L
)
=
W (n)
3
(
γ2
(
1 +
10
9
(1− b+ bθ)
)
+
(
4
9
+
1
3
(1− b+ bθ)
)
γ +
1
9
)
.
(B.131)
Let us similarly consider the cooperative case. Since γ < γcoop < γ2, switching occurs
only when the previous producer’s technology is 1 while the alternative supplier’s one
is γ2. This event occurs with probability 1/9. The chosen supplier’s productivity is 1
if the original supplier’s productivity is 1 and the alternative supplier did not draw γ2:
this happens with probability 1
3
(
1− 1
3
)
= 2
9
. The chosen supplier’s productivity is γ if
the original supplier’s productivity is γ (as then she is always picked), which happens
with probability 1
3
. Finally the chosen supplier’s productivity is γ2 with probability
1− 1
3
− 2
9
= 4
9
. Let us then consider the second round of producers:
• With probability 1
3
, the previous supplier’s productivity is γ2. Therefore that
supplier is chosen and the social surplus is given by γ2W (m).
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• With probability 1
3
, the previous supplier’s productivity is γ. Therefore that sup-
plier is chosen and the social surplus is given by γW (m).
• With probability 1
3
, the previous supplier’s productivity is 1.
– Then, with probability 4
9
, the alternative supplier’s productivity is γ2, so that
the social surplus is ((1− b)W (m) + bθW (n)) γ2.
– Otherwise, with probability 5
9
, the previous supplier is chosen and the social
surplus is W (m).
The expected social surplus for these lines in the cooperative case is given by:
E
(
W coopj |j ∈ L
)
=
1
3
(
γ2
(
W (m) +
4
9
(1− b)W (m) + bθW (n)
)
+ γW (m) +
5
9
W (m)
)
.
(B.132)
Take the difference between (B.132) and (B.131):
E
(
W coopj |j ∈ L
)− E (WNashj |j ∈ L)
=
W (m)
3
 ((1 + 49 (1− b)) γ2 + γ + 59) (1− W (n)W (m))− 19 (γ − 1) W (n)W (m)
− (2
3
γ + 1
3
)
[(1− b+ bθ) γ − 1] W (n)
W (m)
 .
Since (1− b+ bθ) γ − 1 > 0, this expression shows that for n sufficiently close to m
(which is obtained by increasing β), then E
(
W coopj |j ∈ L
)
< E
(
WNashj |j ∈ L
)
. When
λ is close to 0, then nearly all lines belong to L therefore we also have UNash > U coop.
C Appendix: Data and regression
In this appendix, we describe our data and run some additional regressions involving
other countries than the US and Japan.
C.1 Data
We use the patent data set of the OECD (OECD, 2015) which is built on data from
the European Patent Office (EPO). The data set records all patent applications to the
EPO. The year of a patent corresponds to the earliest year of application. Each patent
is associated to a country depending on the address of its inventors (if a patent is associ-
ated with inventors from several countries, we weight each patent x country combination
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according to the share of inventors from each country). We restrict attention to patents
granted by 2009 (from 2010, more than 10% of patent applications have been neither
granted nor rejected yet, in addition, few patents have had the time to receive citations,
which is problematic for the accuracy of our measure of generality). Furthermore we
consider only the patents that have never been withdrawn. The generality measure is
computed by the OECD and we use it directly (it is computing using citations made
by other EPO patents). We drop patents for which the measure is not computed (ei-
ther because the patents have not received any citations—indicating their low value—or
because of missing information).
To compute our “Rauch index,” we first use a PATSTAT file which attributes 2, 3
or 4 digit NACE Rev 2 codes (depending on the sector) to each patent. Some patents
might have multiple weighted associated NACE codes. Then, we use the liberal classifi-
cation from Rauch (1999) which labels each 4 digit SITC 2 code as either “goods traded
on organized exchange”, “reference priced” or “differentiated”. We attribute a “Rauch
index” 1 to goods which are labeled as differentiated, and give an index of 0 to the
other goods. We convert this into SITC 3 codes using the conversion table from http:
//econweb.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/rauch_classification.html. This is close to a one-
to-one conversion. We use a conversion table from SITC 3 to NACE Rev 1 from World In-
tegrated Trade Systems (http://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html)
to convert the SITC 3 to NACE Rev 1. If a NACE Rev 1 is associated with multi-
ple SITC 3 codes we take the average value of the SITC 3 codes. Finally, we con-
vert the NACE Rev 1 into NACE Rev 2 using a concordance table from Eurostat
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nace-rev2/correspondence_tables). Again,
if a NACE Rev 2 code corresponds to multiple NACE Rev 1 we use an unweighted
average. We use the two digit NACE Revision 2 in our analysis, which leaves 27 distinct
NACE categories with a Rauch index varying between 0.16 and 1. The Rauch index of
each sector is given in Table C.1a below.
Data on trust (used for the additional regression below) come from the World Value
Survey longitudinal data file 1981-2014. We focus on questions G007 33 which ask to
respondents whether they trust people they know personally and G007 34 which ask
them whether they trust people they meet for the first time. There are 4 levels of
trust and we linearly transform each variable so that they are in [0, 1] with a high value
corresponding to a high level of trust. These two questions where only asked from 2005
onward. For each country and wave, we average the answer given by individuals using
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the weights provided in the dataset (as recommended we censor weights below 0.33 and
above 3).63 For countries which are present in multiple waves, we further average across
waves. Then, we take the difference between the trust level towards people met for the
first time and trust towards people already known to define our “Dif Trust” variable:
a low level indicates a relatively higher trust towards known people which favors the
establishment of cooperation in long-term relationships. Since our trust measures are all
from 2005, we restrict attention to patents filed after 1995. Furthermore, we focus on
countries with more than 100 patents with generality data, though little depends on this
choice. Table C.1b reports the full list of countries with their differential trust measure.
C.2 Regression
We first run a regression analogous to that of table 2 but at the lowest level of disaggre-
gation available in the patent data (2 to 4 digit NACE level depending on the sector).
The results are in table C.2. There is little difference in the estimates.
We now report results on the larger set of countries which are consistent with our
theory that cooperation in an environmental of weak contractability should deter general
innovations. Direct evidence for whether countries are in the ‘cooperative’ or ‘Nash’
equilibrium is difficult to come by, we use the Dif Trust variable built above using World
Values Survey data. A high value corresponds to a high relative trust in strangers, which
reduces the scope for the establishment of cooperation in existing relationships. Japan
gets the fourth lowest score and France the lowest, whereas the United States is slightly
above the middle with South Africa receiving the highest score. Trusting that these
values are relatively constant, we include patents filed ten years before and until 2009.
We focus on countries with more than 100 patents with generality data, though little
depends on this choice. This leaves us with 318,197 patents and a total of 24 countries.
We then run the following regression:
geni,t,s,c = β0 + β1Diff Trustc ×Differentiateds + δc + δs + δt + i,t,s,c,
where geni,t,s,c is the generality of patent i, which was filed in year t, corresponds to
sector s and whose inventors were from country c, Differentiateds is the measure of
the importance of contractibility issues in sector s and δc, δs and δt are country, sector and
63For the United Kingdom we use the value corresponding to Great Britain (which excludes Northern
Ireland) and for Serbia we use results conducted for Serbia and Montenegro.
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NACE, 
rev. 2 Label
Degree of 
Differentiation
11 Beverages 0.16
12 Tobacco products 0.17
24 Basic metals 0.23
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 0.25
10 Food products 0.28
20 Chemicals and chemical products 0.50
17 Paper 0.55
21 Basic pharmaceutical products 0.61
22 Rubber and plastic products 0.78
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.78
27 Electrical equipment 0.78
16 Woods and similar 0.79
13 Textiles 0.84
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.85
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 0.88
25 Fabricated metal products 0.91
32 Other manufacturing 0.93
18 Print and repro of recorded media 0.94
43 Specialized construction activities 0.95
15 Leater and related products 0.95
30 Other transport equipment 0.97
31 Furniture 0.98
28 Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 0.99
14 Wearing apparel 1.00
62 Computer Programming, consultancy 1.00
(a) Extend of differentiation for NACE Rev.2
product categories (details in text)
Trust person 
you know
Trust person 
you just met Difference
France 0.87 0.44 -0.43
Russia 0.67 0.27 -0.40
Turkey 0.67 0.29 -0.38
Japan 0.65 0.28 -0.37
Great Britain 0.83 0.46 -0.37
Spain 0.75 0.39 -0.36
South Korea 0.65 0.30 -0.35
Singapore 0.73 0.38 -0.35
Netherlands 0.71 0.36 -0.35
China 0.65 0.30 -0.35
Germany 0.71 0.36 -0.34
Canada 0.81 0.47 -0.34
Australia 0.79 0.45 -0.34
USA 0.74 0.41 -0.33
Brazil 0.54 0.21 -0.33
Hungary 0.70 0.39 -0.31
Finland 0.80 0.49 -0.31
Norway 0.86 0.56 -0.31
Poland 0.65 0.35 -0.30
Switzerland 0.77 0.48 -0.29
Sweden 0.81 0.54 -0.28
Italy 0.57 0.31 -0.26
India 0.63 0.38 -0.26
South Africa 0.62 0.39 -0.24
(b) Trust measures for countries used in regres-
sion (details in text)
Table C.1: Country and Product category information used in the regressions
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(I) (II) (III)
Generality Generality Generality
US. 0.055∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.007
(13.47) (6.08) (1.36)
US x Differentiated 0.077 ∗
(1.79)
Fixed Effects No Year, NACE Year, NACE
Observations 337913 337913 337799
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. Std. errors clustered at NACE x country level for (III)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.2: Regression Results for 4 digit NACE
(I)
Generality
Trust x Differentiated 0.015∗
(1.84)
Fixed Effects NACE, Country, Year
Observations 318197
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses.
Column (I) uses 2 digit NACE (details in text)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05
Table C.3: Regression results for 24 countries
year fixed effects. shows this regression to be consistent with our predictions as a high
relative trust in strangers (i.e. a lower scope for cooperation in existing relationships)
is associated with relatively more general patents in more differentiated industries. The
result is no longer statistically significant if we employ the NACE code at 4 digits.
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